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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
THE EXAMINATION OF HAZING CASE LAW AS APPLIED BETWEEN 1980-2013  
 
 
 This study contributes to the knowledge and understanding of the application of 
hazing law and response of courts to case law where hazing has been alleged between the 
years of 1980-2013. This study expands upon the 2009 research conducted by Carroll, 
Connaughton, Spengler and Zhang, which used a content analysis methodology to look at 
anti-hazing case law as applied in cases where educational institutions were named as 
defendants, and the 2002 unpublished dissertation of Guynn which explored anti-hazing 
case law and its application in cases involving high school students. This study examines 
all court cases between 1980-2013 where a judicial opinion was written and an allegation 
of hazing or an injury resulting from hazing occurred. 
 
 This study uses content analysis methodology to identify, code and analyze cases 
and applies analogical reasoning to the case review to 1) examine the breadth of legal 
cases that occurred between 1980-2013, 2) identify the legal issues most likely to be 
created by an incident of hazing, and 3) apply predictive analysis for how those issues 
may impact individuals, organizations, and institutions. 
 
 The study identified that legal issues related to 1) tort liability and negligence, 2) 
allegations of violations of 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 3) hazing, 4) 
assault and battery, and 5) Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 were most 
commonly argued in courts of law following an incident of hazing. A discussion of each 
area of law and the parameters under which a court would make decisions in this area of 
law were provided for discussion. 
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Chapter 1  
Purpose of the Study 
 In 2011 student deaths at Cornell University and Florida A&M University 
represented the most tragic of outcomes that can occur from an incident of hazing 
(Associated Press, 2012; Crimesider, 2012; Kaminer, 2012; Mulvihill, 2011; Ng, 2012; 
Winerip, 2012). In the same year, high profile hazing incidents at Binghamton University 
in New York led to the university administration canceling spring pledging for 
fraternities, a report written by a former fraternity member who admitted to participating 
in grotesque hazing activities at Dartmouth University led to alumni and student pressure 
for the termination of the President of the institution, and an incident at Boston 
University left six young men kidnapped and tied up in the basement of a fraternity house 
(Cohen, 2012; Reitman, 2012). The deaths and injuries of these students, and the 
resulting criminal and civil legal cases, garnered attention from a wide array of national 
media outlets including CNN, CBS Morning News, and ESPN Outside the Lines. 
  These stories do not represent the full magnitude of harm and injury that occurs 
on a regular basis due to hazing incidents in high schools, colleges, military bases, sport 
teams, performing arts groups, and beyond. Research has shown that over 50% of 
students involved in at least one student organization on a college campus experiences 
hazing behaviors, and nearly 95% of incidents where students experience hazing go 
unreported to a university or other official (Allan & Madden, 2008). Typically, incidents 
of hazing only come to the attention of school and university officials when the activities 
result in traumatic injury or fatality (Drout & Corsoro, 2003). These two data points alone 
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underscore the fact that many hazing incidents do not result in physical injury and are left 
unknown to universities and other institutions.   
This does not mean that students who experience hazing do not experience injury, 
as often students report psychological injury or academic issues immediately following a 
hazing incident or later in life (Owen, Burke & Vichesky, 2008). Incidents of hazing exist 
today as a cultural and societal phenomenon that puts the wellbeing of young men and 
women at heightened risk in an educational environment (Allan & Madden, 2008; Finkel, 
2002).  
What is Hazing? 
  Hazing has links to cultural rites of passage and tests of manhood throughout the 
history of society and has links to academic pursuits that can be traced back to the times 
of Socrates and Plato (Kuzmich, 2000; Nuwer, 2004; Trota & Johnson 2004). Those who 
have a higher status within a group or organization (e.g., class, rank, age) use hazing as a 
tactic to bring potential new members into the same group. Hazing is often used as a 
formal introduction into an organization, marking the attainment of status for the 
potential new member (Carroll et al., 2009; Johnson & Holman, 2004; Lewis, 1991). In 
this way, hazing can take many forms as it “incorporates treatment such as the wearing of 
a beanie cap to the permanent disfigurement of the body” (Lewis, 1991, p. 125).  
Some participants in hazing consider the activities themselves to be ‘fun’ or 
‘exciting’ while others recognize the humiliating, dangerous, and potentially illegal 
aspects of hazing (Hoover & Pollard, 2000). Hazing activities can take on such innocuous 
forms as the practical joke played at a participant’s expense to the serious crime of 
assault, battery, or rape (Lewis, 1991; Solberg, 1998). This dichotomy of experiences 
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clouds the interpretation of hazing activities and the experiences of those participants in 
hazing, leaving each new experience to be either more dangerous or more enjoyable for 
the victim. Malszecki (2004) writes of his experience with hazing in the military:  
Hazing is presented as ‘games’ that educate the initiate into the grammar of 
violence by playing out ritualized roles of submission and success. In hazing, the 
confusing mix of play and violence, pain and encouragement, fear and joy, ordeal 
and acceptance, and the hyper-exaggerated sense of brutality fueled by the mental 
dis-orientation of alcohol abuse, works to prove that honorable loyalty to the 
group is the highest good. (p. 35)  
 
This struggle between positive and negative group experiences and loyalty to or hatred of 
the perpetrators of hazing leaves a vast expanse of interpretation and analysis of group 
behaviors and has led many legislatures to enact laws that cover every possible activity 
that may risk an individual’s mental or physical health, or the safety of those involved in 
hazing activities (Govan, 2001; Kuzmich, 2000; Pelletier, 2002). Additionally, the 
dichotomous nature of hazing has created an environment that makes defining hazing 
extremely difficult (Ellsworth, 2006; Hollmann, 2002). 
 This difficulty in defining hazing has created numerous hazing definitions across 
the United States, each one slightly tailored for the organization creating the definition 
(Acquaviva, 2007; Carroll et al., 2009; Pelletier, 2002). Some states created hazing 
definitions that cover the gamut of potential hazing activities, making activities that cause 
mental and physical harm illegal for their citizens; while other states have limited the 
extent of hazing law to only those activities that cause severe physical injury or death 
(stophazing.org, 2012). This struggle to define hazing legally at a state level has led to 
certain activities in one state being permissible, while the same activity would be illegal 
in another state (Sussberg, 2003).  
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Even more complicated in defining hazing is the difference between definitions at 
institutions of higher education that define certain activities as inappropriate, while the 
state definition may allow those same activities under the criminal codes. Examples also 
exist within states and within institutions of higher education where hazing may not be 
allowed for certain organizations, such as fraternities and sororities, but hazing may be 
allowed for athletic teams or military groups (Crow & Phillips, 2004). This confusion 
with the definition of hazing has been supported by numerous research studies which 
show that students who report having participated in an experience that meets the criteria 
for hazing at an institution, do not label their experience as hazing (Allan & Madden, 
2008; Campo, 2005; Ellsworth, 2006; Hoover & Pollard, 2000). This led Campo and 
colleagues (2005) to write:  
Students have a narrow definition of hazing, including only extreme forms like 
being tied up, beaten or raped. Additionally, there may be psychological barriers 
to students recognizing their own involvement (in hazing) such as dissonance 
caused by feelings of guilt or hypocrisy. (p. 146)  
 
This finding was supported by Allan and Madden (2012) where students only reported an 
activity as being hazing in its most extreme forms, and many students did not believe an 
activity constituted hazing if the activity had a productive purpose such as maintaining 
organizational traditions or group bonding activities, despite the dangerous nature or 
illegal aspects of the activity. Owen, Burke and Vichesky (2008) voiced the need for a 
uniform hazing definition when they wrote: 
Clarifying the definition of hazing could help reduce illegal acts, because 
individuals who discover their conduct is considered hazing may cease problem 
behaviors, and victims who are more fully aware of hazing laws may be more 
forthcoming in reporting incidents which they otherwise would not consider to be 
violations. (p. 45) 
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The call for a uniform definition has been made consistently throughout the literature 
(Acquaviva, 2007; Ellsworth, 2006; Hollmann, 2002; Sussberg, 2003). As of yet, no 
empirical study exists that supports a clear definition of hazing will result in reduced 
incidents or higher reporting. Still the confusion surrounding the definition creates a void 
between student experience and student understanding (Allan & Madden, 2012; Hoover 
& Pollard, 2000). 
Hazing is defined in this study as, those activities associated with membership or 
potential membership in an organization, group or team that appear unrelated to the 
purpose of the organization, group or team, by a reasonable observer. Hazing also 
includes activities that are related to the purpose of the organization, group or team, that 
are unnecessarily excessive in nature (Cimino, 2011; Ellis, 2012). This definition is 
derived from the writings of Cimino (2011) and diverges from the standard research 
definition developed by Hoover (1999) and considers the appropriateness of some 
activities that are related to a group’s purpose while also defining hazing activities that 
are unrelated to a group’s mission or purpose. 
Statement of the Problem 
Historically the practice and use of hazing has persisted as a means of initiating or 
inducting new members into an organization, team, or military unit. Today, the continued 
use of hazing as a process for membership induction continues to place individuals in 
harm’s way and has taken on a potentially dangerous and occasionally deadly tone 
(Finkel, 2002; Nuwer, 2004). To date, no official statistic regarding the number of hazing 
or hazing-like deaths exists or is currently kept by a governmental agency, yet historian 
and journalist Hank Nuwer has kept a log of all incidents of hazing that he has been able 
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to uncover through research; as of 2012, he lists 151 incidents of death related to hazing 
or hazing- like activities (Nuwer, 2012). A similar study conducted in 2008 reviewed 
news reports in English speaking countries and tracked 55 deaths related to hazing 
between the years of 1950 and 2007 (Srabstein, 2008). In the study, Srabstein reports that 
80% of hazing deaths occurred in the United States, and 87% of deaths related to hazing 
occurred with the victim in an age range between 18 and 24 years old. The stories of 
these students, the lives they led, and the tragedy of their deaths identify hazing as a 
significant risk for high school and college-aged students.  
The resulting injuries and deaths from instances of hazing over the past 150 years 
of American history have led 44 states to adopt anti-hazing laws. Many of these laws 
were written and enacted in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of the lobbying efforts of an 
organization called Committee to Halt Useless College Killings (C.H.U.C.K.) and other 
similar organizations (Acquaviva, 2007; Lewis, 1991; stophazing.org, 2012). These laws 
were enacted without the benefit of the first truly comprehensive research studies on 
student hazing conducted by Alfred University in 1999 and 2000, and the 2008 National 
Study on Student Hazing conducted by Maine University (Allan & Madden, 2008; 
Hoover & Pollard, 2000; stophazing.org, 2012). These seminal studies explored hazing in 
high schools and on college campuses and in all student organizations including 
fraternities and sororities and athletic teams.  
Among the 44 states with anti-hazing legislation, the definition of what 
constitutes hazing, the populations that can be held responsible for committing hazing, 
and the authority of the state in adjudicating hazing cases varies widely providing 
ambiguity across state lines for determining the criminal standard for hazing (Crow & 
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Phillips, 2004). The ambiguity around hazing is heightened when one considers the 
differences that exist in the definition of hazing as defined by institutions of education 
and learning, and the definition of hazing as applied in criminal and civil law. 
Additionally, the legal standard for an individual to be found guilty of hazing has been set 
extremely high, and few cases that go to trial result in a guilty verdict for hazing 
(Pelletier, 2002).  
Finally, in instances where extreme injury or death are the result of hazing, public 
outcry, state representatives, and members of the media often respond by calling for 
stricter legislation at the states level or for the creation of a National Hazing Law (Barr, 
2012; Cohen, 2012). The proponents of stricter legislation maintain the belief expressed 
by attorney Douglas Fierberg who specializes in representing the families of hazing 
victims against social fraternities that “the industry will not be made safer and ultimately 
fewer people will experience the traumatic injury and death that has come with 
fraternities (hazing) until change (in the law) is made” (Cohen, 2012 online). This outcry 
propagates a response to hazing focused on a specific incident or series of incidents, yet 
more recent public health and prevention research conducted by the United States 
Department of Education’s Higher Education Center for Alcohol, Drug Abuse and 
Violence Prevention has outlined a need for hazing to be explored as a public health 
concern and as a part of a larger cultural issue facing institutions of education (Langford, 
2008). This study will explore legal cases alleging hazing to discern if the pursuit of 
stricter laws and national anti-hazing legislation are worthwhile. 
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Negative Impact of Hazing 
 Drout and Corsoro (2003) identify that the public is most often only made aware 
of hazing incidents that end in extreme physical injury or fatality of a hazing victim; 
however, many of the negative effects of hazing cannot be seen by a visual scan of the 
many participants in hazing each year. It is in fact the psychological impact of hazing that 
has the most negative consequences for those who are participants in hazing (Villahba, 
2007). Hazing leaves mental scars upon its participants that may show up immediately, or 
may not present themselves for years later, leaving the victim to experience emotional 
pain including anger, fear, nightmares, and suicidal tendencies (Acquaviva, 2007; 
Edelman, 2005).  
Hoover (2001) found that “71% of students subjected to hazing reported negative 
consequences such as getting into fights, being injured, fighting with parents, doing 
poorly in school, hurting other people, having difficulty eating, sleeping or concentrating, 
or feeling angry, confused, embarrassed or guilty” (p. 1). This study was among the first 
to identify initial psychological injuries as a result of hazing and has led to future 
research exploring the long-term effects of hazing upon the individual. Campo and 
colleagues (2005) identified that students who experienced hazing struggled with a 
cognitive dissonance of making sense of the experiences forced upon them by their peers 
and revealed that some of those students went on to haze others as a way of ‘meaning 
making’ and rationalization of their own negative experiences. Edelman (2004) writes: 
According to psychologists, hazing perpetuates through a vicious cycle, which 
requires new members to behave subserviently. Older members demand 
subservience because they believe it will help them to restore their own dignity, 
which they themselves lost as victims of hazing incidents. Even though hazing 
perpetrators expect to feel schadenfreude (enjoyment derived from the misfortune 
of others), in the end, hazing harms all parties. Hazing victims suffer from 
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physical and emotional pain, witnesses are tortured by their fear of confronting 
hazers, and hazers themselves suffer from guilt associated with their wrongdoing. 
(p. 18) 
 
This description of hazing as an act that has negative consequences for all parties 
involved identifies one of the deeper issues related to hazing and a key reason why 
hazing has persisted through history into today’s educational environment.  
The psychological effects of experiencing hazing lead to the rationalization, 
acceptance, and future defense of the activity while also perpetuating the creation of 
future organizational hazers (Campo et al., 2005; Kimmel, 2008). Additionally, Allan & 
Madden (2012) identified that students who experience prolonged hazing tended to 
dismiss institutional and legal definitions of the activity and began to minimalize the 
potential harms that may result from experiencing hazing. Finkel (2002) goes so far as to 
recommend that physicians who interact with hazing victims should treat the patient as a 
victim of violent crime, not a willing participant in the activity that led to their injury, 
stating “prolonged hazing can lead to a feeling of hopelessness or to the idea that after so 
much harassment, it would be foolish to quit” (p. 231). These negative experiences can 
lead the victims of hazing to define themselves as the organization or group defines them. 
If the organization instills a belief in the individual that they are unworthy of respect, 
over time the individual begins to accept this belief; if the individual in turn receives 
positive reinforcement by completing hazing activities (in the form of illegal, harmful, or 
dangerous actions), the participant then becomes defined by the negative influences of 
hazing and seeks to pass these experiences on (Nuwer, 2004; Sweet, 2004). Thus, in 
addition to the potentially injurious and fatal side of hazing, hazing activities also have 
significant psychological impacts on generations of impressionable young adults. 
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Purpose of the Study 
 This study seeks to provide a thorough analyses of the total body of civil and 
criminal legal cases regarding hazing between the years of 1980-2013, and expand upon 
the 2009 research conducted by Carroll, Connaughton, Spengler and Zhang, which used a 
content analysis methodology to look at anti-hazing case law as applied in cases where 
educational institutions were named as defendants, and the 2002 unpublished dissertation 
of Guynn which explored anti-hazing case law and its application in cases involving high 
school students. Specifically, this study seeks to address these research questions:  
1. How have cases with allegations of hazing been applied by criminal and civil 
courts?  
2. How many cases alleging hazing as a precipitating factor have been heard in 
Federal or State District Courts (or higher) since 1980? 
3. What other legal issues have been brought before the court in cases alleging 
hazing as a precipitating factor? 
4. Is the creation of stricter anti-hazing laws an applicable response to incidents 
of hazing? 
5. In an incident of hazing, are other criminal acts more applicable than the anti-
hazing law itself? 
 
Significance of the Study 
The months following the incidents at Cornell University, Florida A&M 
University, Boston University, and Binghamton University in 2011-2012 brought 
increased media scrutiny around the criminal nature of hazing related injuries and deaths. 
State Representatives and Senators in Florida and New York immediately began drafting 
legislation to strengthen the anti-hazing laws of their states and to increase the penalties 
for those found guilty of committing criminal hazing (Barr, 2012). Similarly, legislators 
in the state of Georgia considered legislation in 2012 that would restrict state educational 
funding for students found guilty of hazing in the state, and the state of New Mexico 
became the 44th state to adopt anti-hazing legislation (Alexander, 2012; Turner, 2012).  
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As more states consider legislation creating stricter anti-hazing laws as a response 
to hazing injuries or deaths in their states, a study that analyzes the various state laws and 
criminal and civil cases where hazing was alleged would be useful to inform the basis for 
new legislation. One of the difficulties in tracking instances of hazing across the United 
States can be attributed to the lack of a clear definition of hazing by the law as 44 states 
have independently adopted laws and policies against the use of hazing in activities 
associated with organizations that are affiliated with educational institutions 
(stophazing.org, 2012). The full extent of these laws varies from state to state as some 
states have adopted laws which make the act of hazing a felony, while other states have 
adopted policies that outline rules against hazing for the public institutions of higher 
education in their state.  The states have adopted varying degrees of penalty for hazing as,  
Statutes differ from state to state in their definition of what constitutes hazing 
actions. The laws frequently differ in classification of crime and in the degree of 
severity associated with the criminal action. They also carry a diverse course of 
punitive and management action for perpetrators, and compensation and recourse 
for the victims. (Crow & Phillips, 2004, p. 20)  
 
The differences that exist from state to state regarding what behaviors organizations can 
or cannot engage in to bring new members into their ranks causes hazing law to be 
among the most difficult to prosecute in a criminal or civil court (Kuzmich, 2000; 
Pelletier, 2002).  
This study is significant as it seeks to inform legislatures about whether or not 
anti-hazing legislation is an effective response to incidents of hazing in their state, or if 
the time, energy, and resources of the state would be better used in developing alternative 
response strategies. Further, when one considers the initial hearings of the 2012 hazing 
trial involving the three men charged with and acquitted of the hazing of George 
12 
 
Desdunes, a study that identifies the various legal issues that surround an incident of 
hazing may assist prosecutors in determining if a charge of hazing is worth pursuing, or if 
the parties involved should be pursued under separate legal statutes such as negligence, 
assault, kidnapping. (Associated Press, 2012; Kaminer, 2012; Villalba, 2007). 
Finally, this study is significant as it provides a full analysis of the body of hazing 
case law across the 44 states that have adopted anti-hazing legislation, building upon 
previous studies that have focused solely on case law that involved institutions of higher 
education, or incidents of hazing that occurred in high schools. By focusing upon the full 
body of criminal and civil cases involving hazing, this study provides a complete picture 
of the challenges inherent in adjudicating cases involving hazing. 
Defining the Timeframe of the Study 
 The United States of America has seen waves of focus applied to legislating the 
issue of hazing in educational institutions including the passing of the first piece of 
legislation in the United States Congress in 1874 outlawing hazing in the Military 
Colleges (Kuzmich, 2000; Lewis, 1991). In 1901, the State of Illinois became the first 
state legislature to pass a statutory anti-hazing law, yet many states failed to see the need 
of such legislation for many decades (Lewis, 1991). Anti-hazing legislation saw its 
greatest period of growth in the 1980s and 1990s “due in large part to the efforts of the 
Committee to Halt Useless College Killings (C.H.U.C.K.) and similar organizations” 
(Acquaviva, 2007, p. 312). States during this period began to make efforts that would 
prohibit and/or criminalize hazing behaviors in response to an increase in hazing-related 
deaths at the college level (Carroll et al., 2009; Lewis, 1991). The laws created during 
this time varied dramatically, and still lack uniformity today (Crow & Rosner, 2002; 
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Lewis, 1991). This period of dramatic growth in legislation identified 1980 as the ideal 
date to begin the review of case law involving incidents of hazing. 
 The year 2013 marked a shift in the amount of attention popular media paid to the 
issue of hazing. The death of Robert Champion at Florida A&M University sparked the 
nation’s attention to the topic of hazing in a way that was rarely seen before (Associated 
Press, 2012; Crimesider, 2012; Kaminer, 2012; Mulvihill, 2011; Ng, 2012; Winerip, 
2012). The addition, availability, and growth of social media outlets during this time 
increased the amount of attention drawn to a death that (five years prior) may have been 
only a local news story (Biemiller, 2018). This new attention was likely to change the 
way state legislatures and in turn state courts would addres the issue of hazing and thus 
the end date of 2013 was chosen to bookend this study.  
Research Method 
This study builds upon the work and method used in the 2009 research study 
conducted by Carroll, Connaughton, Spengler, and Zhang, Case Law Analysis Regarding 
High School and Collegiate Liability for Hazing, which used a content analysis 
methodology to look at anti-hazing case law as applied in cases where educational 
institutions were named as defendants. The content analysis methodology of legal 
research is the process of, “collecting a set of documents, such as judicial opinions on a 
particular subject, and systematically reading them, recording consistent features of each 
and drawing inferences about their use and meaning” (Hall & Wright, 2008, p. 64).  
This method of analysis provides a reproducible and empirical study by focusing 
on the whole body of case law. Traditional legal scholarship and case analysis does not 
include an explanation of the full detail and structure of an empirical content analysis 
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(Hall & Wright, 2008). The content analysis method involved looking at a breadth of 
cases and applied equal value to each case. Traditional legal analysis that looks in depth 
at one influential case, or a group of influential cases, and provides commentary about all 
cases based only upon the small grouping (Hall & Wright, 2008). Content analysis in 
contrast, looks at a larger group of similar cases to identify patterns amongst the 
application of the law in those cases. Regarding criminal and civil cases involving anti-
hazing laws, a wide look at many cases is more likely to provide the analysis needed to 
make determinations on how legal standards have been applied across the 44 states that 
have adopted such laws. Using content analysis “aims for a scientific understanding of 
the law as found in judicial opinions and other legal texts” (Hall & Wright, 2008, p. 64) 
and allows the researcher to use a variety of methods to explain the cases in whole. 
 To address the research questions the study identifies all criminal and civil cases 
where hazing or hazing- like behaviors were alleged and tried in a court of law. 
LexisNexis was used as the main research database to collect the cases. LexisNexis exists 
as an online research tool, which contains a backlog of most legal decisions that have 
occurred in the multiple jurisdictions within the United States legal system (Berkum et 
al., 2006). LexisNexis also maintains a breadth of secondary source law reviews and 
journal articles within its database and provides the researcher the ability to perform a 
keyword search about a law and the ability to search the factual concepts that are 
involved in a case. By searching both the law and the facts within a case, applicable cases 
involving alleged hazing activities were pulled if they were relevant to the study but did 
not come up in a search for a law but may be similarly related (Kunz et al., 2004).  
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Legal reasoning by analogy or example was utilized as the method to analyze 
cases once they were identified. Legal reasoning by analogy is the process of comparing 
cases to one another utilizing the similarities between the two and is built off the work of 
Edward Levi (Sunstein, 1993). Levi’s approach to the interpretation of case law continues 
to be utilized as sound legal analysis.  
The basic pattern of legal reasoning is reasoning by example. It is reasoning case 
by case. It is a three-step process described by the doctrine of precedent in which 
a proposition descriptive of the first case is made into a rule of law, then applied 
to a next similar situation. (Levi, 1948, p. 501)  
 
A comparison of case law across states utilizing legal reasoning by analogy provides a 
full picture of the treatment of hazing cases despite the differences in the state laws. 
Summary 
 The act of hazing has been present on college campuses for centuries. Numerous 
men and women have been physically or mentally injured because of experiencing 
hazing, yet incidents persist (Nuwer, 2004; Srabstein, 2008). State and federal 
legislatures have attempted to regulate the behavior by creating laws (dating back to 1901 
in the United States) and policies (dating back to 1874 in the United States) against the 
practice of hazing (stophazing.org, 2012). This study seeks to determine how criminal 
and civil courts have applied hazing laws and if anti-hazing laws have been written to 
accurately define the practice of hazing, or if the act of hazing is better legislated by other 
criminal acts (such as negligence, kidnapping, assault). The next chapter will provide a 
brief historical overview of hazing in academia and in the United States, an in-depth 
analysis of the literature surrounding the definition of hazing, and a synopsis of legal 
reviews and critiques of existing hazing law. 
Copyright © Christopher Keith Ellis 2018 
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Chapter 2 
Review of the Literature 
 This chapter provides a review of the literature relevant to the topic of hazing in 
the United States. The chapter begins with a historical overview of hazing, tracing the 
activity from the Middle Ages to the present.  Following the historical context, the 
chapter provides a review of the definition of hazing as defined in research studies and a 
review of the legal definition of hazing as enacted by state legislatures. Finally, the 
chapter presents a synthesis of law review articles, which analyze and comment on the 
courts’ opinions on hazing law.  
Historical Overview of Hazing 
The first written accounts of hazing trace back to medieval times when “in 
Western Europe in the 12th century, hazing and hazing traditions became an integral part 
of both academic and social life” (Trota & Johnson, 2004, p. xi). Hazing was utilized in 
the Middle Ages as a way for students to show their commitment to the educational 
rigors of their institution of higher learning. It was not uncommon for the men of the 
Middle Ages to spend the early years of their education performing acts of servitude for 
the older students to gain their acceptance at the university (Kuzmich, 2000). Hazing 
became so present and distracting during the early years of medieval education that some 
universities in France and Germany began passing anti-hazing regulations as early as the 
fourteenth century (Nuwer, 2004).  
The origin of the word hazing and its use in reference to the activities of 
bringing/maintaining new men or women into an organization has been traced back to 
two different locations (Etymology Online, 2012). One origin of the word is linked to an 
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old nautical tradition whereby crewmembers were required to perform unpleasant and 
unnecessary hard work as a form of punishment for their transgressions while at sea. This 
origin of the term has a direct link to the common use of the word hazing as it is 
described in Richard Henry Dana, Jr.’s 1842 writing entitled Two Years before the Mast. 
The author’s description in this writing depicts how the nautical sense of “hazing as 
punishment” transitioned into hazing as torture or hazing as welcoming and describes a 
full account of unnecessary tasks required of new hands to a ship.   
In this account, the author describes crewmembers being required to stand upon 
the ship’s deck during a rainstorm while at port performing meaningless tasks. This 
depiction of hazing outlines a culture within the navy of treating new crewmembers 
poorly until they have proven their worth to the crew. This culture can also be seen in the 
traditional Pollywog ceremony that is conducted on many ships as the ship and its crew 
cross the equator. The Pollywog to Shellback tradition dates back centuries and has roots 
in the many merchant marines and navies around the world (Desa Online, 2012). The 
ceremony describes many similar attributes to a hazing ceremony that may be seen in 
conjunction with sports teams or student organizations, and the ceremony involves the 
public ridicule, abuse, and harassment of any member of the crew who is crossing the 
equator for the first time, including commanding officers.  
The link from utilizing the term hazing as a nautical word describing punishment 
to the first appearance of the word in Harvard Magazine in 1860 describing “the absurd 
and barbarous custom of hazing which has long prevailed in college” may have been this 
confusion between “unnecessary and unpleasant work” as a form of punishment and 
“unnecessary and unpleasant” treatment as one crosses the equator (Solberg, 1998, p. 
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233). Once the term hazing was connected to the customs of sophomore/freshman rushes 
in American higher education by Harvard Magazine in 1860, the term began to take on 
new meanings related to this new setting. 
Hazing was first presented as a method of training young boys “long before the 
organization of the first civilized armies” (Malszecki, 2004, p. 44). Early civilizations 
used hazing as a way to separate the soldier from his civil identity and recreate him in the 
mold of the warrior with a bond to the men around him. The common belief for the 
military was that “one cannot wait until hostilities break out to test future warrior-
soldiers. The motivating, testing, and affirming of the untried is accomplished through 
punishing basic training and through initiations into the fighting unit” (Malszecki, 2004, 
p. 35). The armies of the world put their soldiers through harassing drills on a regular 
basis to prepare them for the battles that would come, and when the drills led by officers 
were over, the men of the unit took their own rights in bringing new soldiers into the 
group. Hazing would become a method employed by most units in most armies to build 
bonding, brotherhood, and subservience to the will of the unit within the soldier. 
Hazing was recorded in writings within the American system of higher education 
for the first time in the 17th century when the first students won a settlement against a 
fellow student in 1657 (Nuwer, 1990). The first punishable offense of hazing occurred in 
1684 when a student by the name of John Webb was punished at Harvard for striking 
fellow students when they did not submit to his needs (Nuwer, 1990). As 18th century 
colleges and universities developed, and more students attended colleges, hazing 
practices became more ingrained into the institutional culture, with new students serving 
as servants to the older students (Trota & Johnson, 2004). As institutions developed, and 
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as student organizations began to take form, hazing was utilized more to bring new 
students into the institution or organization as the upperclassmen intimated fear into the 
freshmen students. Nicholas Syrett in his 2009 book, The Company He Keeps, writes of 
the typical hazing behavior of students in this time: 
The fiercest rivalry was traditionally between the freshmen and sophomores. This 
commenced at the beginning of each school year with a terrifying campaign of 
hazing visited by the sophomores upon the freshmen, a practice descended from 
sets of “Freshmen Laws” that had been in place at many colleges from the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries onward whereby sophomores “tutored” 
freshmen in the manners of college life. Freshmen were kidnapped, stripped, 
carried off on trips, painted, shorn of their hair, tarred, feathered, bound, gagged, 
and left in cemeteries. Those freshmen who had been punished the year before 
often exacted a misplaced revenge on the next year’s newly arrived freshmen. (p. 
18) 
 
The establishment of rules for the freshman class and the expectation that freshmen 
should submit themselves to the wills of the upperclassmen was a concept that was borne 
on the college campus in the colonial era (Sheldon, 1901). “‘Freshman Laws’ created a 
social system where the sophomores instructed the freshmen in the ways of the college, 
and the new students were expected to run errands for the upper classmen” (Barber, 2012, 
p. 2). At the turn of the 18th century, most institutions had done away with the formalized 
Freshman Laws; however, the upper-class students continued the practice of welcoming 
the freshman class to the institution through any number of hazing activities.  
Students confronted each other in ‘rushes,’ violent free-for-alls that pitted the 
sophomores and the freshmen against each other. To enter college the freshman 
endured the physical and psychological pain of initiation. The sophomore his 
primary enemy made him feel distinctly unwelcome, fighting him in the streets, 
denying him the right to carry the principal undergraduate weapons of defense, 
the club or cane, excluding him from the turf of the college. Sophomores stole the 
personal items of freshmen, forced them to endure humiliation, and subjected 
individuals who refused to be good sports to brutal hazing. (Horowitz, 1987 p. 42) 
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The first reported hazing death occurred during this post-bellum timeframe at Cornell 
University during a Kappa Alpha ritual (Nuwer, 1990; Syrett, 2009; Torta & Johnson, 
2004). In 1873 members of the Kappa Alpha fraternity dropped Mortimer Leggett and his 
pledge brothers off in the woods and instructed them to find their way back to campus. 
All the pledges were wearing blindfolds when they were dropped off; when Mortimer 
was found after falling to his death in a gorge in upstate New York, he was still wearing 
his blindfold. Tragically, the death of Mortimer Leggett would only be the first among 
many hazing related injuries and deaths in American higher education. 
 States, colleges, and national fraternal organizations would soon recognize that 
hazing was a growing danger to their students’ well-being (Kuzmich, 2000; Syrett, 2009). 
Much like the attempts of some universities in France and Germany in the 14th century, in 
1874 the United States Congress would be the first to write a statute outlawing the 
practices of hazing for any organization (Kuzmich, 2000; Lewis, 1991). Recognizing the 
dangerous outcomes of hazing within military units, Congress outlawed hazing at the 
United States Naval Academy to protect the students and cadets there. In 1894, Phi 
Kappa Psi became the first social fraternity to pass national legislation outlawing hazing 
as a practice for its members and recognizing that the use of the practice was detrimental 
to the development of their organization nationally (Syrett, 2009). Finally, in 1901, the 
state of Illinois would become the first to outlaw hazing at its state institutions and to 
define the behavior for students in the state (Lewis, 1991). These statements are the first 
attempts to define the concept of hazing in a legal and social environment. 
 The growing attention to legal issues of hazing between 1900-1960 did not 
change much to deter hazing on the college campus. Accounts of hazing behaviors can be 
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found in historical records of social fraternities and colleges throughout this period, much 
like the account of one Dartmouth alumnus from Delta Kappa Epsilon in the 1920s:  
Initiations of the 1920s had distinct phases made up of running a gauntlet, 
extensive paddling, eating a concoction of oysters and asafetida, and a number of 
other rituals that were more ‘elevated in tone.’ One of these was a ritual branding 
whereby the ‘∆KE’ was seared into the forearms of the newly initiated brothers. 
The process of branding also had import: by withstanding the pain of the ‘red hot 
pronged branding iron,’ the neophytes proved their masculinity, and they did so in 
the service of their fraternity. (Syrett, 2009, p. 203) 
 
The adherence of the fraternity to the practice of hazing was firmly ingrained in tradition 
and ritual for most social fraternal organizations of this time, and despite attempts by 
college administrators and faculty to rid the university students of these practices, hazing 
would continue.   
As campus-wide hazing of the freshman class began to diminish, some social 
fraternities began adopting hazing practices for their yearly welcoming of new members 
to the organization. Self-proclaimed as the protectors and preparers of America’s elite, 
social fraternities believed that obtaining a place among the upper echelon of society was 
not something that should be easily gained (Syrett, 2009). Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
wrote these words to his mother of the impending hazing practices upon his selection into 
Delta Kappa Epsilon fraternity at Harvard University. “I have been admitted to a secret 
fraternity that required its members to undergo arduous initiation rites that have been 
aptly described as ‘a curiously primitive rite of passage’” (Karabel, 2005, p. 16). But 
Roosevelt accepted these rites without complaint, writing to his mother that “I am about 
to be slaughtered, but quite happy nonetheless” (Karabel, 2005, p. 16). These practices of 
hazing continue in American higher education through the Great Depression, the Civil 
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Rights era, and into the 1980s before most Legislative bodies begin to address them 
(Syrett, 2009). 
Multiple Definitions of Hazing 
 The understanding and definition of the term hazing should consider two separate 
categories: (1) the research definition as defined by the scholarly writing done regarding 
the topic, and (2) the legal definition as defined by state legislatures and enforced by 
courts through case law. Each of these definitions provides a different perspective on the 
term hazing which can lead to an understanding of the greater concept of hazing and will 
be explored below. 
 The Oxford English Dictionary defines hazing as “a sound beating, a thrashing, a 
species of brutal horseplay practiced on freshmen at American colleges” (Oxford English 
Dictionary, 2012 online). This definition identifies the practice of hazing as a significant 
piece of the American college experience yet limits in scope the broader aspect of hazing 
as it applies to many different arenas including secondary schools, athletic fields, 
workplaces, and military units. This narrow definition of hazing also ignores the many 
non-physical aspects that hazing can include.  
Pelletier (2002) builds upon the definition of hazing in the dictionary, describing 
hazing as “to subject to treatment intended to put one in ridiculous or disconcerting 
positions” (p. 378). The expansion of the definition in this way specifies the intentionality 
of hazing the subject, creating the outcome of the hazing as placing the subject in a 
ridiculous situation, or a situation that leaves the subject uncomfortable and potentially 
unnerved. The inclusion of the intentionality of the behavior strengthens this definition of 
hazing as it is generally understood.  
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The definition used by Wozniak (1995) maintains the significant pieces of the 
definition used by Pelletier (2002) but adds an important qualifier to the term hazing; an 
initiation process (Acquaviva, 2007; Wozniak, 1995). In Wozniak’s definition, “hazing is 
the act of putting another in a ridiculous, humiliating or disconcerting position as part of 
an initiation process” (Acquaviva, 2007 p. 308). Under this definition, any activity that 
occurs outside of the process of an initiation should not be linked to the term hazing. This 
is an important distinction for the general understanding of hazing and its application. 
Wozniak’s definition implies that to be hazed, one must be undergoing a process of 
initiation into something. This definition potentially leaves out numerous activities and 
hazing accounts that occur outside of a formal or informal initiation process.  
Wozniak (1995) is not the only author to set the qualifier of initiation upon the 
term hazing; the Merriam-Webster dictionary goes one step further and defines hazing as 
“an initiation process involving harassment” (Merriam Webster Dictionary, 2012 online). 
Taken literally, the Merriam-Webster definition does not qualify hazing as a part of an 
initiation process, but instead qualifies initiation processes as hazing processes involving 
harassment. The potential downfall of this definition is the same as the downfall of 
Wozniak’s definition, not all hazing occurs as a part of a formal or informal initiation 
process and many hazing accounts occur in settings where no initiation process exists.  
Despite this omission in the Merriam-Webster definition, Trota and Johnson 
(2004) expand upon the Merriam-Webster definition in their introductory chapter to the 
book Making the Team: Inside the World of Sport Initiations and Hazing that “hazing is 
by definition a rite of passage wherein youth, neophytes or rookies are taken through 
traditional practices by more senior members in order to initiate them into the next stage 
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of their cultural, religious, academic or athletic lives” (p. x). By including the transition 
from one form of membership within a group to another form of membership within the 
same group, Trota and Johnson make significant additions to the definition of hazing. 
First, the Trota and Johnson definition provides an important qualifier for the term 
initiation, being that regardless of whether a formal or informal initiation ceremony 
exists, hazing (in these terms) is simply the process of moving a new member of an 
organization or team to the next stage of their membership. The Trota and Johnson 
definition also identifies an important piece of future hazing definitions, that hazing 
occurs within a group setting. The group setting is important to the understanding of the 
term hazing because it is the one significant difference between the definition of bullying 
and the definition of hazing.  
Hazing has come to be understood through definitions like Trota and Johnson’s to 
be more about the process of inclusion into a group, whereas bullying is done as a 
process of exclusion and separation from a group (Allan & Madden, 2012). Trota and 
Johnson’s (2004) definition highlights the importance of hazing occurring within a group 
or team setting and that the intentionality of the hazing process is created to move 
members from being new to the next stage of membership. The Trota and Johnson 
definition is predicated on all processes of moving members to new stages of 
membership be considered hazing. This predication creates a definition of hazing that 
includes both positive experiences and negative experiences, associating membership 
processes that create solely positive outcomes and experiences with a word that maintains 
a negative connotation.  
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Sussberg (2003) has a similar take on hazing, believing that all membership 
activities are hazing, and encouraging an appropriate definition for hazing that “does not 
forbid all hazing, but only those acts which create a strong likelihood for mental or 
physical injury” (p. 1489). Allan and Deangelis (2004) offer a different perception of 
hazing and initiation activities, encouraging the separation of the two from definitions: 
It is important to note that while the term ‘initiation’ is commonly associated with 
the term hazing, the terms are not synonymous. Initiations do not by definition 
involve hazing practices. Anthropologists have long studied initiations and rituals 
as important elements of any culture. Hazing, however, carries a much more 
specific meaning and involves humiliating, degrading and/or abusive behavior 
expected of someone in order to become a member, or maintain one’s full status 
as a member of a group. (p. 63) 
 
The distinction between appropriate initiations and rites of passage and inappropriate 
hazing behaviors is important when defining hazing. If the definition of hazing is written 
so broadly to include positive group activities, then the word itself may become much 
more difficult to understand.  
 In 1999, Nadine Hoover published the first comprehensive study of hazing in 
college athletics at Alfred University in New York. The definition given to the 
participants in the 1999 Alfred study was the first to be used to define hazing in a 
research setting. The Alfred study defined hazing as:  
Any activity expected of someone joining a group that humiliates, degrades, 
abuses or endangers, regardless of the person’s willingness to participate. This 
does not include activities such as rookies carrying balls, team parties with 
community games, or going out with your teammates unless an atmosphere of 
humiliation, abuse or danger arises. (Hoover, 1999, p. 8)  
 
The Hoover definition of hazing narrows the definition of hazing in previous writings. 
Hoover allows that within a group dynamic there may exist certain requirements of 
rookies or new members that are humbling but not objectionable and adds the qualifier 
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that if an activity that might otherwise be acceptable is presented in an environment or 
context that creates humiliation, abuse or endangerment then the normally acceptable 
behavior may also be considered hazing. This change in the definition allows groups and 
teams to create positive meaningful experiences for new members to bond with one 
another and with the older members of the group or team.  
 In 2000 Alfred University released the second comprehensive study of hazing, 
focusing on the hazing experiences of high school students across the United States. The 
2000 study attempted to hone the research definition of hazing, identifying hazing as: 
“any humiliating or dangerous activity expected of you to join a group, regardless of your 
willingness to participate” (Hoover & Pollard, 2000, p. 4). This definition of hazing 
eliminated the qualifiers provided in the 1999 study and reduced the number of 
descriptors for activities identified as hazing eliminating abuses and degrades from the 
definition. The assumption within this definition is that some of these descriptors are 
redundant, identifying that most degrading activities are in some form humiliating and 
that most abusive activities are also dangerous in nature.  
The 2000 Alfred study assumes that context and environment are implied in 
hazing activities with the removal of the qualifying statement: “unless an atmosphere of 
humiliation, abuse or danger arises” (Hoover & Pollard, 2000 p. 4). Despite the 
simplification of the definition of hazing used in the 2000 study, future research on the 
topic of hazing dismissed the definition used in the 2000 study in favor of the definition 
used in the 1999 study (Allan & Madden, 2008; Crow & Rosner, 2002; Edelman, 2004; 
stophazing.org, 2007;). 
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 An alternate research definition for hazing has been offered by Aldo Cimino in 
his 2011 article, The evolution of hazing: Motivational mechanisms and the abuse of 
newcomers. In this study, Cimino examines the motivational causes of hazing to identify 
why groups utilize hazing activities as a means of membership and group identification. 
In this study, Cimino states that “much of the literature that is pertinent to the study of 
hazing does not concern ‘hazing’… and may include non-trivial components and have 
not designed their theories to explain hazing itself or hazing outside of certain 
populations” (Cimino, 2011, p. 243).  
Cimino (2011) identifies that much of the writing concerning the subject of 
hazing confuses group-relevant activities with activities that are inappropriate and 
irrelevant to the purpose of the group and that much of the writing is done to define 
hazing in specific populations. As an alternative approach to the definition of hazing, 
Cimino writes that:  
Hazing is defined here as the generation of induction costs (i.e., part of the 
experiences necessary to be acknowledged as a ‘legitimate’ group member) that 
appear un-attributable to group-relevant assessments, preparations, or chance. 
Hazing may also be manifest in unduly excessive assessments or preparations. (p. 
242) 
 
Put another way: “hazing is defined as those activities associated with membership or 
potential membership in an organization that appear unrelated to the purpose of the 
organization by a reasonable observer. Hazing also includes unnecessarily excessive 
activities” (Ellis, 2012 presentation).  
This definition of hazing relies on the ideas of context and environment to 
determine if hazing is or is not occurring. Under this definition, an activity does not need 
to be described as humiliating, degrading, abusive, or dangerous to be considered hazing. 
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Instead the activity must only be determined as attributable to the purpose and 
preparation of membership within the group (and not excessive) to be determined as 
hazing or not hazing. This definition allows the activity (or activities) within the group 
context to be deemed hazing or not, and this definition of hazing is not reliant upon the 
voluntary or involuntary participation of individuals in the activity (the activity itself 
either is or is not attributable to the group’s purpose).  
By providing this alternative as a research definition, Cimino (2011) increases the 
ability of qualitative researchers to determine if an activity is hazing or not based on the 
context of the group and side steps the issues of transferability to each individual group. 
Conversely, Cimino’s definition of hazing is not generalizable to every group, which 
creates issues for future empirical research across populations and group dynamics (i.e., 
an activity such as calisthenics would be appropriate in a military and athletic team 
context but would not be appropriate for a fraternity or sorority). Despite the lack of 
generalizability, Cimino’s definition identifies the need for hazing to be defined in the 
context of group and environment like the way Hoover (1999) did initially. 
Since the 1999 Alfred study was written, most researchers have utilized Hoover’s 
definition to define hazing in their own writings, any activity expected of someone joining 
a group that humiliates, degrades, abuses or endangers, regardless of the person’s 
willingness to participate (Allan & Madden, 2008; Crow & Rosner, 2002; Edelman, 
2004; stophazing.org, 2007). This definition identifies the major components of hazing as 
defined by research which includes the following: (1) hazing occurs as the process of 
joining (or continuing membership in) an organization or team; (2) hazing includes 
activities that have the potential for humiliation, degradation, abuse, or endangerment; 
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and (3) hazing occurs regardless of whether a person voluntarily participates or is forced 
to participate. To these three qualifiers for hazing provided by Hoover (1999), Cimino 
(2011) adds: (4) hazing occurs when the activity is not attributable to the purpose of the 
group or team.  
These qualifiers identify how hazing differs from other activities an individual 
may participate in and are important to include in any definition of hazing. Without the 
group context, hazing activities may be confused with bullying activities, or with 
activities associated with domestic violence or general assault. The inclusion of voluntary 
and involuntary participation classifies hazing behaviors as inappropriate no matter the 
circumstance. Research has shown that individuals will voluntarily submit to many forms 
of inappropriate, painful, abusive, or degrading activities to belong to a group (National 
Geographic, 2011). The same research also identified that 18-25-year olds rank the sense 
of belonging to a group as being as important as food or shelter in their lives; this 
understanding brings into question the volunteer nature of one’s involvement in 
inappropriate, painful, abusive, or degrading activities. Hazing does occur regardless of 
the willingness to participate in the activity. Lastly, hazing is dependent upon the context 
and environment of the group requiring the activity and a single activity may not be 
generalizable as hazing across all groups. With these parameters set for the research 
definition of hazing and the general definition of hazing, there exists one more realm of 
definitions to explore: the legal definition of hazing. The next section will look at law 
reviews and articles that discuss hazing across the United States of America. 
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Legal Definitions 
 Hazing has been difficult for courts and state legislatures across the United States 
of America to uniformly define. As of 2018, 44 states have adopted hazing laws and 
policies independent of one another, and each state law defines hazing differently from 
the others (stophazing.org, 2012). To date, no singular definition of hazing has been 
uniformly adopted by the courts or state legislatures. Sussberg (2003) highlighted the 
challenges of legally defining hazing in his law review note, Shattered Dreams: Hazing 
in College Athletics: “states have struggled in attempting to define ‘hazing’ and it is not 
surprising that many definitions have resulted. Because of varying definitions, what is 
criminal in one state may be permissible in another” (p. 1429). Sussberg identifies that 
the lack of uniformity in defining hazing across the states has created confusion around 
the activities and behaviors that may (or may not) be constituted as hazing. This 
confusion represents itself in many different forms of the law; state-to-state, hazing laws 
differ regarding whom the law applies to, how the law should be applied, what activities 
constitute hazing, and when an activity may be considered hazing.  
Prosecutors face many difficulties in charging those accused of illegal hazing. 
One is the definition of the activity. An overly broad definition may encompass 
relatively harmless activities that might not warrant the necessary time and 
expense to prosecute. A too narrow definition might ‘handcuff’ prosecutors in 
their pursuit of justice. Some definitions only apply to institutions of higher 
education, while others exclude athletic teams. Still others only allow for hazing 
during pre-initiation or actual initiation activities, and do not cover post-initiation 
events. (Crow & Phillips, 2004, p. 21) 
 
Anti-hazing legislation saw its greatest period of growth in the 1980s and 1990s “due in 
large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless College Killings (C.H.U.C.K.) 
and similar organizations” (Acquaviva, 2007, p. 312) States during this period began to 
make efforts that would prohibit and/or criminalize hazing behaviors in response to an 
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increase in hazing-related deaths at the college level (Carroll et al., 2009; Lewis, 1991). 
The laws created during this time varied dramatically, and still lack uniformity today 
(Crow & Rosner, 2002; Lewis, 1991). An analysis of current state hazing statutes 
demonstrates the following:  
1. The majority of states consider hazing to be a misdemeanor that does not change 
the penalty or definition of any activity covered by other criminal statutes. 
2. Statutes in only seven of the forty-three (now forty-four) states with anti-hazing 
laws include language that bars observing or participating in hazing and failing to 
notify authorities. 
3. Thirteen states with anti-hazing laws require only that anti-hazing policies be 
developed and disseminated at public schools. 
4. Twenty states specifically state in their codes that implied or express consent, or a 
willingness on the part of the victim to participate in the initiation is not an 
available defense. (Crow & Rosner, 2002, p. 89) 
 
This variety in anti-hazing legislation can make the prosecution of hazing in a court of 
law a difficult process and may lead prosecutors to pursue defendants under different 
legal avenues or may lead to criminal hazing cases being under-pursued in a court of law. 
Despite the 30-year existence of anti-hazing legislation across the United States, Edelman 
(2005) writes that: “in recent years, hazing has emerged as a vicious problem, requiring 
proactive solutions. To date, the legal system has failed to provide these solutions. 
Consequently, hazing has exacerbated” (p. 340). This section will focus on nuances 
within anti-hazing legislation and some of the different challenges that have been raised 
against anti-hazing legislation within law review articles and journals. 
Legal Issues Associated with Hazing 
 The next section of this chapter will outline common issues associated with 
hazing in a court of law. Among these are the issues of, (1) Ambiguity and vagueness, (2) 
constitutional challenges, (3) civil laws, and (4) the applicability of hazing laws.  
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Ambiguity and Vagueness Challenges 
 A consistent challenge to anti-hazing legislation stems from the claim that some 
states have written legislation that is ambiguous in nature, especially where no physical 
contact may occur (Lewis, 1991). While anti-hazing legislation in most states outlaws the 
common form of physical hazing, that conduct which could also be considered assault or 
battery, some states only outlaw extreme physical harm and many overlook instances of 
hazing that may not involve any form of physical contact whatsoever. The ambiguity in 
much of the anti-hazing legislation lies in those instances where no physical contact may 
occur, or in the differences between physical harm and extreme physical harm (Lewis, 
1991).  
These ambiguities often bring up the common legal challenge of vagueness 
against anti-hazing legislation. “Under the void for vagueness doctrine, all such laws 
must provide fair notice to persons before making their activity criminal” (Kendrick, 
2000, p. 412). Using this doctrine, many state anti-hazing statutes may be open to 
challenges due to the lack of specificity within the statute regarding the question what is 
hazing. If the statute is not explicit enough, the charges may be disregarded in court or, if 
the statue includes items such as mental and emotional distress, the court may not be able 
to come to agreement regarding what constitutes mental distress. Additionally, if a statute 
were to include terminology like Kansas State Law where the threshold is great bodily 
harm there may be disagreement and ambiguity within the court about what distinguishes 
great bodily harm from bodily harm (Kan. Stat. Ann. §21-5418, 2018).  
Each of these areas raises potential challenges to anti-hazing law under the 
vagueness doctrine, and yet some states have had their laws upheld in court using the 
33 
 
New York Supreme Court ruling from People v. Lenti I. The court in Lenti dismissed 
vagueness as a defense stating: “‘Hazing’ is a word which incorporates treatment such as 
the wearing of a beanie cap to the permanent disfigurement of the body. It would have 
been an impossible task if the legislature had attempted to define hazing specifically” 
(Lewis, 1991, p. 125). The New York State Supreme Court recognized in the Lenti I 
ruling that hazing is an activity that is not necessarily definable by the actions, or 
activities one is required to participate in or the resulting injury that occurs, but instead 
hazing may be defined by the intent of the person conducting the activity. The “intent of 
the hazer” creates more ambiguity in anti-hazing legislation across states, as “it is 
questionable whether one must look to the intent of the hazer or the resulting state of 
mind of the hazee to determine whether outlawed activity has occurred” (Lewis, 1991, p. 
129).  
It is not clear in anti-hazing legislation whether intent to harm or intent to haze 
must be present for someone to be guilty of hazing, or whether the action of requesting an 
inappropriate action from a member seeking a certain status within an organization is 
intent enough. Most hazing is not conducted with the intention of harming an individual, 
or group, but instead is performed for a variety of reasons “that certainly lacks a single 
causal explanation” (Cimino 2011, p. 245). Cimino’s study examined the theories about 
why hazing may occur within an organization. The three areas explored in his study were 
“(a) hazing generates group solidarity; (b) hazing is an expression of dominance; and (c) 
hazing allows for the selection of committed group members” (p. 243). The study found 
that while hazing may manifest itself in expressions of coercion, dominance, and group 
cohesiveness, the hazing occurred as a result of withholding automatic group benefits 
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from new members. With this study in mind, the intent of an occurrence of hazing may 
not be to harm an individual, thus looking for intent to harm may only exacerbate the 
ambiguity of anti-hazing law. 
 A secondary area of ambiguity and vagueness in anti-hazing law also results from 
the consideration of participation in an organization that hazes is not required, and that 
membership in such organizations is often considered voluntary. Crow and Rosner (2002) 
identify that 20 of the 44 states with anti-hazing legislation do not consider consent of the 
victim to be a defense of hazing; however, there are more states with anti-hazing 
legislation that continue to allow the consent of the victim defense in litigation.  
A prevalent example of this is the State of Alabama where an Alabama trial court 
ruled against the plaintiff in the case of Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order asserting that the 
plaintiff assumed the risks of hazing by voluntarily participating in the hazing to become 
a member of the fraternity (Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, 1997; Kendrick, 2000). The 
Alabama Supreme Court upheld the trial court’s decision stating that “Jones knew and 
appreciated the risks involved because Jones knew hazing was illegal and against school 
rules, but repeatedly lied about the hazing to school officials, his doctor and his family” 
and “as a responsible adult in the eyes of the law, Jones cannot be heard to argue that 
peer pressure prevented him from leaving the very hazing activities that, he admits, 
several of his peers left” (Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, 1997; Kendrick, 2000, p. 419). 
This case in the state of Alabama highlights that some states still consider the voluntary 
nature of participation in an organization that hazes precludes an individual from bringing 
criminal or civil charges of hazing against that same organization. This consideration 
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further highlights the ambiguous nature of anti-hazing legislation across the United 
States. 
Constitutional Challenges 
 Another area of debate regarding anti-hazing legislation occurs around the topics 
of the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United 
States Constitution. These challenges relate not only to the creation of anti-hazing 
legislation and its targeting of specific audiences, but also to the requirement of states to 
enforce legislation to protect its citizens (Ball, 2004; Kendrick, 2000; Pelletier, 2002). 
Under the First Amendment, some legal analysts argue that anti-hazing legislation may 
limit the ability of certain organizations to associate and assemble freely and may limit 
the freedom of speech of organizations (Pelletier, 2002). The arguments against freedom 
of assembly and association stem from anti-hazing legislation’s attempt to restrict the 
means through which members may be brought into an organization, or the assumption 
that some of those means are inappropriate. Organizations who utilize the First 
Amendment to defend their right to haze claim that membership within the organization 
is voluntary in nature and because the organization itself is a private entity, the states 
should not have the ability to restrict their membership processes.  
A freedom of assembly claim would include the right of the organization to form 
in the manner of its choosing, and a state law which attempts to restrict that formation is 
over-broad and overstepping the state’s authority. A freedom of speech claim would 
extend from the organization’s right to freely express itself through any means it chooses, 
including the hazing of potential new members or the hazing of current members. Claims 
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against anti-hazing legislation based on First Amendment challenges are not overly 
common, but have been expressed in court (Pelletier, 2002). 
 Conflicts with the Fifth Amendment are more prevalent regarding anti-hazing 
legislation. Some state anti-hazing statutes include language stating: “It is unlawful for 
any student in attendance at any university, college or school to engage in hazing, or to 
aid or abet any other student in the commission of this offense” (North Carolina General 
Statute § 14-35). A strict reading of anti-hazing legislation written that includes this 
language may place the victim of hazing in a position where he or she would self-
incriminate if he/she were to come forward with information about hazing (Ball, 2004; 
Pelletier, 2002).  This language extends itself to members of an organization who may 
have been present for the hazing and not participated or may have had knowledge of the 
incidents but may not have been present. The individual may place himself/herself at risk 
by coming forward and presenting information regarding the incident to the appropriate 
authorities; this limits the willingness of the individual to come forward or could dismiss 
the individual’s testimony because it would self-incriminate where no statute for 
immunity exists.  
Another Fifth Amendment concern has also been raised regarding the granting of 
immunity in hazing cases. “Hazing presents interesting issues of Fifth Amendment 
privilege and the paradox of immunity granted for those who participate in a hazing 
incident and thereafter report the incident to the police” (Ball, 2004, p. 483). Ball presents 
an instance where an individual who may have committed the acts of hazing comes 
forward with information regarding the incident and receiving immunity from the courts 
for committing the very acts he or she is reporting. This situation may play itself out in 
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numerous ways in a courtroom, one potentially being where a member may testify 
against the organization regarding the acts committed; this could lead to an organization 
being found guilty of the act of hazing while the perpetrators of the act go free, leaving 
no individual to be held accountable for the crime.  
Another challenge in cases of fraternity hazing regard the issue of who is to be 
held responsible. In many states, fraternities exist as voluntary unincorporated bodies, 
allowing the officers and alumni representatives of the groups the opportunity to not 
respond to court summons (Pelletier, 2002). In the case of the death of MIT student Scott 
Kruger, this left no one available to speak on behalf of the fraternity during the trial, and 
no one the state could pursue as a representative of the group. The local chapter of a 
fraternity, which was immediately disbanded following the death of Scott Kruger and the 
prevailing criminal charges, was held responsible for the actions, yet there was no 
recourse available to the family under the law (Krueger v. Phi Gamma Delta, 2001). 
While the Fifth Amendment did not play a direct role in the case of Scott Kruger, it does 
represent a scenario that could be played out should the perpetrators of hazing be given 
Fifth Amendment rights to not incriminate themselves. 
A final constitutional challenge to anti-hazing legislation occurs under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause (Kendrick, 2000). The challenge that 
is presented here is based on most of anti-hazing legislation’s focus on the specific 
protection of students in a collegiate and university setting, or within the laws, the 
specific focus and protection of only members of fraternal organizations. Those who 
make Fourteenth Amendment claims against anti-hazing legislation state that the law is 
unconstitutional on the grounds of a violation of the Equal Protection clause which states: 
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“No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the 
equal protection of the laws” (United States Constitution 14th Amendment).  
An anti-hazing law that applies only to certain populations, in certain instances 
may be unconstitutional. Because anti-hazing legislation in many states is only directed at 
students enrolled in colleges, and in some cases only students involved in fraternities and 
sororities in colleges, the legislation does not offer protection to all persons within the 
state’s jurisdiction. In the State of Illinois in the case of Illinois v Anderson, the courts 
upheld the law stating, “The State certainly has a legitimate interest in protecting people 
from physical injury, and we conclude that there is a rational basis for limiting the reach 
of the hazing statute since it is reasonable to assume that most hazing occurs in colleges, 
universities, and other schools” (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 469). One may wonder if 
this rationale can be carried into other states with recent research showing that a 
significant percentage (30-45%) of high school students are reporting experiencing 
hazing connected to their athletic or student organizational experiences (Allan & 
Madden, 2008; Hoover & Pollard, 2000). 
Anti-Hazing Claims Made Under Civil Law 
 While some anti-hazing cases have been filed in criminal courts, a larger number 
of cases claiming acts of hazing have been filed in civil courts across the United States 
under tort law and negligence claims (Edelman, 2005; Kendrick, 2000; Villalba, 2007). 
In Chapter 3 of this study, a review of the American Court System is provided identifying 
the differences between criminal and civil courts. The section below offers a brief 
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explanation of negligence and tort theory and its application to hazing law as reviewed in 
legal journals. 
Tort law. Tort law is a legal concept that traces its roots back to medieval 
England when “civil liability for certain forms of accidental personal injury and property 
damage” were applied in medieval courts (Abraham, 2008, p. 14). The concept developed 
out of a need for individuals to have some protection for themselves and for their 
property from the wrongdoings of another. While some claims of injury could be and are 
often criminal, with intent to harm being the key component, other claims became civil or 
financial, either when the individual may not have had criminal intent, thus being 
accidental, or when a financial recovery of property was necessary to be added to the 
criminal act. Bickel and Lake (1999) identify that there are three methods for lawsuit 
under tort law: negligence, intentional torts, and strict liability. In general, hazing claims 
are not made under strict liability and intentional tort law, leaving negligence as the area 
of tort law that is most broadly applied in instances of hazing.  
Negligence did not find its way into law generally until the middle of the 19th 
century and then only with limited scope until the 20th century (Abraham, 2008). Today, 
negligence is applied broadly and is the “basis for imposing liability in the overwhelming 
majority of cases involving accidental bodily injury or property damage” (Abraham, 
2008, p. 171). The establishment of negligence “injury to another caused by a failure to 
maintain a standard of care” allowed the expansion of torts to a broader societal group 
(Hennessy & Huson, 1998, p. 63). Where originally torts were applied between 
individuals, the standard of care was more broadly applied to corporations and 
organizations in the late 19th century and early 20th century. The applications of the law to 
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corporations grew out of the expansion of commercial shipping and travel using railroads 
and nautical shipping. As more and more corporations began trusting their freight to the 
commercial shipping industry, and more individuals trusted their travel to the railroad 
industry, more duty of care was provided for the safe arrival of the freight and the 
individual (Abraham, 2008). Courts began applying the duty of care to corporations when 
it was established that a party suffered some form of injury, and the corporation did not 
act reasonably to avoid the injury or loss of goods (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).  
 The standard of care was applied to colleges and universities in the 1920s through 
the Hamburger v Cornell University 148 N.E. 539 (N.Y. 1925). In the initial hearing of 
the case, the court found that Cornell University and its faculty were responsible to 
provide reasonable oversight to students in the classroom where there is an increased 
level of risk, and initially awarded the plaintiff a sum of $25,000 for the negligence of the 
Cornell faculty member (Bickel & Lake, 1999). The decision of the trial court was later 
overturned by the New York Court of Appeals, but a shift in thinking and the application 
of negligence and tort law was hinted at in this case. While it would not be until 1941 in 
the case of Brigham Young v Lilly White 118 F.2d 836 (10th Cir.1941) that a university 
was held liable for the injuries of a student, institutional organizations were being 
established by courts as having the same standard of care which was being applied to 
corporations and individuals.  
Negligence Defined. There are many ways in which an institution, individual, 
corporation or organization can be considered negligent (Bickel & Lake, 1999). 
Negligence is found in the upkeep of buildings and grounds, or in the failure to inform 
the public of dangerous persons on the loose. Negligence can be found in the failure to 
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complete one’s job duties that leads to an individual being harmed or in the failure to 
properly supervise a field trip or recreational activity. Despite the many forms of 
negligence that would allow personal remedy through the courts, “the law of negligence 
regulates the basic form that almost every negligence case must take” (Bickel & Lake, 
1999, p. 66). To that end, a negligence case must be shown to have four basic elements 
for negligence to be proven. Those elements are: (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) 
causation and (4) damage. For a legal claim of negligence to be proven, all four elements 
of negligence must be proven by the plaintiff. If just one element of a negligence claim is 
missing, then the case is likely to be dismissed. 
 The initial conversation of a negligence claim hinges on the concept of duty and 
breach of duty (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & Lee, 2007). Without duty, no claim of 
negligence can exist. “Duty is about setting limits on responsibilities owed to others” 
(Bickel & Lake, 1999, p. 67). The concept of duty sets the parameters on the legal 
relationships individuals have with each other.   
 Once duty has been established in a case of negligence, the second question that is 
applied is, was that duty breached? To answer the question of breach of duty, courts 
again apply the reasonable person test. In this application of the reasonable person test, 
the court seeks to discover if the defendant did what was reasonably expected of him/her 
to protect the plaintiff (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & Lee, 2007). The court does not 
ask if the individual or defendant did everything possible to protect the plaintiff from 
harm, as it is often the case with any injury that more could have been done; however, the 
standard of minimalism (did you do what was minimally expected) comes into play. If it 
can be shown that the defendant did exactly what a reasonable person would have done, 
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then typically no breach of duty exists; however, if the individual did less than what 
could be minimally expected, then it is likely that a breach of duty occurred. 
 If a plaintiff has successfully established that the defendant owed him/her a duty, 
and that the defendant did in fact breach that duty, the third element of a successful 
negligence case must then be proven. This element, causation, is broken down into two 
specific areas, factual causation and proximate causation (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & 
Lee, 2007). Factual causation is grown out of the premise that the defendant’s breach of 
duty caused the injury to occur, that is, there is a direct link between the defendant’s 
breach of duty and the injury of the plaintiff. If there is no link, there is no causation; if 
there is a link, the defendant still has an opportunity for defense through the concept of 
proximate causation. Proximate causation allows a jury to still find the defendant not 
responsible even when there is a breach of duty and that breach led to the injury of the 
plaintiff. Proximate causation also leans on the concept of foreseeability to prove that the 
breach of duty caused the injury and that there were no other intervening factors in the 
injury. Proximate causation allows the jury to use intuition in the decision of negligence 
cases, not just breach-fault. 
 The fourth element of a negligence case is damage. In most cases, damage is 
shown through either a physical injury, or a form of mental distress and anguish. If it is 
not the case that the causation resulted in either physical or mental injury, then it is not 
likely that a negligence case will be seen through. 
Application of Tort Law in Hazing Cases 
 When a hazing claim is made in a civil court utilizing tort/negligence law as its 
basis, there are several issues that present themselves. Initially,  
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A plaintiff alleging negligence must prove each of the following six elements by a 
preponderance of evidence: duty, standard of care, breach of duty, causation, 
proximate cause and damages. [Additionally], the concepts of assumption of risk, 
comparative negligence and negligence per se are relevant to cases examining 
liability for hazing. (Kuzmich, 2000, p. 1106)  
 
In most scenarios where a hazing claim is made, the damages to the victim involve a 
form of physical harm that resulted from the participation in some activity or task related 
to the individual seeking membership in the organization. The plaintiff in these cases is 
making the claim that the organization in question held: 
(1) A duty of care on the part of the organization members; (2) A breach of that 
duty; (3) A causal connection between the organization members’ conduct and the 
injury; and (4) An actual loss or damage as a result of the injury. (Schoen & 
Falcheck, 2000, p. 130)   
 
Most often in hazing cases, the courts have found that organizations do in fact have a 
duty to protect the individuals who are seeking membership in that organization from 
being harmed during the membership process, and “few cases have failed to find that a 
duty of care existed for an organization that required hazing as part of its initiation (or 
membership) activities” (Kendrick, 2000, p. 420). Thus, the first three elements of 
negligence theory (duty, standard of care, and breach of duty) are generally established in 
hazing cases where an individual has been injured during the membership process; 
however, plaintiffs in hazing cases do face challenges in establishing hazing claims. 
 The two defenses that are most often used in hazing cases under negligence and 
tort law are the assumption of risk and comparative negligence (Edelman, 2004; 
Kendrick, 2000; Kuzmich, 2000). Under the assumption of risk defense, defendants often 
make three claims: (1) membership in the organization is voluntary and the individual 
could choose to leave at any point; (2) the plaintiff had prior knowledge that hazing was 
involved in the membership process; and (3) the plaintiff willingly consented to 
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participate in the activity (Kuzmich, 2000). These claims are made to shift the fault for 
the injury from the organization to the victim, or at least to share the fault between the 
two. For this reason, many states with anti-hazing legislation have included in their laws 
that the consent of the victim is not a defense against the action of the organization (Crow 
& Phillips, 2004).  
An additional question is the voluntary nature of the participation in hazing 
activities. A whole body of research exists to discover if participation in hazing activities 
is truly voluntary, or if participation is coerced through an individual’s need to belong, 
search for social status, succumbing to peer pressure, or search for rite of passage (Ball, 
2004; Campo et al., 2005; Cimino, 2011; Ellsworth, 2006; Finkel, 2000; Kuzmich, 2000; 
Owen, Burke & Vichesky, 2008; Ruffins, 1998; Solberg, 1998). Each of these studies 
provides indication that participants in hazing activities may voluntarily join 
organizations, but that the perception that these individuals willingly participate in hazing 
activities with full knowledge of the risks involved may be flawed. Additionally, these 
studies indicate that deeper psychological needs may drive individuals to participate in 
hazing activities. Still, courts maintain that hazing victims may be, or in fact are, at least 
partially responsible for their fate (Kuzmich, 2000). This raises the concern of 
comparative negligence wherein a judge or jury may be asked to determine the extent to 
which the plaintiff is responsible for his/her own actions, and the extent to which the 
organization is responsible for the injuries sustained during those activities (Kendrick, 
2000; Kuzmich, 2000).  
 Lastly, in hazing cases involving the consumption of alcohol (whether forced, 
coerced, or voluntarily consumed), issues of negligence become even more relevant to 
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hazing. “In hazing litigation involving the excessive consumption of alcohol and related 
injuries, coercion is almost automatically established, a duty is established by the party 
who forces the plaintiff to drink excessively, and the standard by which the plaintiff is 
judged is that of a disabled person” (Govan, 2001, p. 694). While a direct link between 
hazing and alcohol consumption is not always present, in most cases where injury or 
death results from hazing, alcohol can be found to be a contributory factor (Nuwer, 
2004). When alcohol is involved in an incident of hazing, the standard of care is 
increased, and the ability of the victim to give informed consent is often decreased. The 
organization is in a much more precarious position regarding duty and breach of duty. 
Where the link between hazing and alcohol consumption cannot be made, the plaintiff 
often has a much more difficult path to establishing duty, breach of duty, and lack of 
informed consent (Govan, 2001). 
Applicability of Anti-Hazing Law 
 Another theme that presents itself in law review journals surrounding anti-hazing 
legislation is the applicability of the law, most specifically the ability of prosecutors to 
successfully pursue hazing claims, and the potential redundancy of hazing law.  
The recipe for success in prosecuting those who haze requires only a few 
ingredients: a victim who is willing to come forward and discuss the incident, a 
defendant who is able to be charged under the state’s anti-hazing laws, and an 
effective state anti-hazing statute. As demonstrated by case law and newsworthy 
hazing incidents, achieving this balance is rare and nearly unprecedented. 
(Pelletier, 2002, p. 411)  
 
This quote from Pelletier identifies a significant issue with anti-hazing legislation: the 
extreme difficulty for the law to be applied. Due to the secrecy of most hazing scenarios, 
it is often difficult to find a victim that is willing to come forward and discuss the 
incident with police, university or school officials, lawyers, parents, or other parties 
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unless the victim is severely injured (Allan & Madden, 2008). In those scenarios where 
the victim is willing (or able) to come forward, there is often an inability to corroborate 
the victim’s story with others leaving the individual isolated from his or her peers who 
may in turn be charged as defendants in the hazing claim (if applicable). In some states 
(as identified earlier) it is also unclear as to who can be charged with incidents of hazing, 
and/or the groups that anti-hazing law establishes as potential defendants.  
In many states it is unclear as to whether anti-hazing law is applicable to athletic 
teams, as identified by Acquaviva (2007), or whether anti-hazing law is applicable to 
men and women enlisted in the military or ROTC, or just to those men and women 
enrolled in military academies as identified by Pelletier (2002). In states where the law is 
written to only apply to student organizations and not athletic teams, or states where the 
law protects only those students enrolled in colleges, but not in secondary institutions, the 
effectiveness of the law is greatly diminished. Lastly, there is some discussion in the 
literature that the existence of anti-hazing legislation is redundant. With pre-existing laws 
that protect citizens against crimes such as “battery, assault, false imprisonment, 
kidnapping and involuntary manslaughter” (Villalba, 2007, p. 101) some legal theorists 
believe that anti-hazing law is unnecessary as most activities that result in hazing are 
covered by these pre-existing laws. This study seeks to add to this body of literature and 
legal commentary by reviewing legal cases where hazing was alleged to identify the 
overall applicability of these laws. 
Summary 
  Chapter 2 provided a review of the literature relevant to the foundational issues of 
this study. Significant among those issues is an historical review of hazing and the 
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conceptual framework surrounding its existence in the United States, an exploration of 
the different definitions of hazing ranging from the generic definition as expressed in 
common literature sources, and a review of the definition of hazing as utilized in research 
circles, concluding with a review of hazing as defined by state laws. Lastly, a synopsis of 
law review articles was provided outlining the numerous challenges posed to anti-hazing 
legislation, among them the challenges of ambiguity and vagueness; challenges based on 
the constitutionality of anti-hazing legislation; challenges based on the applicability and 
redundancy of anti-hazing legislation; and a brief discussion of negligence and tort law as 
applied to hazing scenarios. Chapter 3 will provide a review of the American Court 
System as a background for this study, a discussion of the process of legal research, and 
the methodology used for this study. 
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Chapter 3  
Research Design and Methodology 
 This study builds upon previous reviews and analyses of anti-hazing law, 
expanding upon the work of Carroll and colleagues (2009), Crow and Phillips (2004), 
and Guynn (2002) to examine the breadth of anti-hazing case law as determined in the 
American Court System. This comparative analysis will draw from criminal and civil 
cases that have been heard in a court of law beginning in 1980 through 2013. This 
analysis will compare the breadth of anti-hazing case law and not limit itself to one 
specific population of cases as previous analyses have done. Specifically, the study will 
address the following research questions:  
1. How have cases with allegations of hazing been applied by criminal and civil 
courts?  
2. How many cases alleging hazing as a precipitating factor have been heard in 
Federal or State District Courts (or higher) since 1980? 
3. What other legal issues have been brought before the court in cases alleging 
hazing as a precipitating factor? 
4. Is the creation of stricter anti-hazing laws an applicable response to incidents 
of hazing? 
5. In an incident of hazing, are other criminal acts more applicable than the anti-
hazing law itself? 
 
Data 
 
Legal research is conducted through the review of three primary categories of 
legal information: “primary sources, secondary sources and research (or finding) tools” 
(Russo, 2006, p. 7). Primary sources of the law are those sources created by the 
government itself. Primary sources are created through three main areas of governmental 
work: legislatures, courts, and governmental agencies. Each of these areas of government 
creates a different form of law. The legislative branch of government creates law through 
the passing of state and federal statutes in the form of legislation. Legislation is the 
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formal aspect of law “exercising the power and function of making rules (as laws) that 
have the force of authority by virtue of their promulgation by an official organ of the 
state” (Merriam-Webster Dictionary, 2013, online).  
The second primary source of law is created by the judicial branch of government 
through the means of judge-made common law or case law (Russo, 2006). “Common law 
refers to judicial interpretations of issues that may have been overlooked in the legislative 
or regulatory process or that may not have been anticipated when the statute was enacted” 
(Russo, 2006, p. 10). This form of law refers to the way that courts either interpret the 
laws that have been created by the legislature or make rulings in areas the law may not 
cover.  
The third primary source of law is created by governmental agencies. 
Governmental agencies are those groups created by the government to make decisions in 
specific areas of governmental work. For example, the Department of Education exists as 
a governmental agency with the ability to recommend and create law based on the needs 
for education in the United States. Agencies create law by “issuing decisions, which 
resemble judicial cases in that they simultaneously resolve specific disputes and operate 
as precedent for future disputes (and by) promulgating regulations, which resemble 
statutes in that they address a range of behavior and are stated in general terms” (Kunz et 
al., 2004, p. 7). This study focuses upon the law as created by state legislatures and the 
interpretations of those laws created through judicial opinion and case law. State court 
cases and anti-hazing statutes exist as the primary sources of data for this study. 
The Westlaw and LexisNexis electronic databases were used to locate state court 
cases involving anti-hazing law. These databases were used based on their access to both 
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published and unpublished cases or for access to cases which are not yet available in a 
hard copy (paper) form (Kunz et al., 2004). Westlaw and LexisNexis provide the ability 
to search “factual concepts” that are involved in a case. This allowed the opportunity to 
expand searches beyond state-defined hazing activities that potentially violated the law to 
include, in database searches, activities inside a case that were “hazing- like” or that may 
be defined as hazing in other states.  
To conduct a search in Westlaw or LexisNexis, the researcher should begin by 
identifying the database within either grouping to search. The selection of the initial 
database reflected the jurisdictional precedent of the case or law being researched and 
progressed to other jurisdictions in order to provide additional context. Upon completion 
of the initial search, both databases provided a listing of cases relevant to anti-hazing law. 
Utilizing these case citations, a new search was conducted for opinions citing each case 
and source of law beginning the process of citating or shepardizing those cases. The 
process of citating is done by “typing in a case’s citation in the Shepard’s or KeyCite 
box” (Kunz et al., 2004, p. 173) within the database. This search then brought up a 
history of other cases that have referred to the case in hand in either negative or positive 
ways. Citating is a useful tool for identifying how the courts have treated previous cases, 
providing weight to those judicial opinions. If a case has been overruled or treated 
negatively by various courts, this identifies that the legal decision should be treated 
cautiously when applying that case’s findings of law, and that other cases provided a 
more accurate interpretation of the law. Cases that were treated positively by other courts 
(i.e., was used to assist in determining the application of the law) were identified as 
reliable findings of the law during analysis. 
51 
 
Citating and shepardizing are built upon the concepts of precedent and 
jurisdiction within the American court system. In the United States, courts exist as a 
series of individual units (federal or state, civil, or criminal) that have been given 
authority (or jurisdiction) over a certain area of the country, or over certain laws or types 
of legal claims. To appropriately analyze case law, one must understand the different 
concepts of jurisdiction and precedent. The next section will explain each of these 
concepts (jurisdiction and precedent) in more detail.  
Jurisdiction 
Within the United States legal system there exist multiple levels of jurisdiction for 
the courts. The first distinction of jurisdiction can be made between state courts and 
federal courts. State courts exist as those courts charged with making rulings based on the 
laws that have been enacted by a state. State courts have the power to hear cases 
involving the constitutions and statutes created by the states themselves (Kunz et al., 
2004; Russo, 2006;). In the instance of hazing law, the federal government has left the act 
of hazing to be a state’s rights issue; however, legislation has been introduced on the 
federal level to make the act of hazing universally illegal (Crow & Phillips, 2004). To 
this date, hazing has only been made illegal in those states that have adopted their own 
laws against hazing. While Federal courts can hear and rule on state issues, when 
presented in conjunction with federal law issues, federal courts would not be the primary 
source of case law involving the hearing or deciding of hazing related cases.  
Within most states, there exist three levels of courts: “a trial court, an intermediate 
appellate court and a court of last resort” (Russo, 2006, p. 10). The trial courts exist to 
hear most of the cases against the laws of the state or regarding citizens of the state. The 
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intermediate appellate courts exist to hear those cases where one party is not satisfied 
with the decision of the court and seeks a “discretionary review” of the case (Russo, 
2006). The appellate court will review the case at hand and will look for any errors in the 
application of the law by the trial court. While the trial court provides most rulings on the 
law, it is traditionally considered that appellate courts provide the interpretations of the 
law that are used to set binding and persuasive precedent.  
In the instance that one party is dissatisfied by the decision of the appellate court, 
he/she has the option to request a “writ of certiorari” from the State Supreme Court. The 
State Supreme Court has the option to ignore the writ of certiorari (leaving the appellate 
decision in place), or to grant to writ of certiorari and review the case based on the state 
law. A decision of the State Supreme Court is deemed to be the final decision and shall 
have binding authority on all rulings of that law within that state (Russo, 2006). The 
interpretation of a state law by a State Supreme Court shall be carried through by all other 
courts (trial and appellate) within that state. Additionally, state courts are only bound to 
the decisions of higher internal state courts regarding the interpretation of the law or the 
Federal Supreme Court in some cases.  
Federal courts have a similar structure to state courts but carry much more weight 
in their decisions. Federal courts exist to make decisions primarily on federal laws, 
“interpretation of the United States Constitution, federal statutes, federal regulations,” 
and cases involving citizens of two different states where the amount in controversy is at 
least $75,000” (Russo, 2006 p. 11). Federal district courts are located in each state. The 
intermediate appellate courts exist based on thirteen circuits (groups of states). The 
Circuit Court of Appeals exists in a similar manner as the state appellate courts where a 
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party has the right to appeal their decision if they are dissatisfied with the outcome. The 
highest jurisdiction lays with the Federal Supreme Court of the United States (Russo, 
2006). The jurisdiction of the Federal Supreme Court covers all citizens in all states 
regarding all federal laws. The Federal Supreme Court has the authority to choose only 
those cases it deems worthy of hearing, and the decisions of the Federal Supreme Court 
are binding on all courts in all states. 
In certain cases, there also exists the concept of “concurrent jurisdiction over 
certain claims stated in federal court” (Kunz et al., 2004, p. 132). In these cases, Congress 
has given both state and federal courts the ability to hear cases of federal law. In this 
scenario, state courts would be bound by the decisions set forth by higher courts 
throughout the federal court system. 
The clear distinctions that need to be made in understanding jurisdiction are: what 
law has been broken, and what entity created the law. A federal court only has the ability 
to hear cases where federal law is involved and cannot (and will not) make a ruling on a 
state law issue unless combined with some other federal court issue. State courts only 
have the jurisdiction to hear cases that violate the law of the state where the “crime” 
occurred. In terms of anti-hazing law, the primary source of case law was pulled from 
state courts as anti-hazing legislation has been enacted on a state-by-state basis and no 
federal anti-hazing law exists. An appropriate analysis of anti-hazing case law will look 
to the individual state’s hazing case law in order to make a determination on the 
interpretation of that state’s hazing laws. Additionally, only case law from the state that 
created the law will have binding authority over future decisions regarding the 
interpretation of the anti-hazing law within that specific state.  
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Judicial Reliance on Precedent and Analogical Reasoning 
 As mentioned previously, courts also use the idea of precedent to help interpret 
and apply laws. Precedent is “the result, rules and reasoning in a decided case (which are) 
generally…followed in the resolution of future similar disputes within the court’s 
jurisdiction” (Kunz et al., 2004, p. 7). The concept of precedent is the application of the 
interpretation of laws by higher courts in which the details of the case are the same 
(Lamond, 2016). The idea of precedent is explained as having practical authority where 
the decision in a current case in which the circumstances of the current case are the same 
as the circumstances in a prior case would reasonably follow the same outcome pattern 
(Lamond, 2016). This type of precedent is often referred to as binding authority i.e., 
lower courts are bound by the decisions of higher courts to interpret the same laws the 
same way (Russo, 2006).  
A second form of precedent, known as persuasive precedent, is also used by 
courts in the interpretation of the law. “Persuasive precedent, a ruling from another 
jurisdiction, is actually not precedent at all. That is, as a judge in Indiana seeks to resolve 
a novel legal issue, the judge would typically review precedent from other jurisdictions to 
determine whether it has been addressed elsewhere. A court is not bound to follow 
precedent from another jurisdiction” (Russo, 2006, p. 10). Persuasive precedent is the 
review of decisions about similar cases from other jurisdictions. The judge in this case 
can review similar cases from different jurisdictions and determine whether a similar 
decision should be made in his/her jurisdiction. 
Analogical reasoning on the other hand is the reliance of law on decisions in prior 
cases where the circumstances are similar but not the same (Lamond, 2016; Levi, 1949). 
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In the use of analogical reasoning, “the rule arises out of a process in which if different 
things are to be treated as similar, at least the differences have been urged” (Levi, 1949, 
p. 504). The courts use analogical reasoning to review a variety of decisions across 
similar cases where the decision of the court may have differed based on the slight 
deviation in characteristics of the case. Using analogical reasoning, the differences 
between cases must be emphasized to draw out the appropriate conclusion to the current 
cases. Analogical reasoning can be useful when reviewing a case with an alleged 
violation of a rarely argued statute (like hazing in most states). The court can use 
analogical reasoning to review judicial decisions in cases in other states with similar fact 
patterns to inform the decision of the judge in the current case. 
Using the case of the alleged hazing death of Florida A&M University student 
Robert Champion to elaborate this point, whichever court in the state of Florida that hears 
the case of Robert Champion shall be bound by prior decisions made regarding anti-
hazing law in the State of Florida. Thus, the decision of the court in earlier cases of 
hazing in the State of Florida (see the case of Marcus Jones, FAMU student, 2006) will 
affect the impending court case involving the alleged hazing of Robert Champion. If the 
cases allege fact patterns that are the same, the court will rely on precedent to make the 
final decisions. If the fact pattern is however similar but there are important differences 
from the previous case, the court will rely on analogical reasoning to determine which 
fact pattern the current case is most like. The Florida court may also review the case of 
Texas v. Boyd & Chapa (Nos. 14-98-00402-CR,14-98-00403-CR) as an opportunity to 
review the application of hazing law in Texas; however, the Florida court is not bound to 
use the same standards and tests, nor come to the same conclusions as the Texas court 
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did. However, it may be bound by the decisions, standards, and tests used in Morton v. 
State (No. 1D07-1623). 
The concepts of jurisdiction, precedent, and analogical reasoning play an 
important role in the analysis of case law. The American legal system depends heavily 
upon the decision of prior cases. Understanding these concepts creates a link between 
each judicial decision, but can also identify divergent opinions between states, or between 
time periods. Identifying those divergent opinions creates an opportunity to further 
understand the changing legal environment around a specific issue or law.  
Method of Analysis 
 This study uses content analysis to analyze the relevant cases with hazing as a 
precipitating factor between the years of 1980-2013. The theoretical framework of the 
mixed-methods analysis is built upon Hall and Wright’s (2008) article Systematic 
Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions. In this article, Hall and Wright outline the steps of 
conducting a content analysis methodology as “(1) selecting the cases; (2) coding the 
cases; and (3) analyzing the case coding, often through statistical methods.” (Hall & 
Wright, 2008, p. 80). This method of legal analysis diverts from traditional legal study 
that identifies a few seminal cases and interprets those cases to provide legal opinion for 
a specific legal topic. The traditional method of legal analysis is like, “auditioning a 
crowd of singers to find the best soloists. (The) objective was to select particular cases 
that eloquently stated the rules of law or illustrated a trend” (Hall & Wright, 2008, p. 77).  
On the contrary, content analysis uses the breadth of law to create a full picture of 
a legal issue, examining all cases thoroughly with equal value placed on each judicial 
opinion. “Content analysis works best when the judicial opinions in a collection hold 
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essentially equal value, such as where patterns across cases matter more than a deeply 
reflective understanding of a single pivotal case” (Hall & Wright, 2008 p. 66). By 
reviewing all cases where hazing was alleged or was involved, a pattern of legal issues 
was identified. This pattern of behaviors alleged in hazing cases helps provide the full 
picture of different legal issues that may arise following an incident of hazing. In 
traditional legal study, the selection of only a few seminal cases may not identify all 
potential legal issues surrounding hazing.  
Additionally, due to anti-hazing legislation being state specific, the content 
analysis method was chosen to provide equal value to all cases across states. While a case 
may set one precedent in one state, that same case may be interpreted differently by 
another court in another state that is not bound by the same precedent. The treatment of 
each case with equal value allows all legal issues, precedents, and court opinions to be 
presented to identify the most likely outcome of a case of hazing within the courts. 
Case Selection 
 The first step of the content analysis methodology is to set the criteria for case 
selection. This study is examining cases where hazing is a precipitating factor (i.e., the 
incident creating the legal issue) for the case. The second criterion was time of hearing. 
This study is reviewing all cases that occurred between 1980-2013, with 1980 recognized 
as the year when most states began passing hazing legislation. The third criterion was 
judicial review. Cases for this study were limited to those that were heard at the District 
Court or higher. Judicial review was chosen as a criterion as the case results in an opinion 
written by a judge upon review of the case. Judicial review allows insight into the 
specific legal issues of a case that may not be present in trial court.    
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Westlaw and LexisNexis searches were conducted to identify cases where hazing 
was alleged. Westlaw and LexisNexis are used as the primary research tools in legal 
research (Russo, 1996). These databases provide access to state court cases where hazing 
was alleged, or the background of the incident involved hazing. Both databases permit 
keyword and terms and connectors searches for cases and statutes based on the topic of 
the research (Kunz et al., 2004). The terms and connectors search were performed by 
“keying in words, with or without root expanders, and connectors, and a space for or” 
(Kunz et al., 2004, p. 152). This method of research allows the researcher to utilize the 
root of a word (such as haz!), to search for all other forms of that word throughout the 
case law database (haze, hazing, hazed, etc.). Once a case was found, it was used to 
identify additional historical cases cited by the current case as a way of identifying 
precedent. The keyword search and sherpardizing search returned a total of 167 cases 
heard in the courts between 1980-2013 to be included in this study. These cases represent 
only those that were heard in court and ruled upon by a judge and do not represent cases 
where one party pleaded guilty or no contest, or those cases that were settled before or 
after trial proceedings began. 
Systematic Case Coding 
 The second step in the content analysis methodology was to conduct “systematic 
case coding” (Hall & Wright, 2008). To successfully code case law, the researcher must 
create the set of standards for the case to be reviewed.  
A defined coding scheme focuses attention more methodically on various 
elements of cases and is a check against looking for confirmation of 
predetermined positions. The effort to articulate beforehand the features of a case 
worth studying…strengthens the objectivity and reproducibility of case law 
interpretation. (p. 81)  
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This study uses cases where hazing has been alleged and identifies the myriad of issues 
that may be argued in a court of law. The cases were examined individually, and as new 
legal theory was introduced, a new category for legal examination was added to the 
coding. In total, 27 categories for legal issues resulting from incidents of hazing were 
created. Categories included: hazing (as law), constitutionality, assault & battery, Civil 
Rights 1983 (sub categories of Frist Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and Fourteenth 
Amendment were a few), liability, negligence, duty, immunity, wrongful death, and 
others. A full list is provided in Chapter 4 Table 1. Within these categories, an “x” was 
placed if a certain legal issue was argued in a case. This is in line with the Hall and 
Wright’s (2008) recommended research method,  
Coding experts advise researchers to create more coding categories, and to make 
coding more fine-grained, than they may ultimately want to analyze. Though this 
produces more information than the project will eventually require, this process 
enables the researcher to test different categorization schemes to learn through 
trial and error which work best. (p. 109)  
 
Additionally, codes were created for the state where the case was heard, and for the 
outcome of the case (affirmed, denied, dismissed). 
Analyzing Cases 
 The third step of the content analysis methodology is to analyze cases using 
mixed-methods analysis. Cases were analyzed utilizing coding to identify patterns and 
associations quantitatively. This study will not however utilize complex statistics to 
analyze the cases, instead “counts and frequencies (percentages) were used to show how 
often a given feature appears in the cases” (Hall & Wright, 2008, p. 117). The 
quantitative analysis will assist in the identification of the categories of legal issues that 
should be examined utilizing analogical reasoning.  
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Analogical reasoning is the most common method of analysis of case law. 
Analogical reasoning is based on the writings of Edward Levi and is often associated as 
“the most common form of legal reasoning” (Hutchens, 2007, p. 47).  This form of 
analysis is based on the legal reliance on precedent where cases are analyzed in 
accordance to the similarities between them, and decisions are made based on consistent 
interpretations of the law (Levi, 1949). This method of analysis allows the researcher to 
draw upon historical decisions made in hazing cases to interpret the application of the law 
in the present and predict the application of the law in the future. 
There are three steps to Levi’s method of analogical reasoning: “similarity is seen 
between cases; next the rule of law inherent in the first case is announced; then the rule of 
law is made applicable to the second case” (Levi, 1949, p. 2). In this way, legal standards 
are constantly under review and altered by new and developing cases within the court 
system. Where cases are similar, it is likely that similar decisions will be made; where 
cases are different, courts utilize reasoning to make decisions that are informed by other 
areas of the law or in response to new and developing social climates. By utilizing 
analogical reasoning, scholars can make predictions on the rule of law through a thorough 
examination of prior cases (Levi, 1949).  
Analogical reasoning can also be particularly helpful in the interpretation of the 
intention of state legislatures. Levi writes, “Interpretation with intention when dealing 
with a statute is the way of describing the attempt to compare cases based on the standard 
thought to be common at the time the legislation was passed” (Levi, 1949, p. 505). This 
study will rely heavily on cases which allege violations of hazing which is a legislative 
statute in 44 states. In most states, violations of hazing are not commonly argued (as this 
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study will show). By using analogical reasoning, the courts have interpreted the intention 
of the state legislature in their decision-making processes where no prior case law exists. 
Analogical reasoning is helpful too in evaluating fact patterns in hazing cases that are not 
likely to be the same but are likely to be similar.  
When coupled with content analysis review, analogical reasoning will allow this 
study to examine the breadth of legal cases that occurred between 1980-2013, identify the 
legal issues most likely to be created by an incident of hazing, and allow predictive 
analysis for how those issues may impact individuals, organizations, and institutions. 
These areas will inform the body of research on how criminal and civil courts have 
responded to the issue of hazing. 
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Chapter 4.  
Analysis of Legal Issues and Associated Case Law 
 This chapter examines the case law data for court cases that appeared in Federal 
District Court (or higher) or State District Court (or higher) between the years of 1980-
2013, where hazing was a precipitating component of the case. The LexisNexis and 
Westlaw databases were utilized to identify relevant cases as outlined in the previous 
chapter. The keyword search and shepardizing/citating process revealed a sample of 167 
cases with written judicial opinions in Federal District Court (or higher) or State District 
Court (or higher). These cases were reviewed using 3 parameters: (1) categories of law, 
(2) state of origin and (3) criminal or civil charges. The results are presented in this 
chapter based on patterns, themes, and the prevalent legal issues of cases where hazing 
was a precipitating factor.  
Purpose of the Study 
This study builds upon previous reviews and analyses of anti-hazing law, expanding 
upon the work of Carroll and colleagues (2009), Crow and Phillips (2004), and Guynn 
(2002) to examine the breadth of anti-hazing case law as determined in the American 
Court System. This comparative analysis draws from criminal and civil cases that have 
been heard in a court of law between 1980 through 2013. This analysis compares the 
breadth of anti-hazing case law over a span of 33 years. Five research questions guide the 
analysis: 
1. How have cases with allegations of hazing been applied by criminal and civil 
courts?  
2. How many cases alleging hazing as a precipitating factor have been heard in 
Federal or State District Courts (or higher) since 1980? 
3. What other legal issues have been brought before the court in cases alleging 
hazing as a precipitating factor? 
63 
 
4. Is the creation of stricter anti-hazing laws an applicable response to incidents of 
hazing? 
5. In an incident of hazing, are other criminal acts more applicable than the anti-
hazing law itself? 
Data Analysis 
 To address the first three research questions, this chapter begins by looking at the 
legal claims brought to the courts following a hazing incident. Table 1 outlines the 
categories of legal claims that resulted from incidents of hazing between the years of 
1980-2013. Claims fell across 28 initial categories; however, two subcategories have 
been created: (1) civil claims related to Tort Liability and Negligence, and (2) civil 
claims related to 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Within these categories, 
Tort Liability and Negligence includes all claims related to: (1) Liability, (2) Premises 
Liability, (3) Negligence, (4) Duty, (5) Agency, and (6) Qualified Immunity. Claims 
associated with 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act were violations of (1) First 
Amendment Rights and Freedom of Association, (2) Fourth Amendment Rights, 3) Fifth 
Amendment Rights and Due Process, 4) Fourteenth Amendment Rights, and 5) Fifteenth 
Amendment Rights.  
The remaining legal claims in the chart may or may not have intersectionality 
with the subcategories. Court cases are not limited to one claim or allegation argued at a 
time, and there are many cases represented in the chart that allege criminal and civil 
behaviors at the same time. The percentages in the right-hand column report the 
frequency (%) of the legal claim, the middle column (n) reports the total number of 
claims. 
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Table 1. Legal Claims Following an Incident of Hazing          
Coded Variables   n   %          
Hazing Law   35   20.95  
Assault   21   12.57  
Constitutionality   8   4.79  
        
42 U.S.C. § 1983    36   21.56  
1st Amendment   5   2.99  
4th Amendment   10   5.99  
5th Amendment   2   1.19  
14th Amendment   15   8.98  
15th Amendment    1   0.59  
Freedom of Association   3   1.79  
Due Process   19   11.38  
        
Tort Liability & 
Negligence   83   49.7  
Liability   80   47.9  
Premises Liability   10   5.99  
Qualified Immunity   36   21.56  
Negligence   83   49.7  
Duty   65   38.92  
Agency   13   7.78  
        
Wrongful Death   8   4.79  
Breach of Contract   4   2.39  
Title IX   15   8.98  
Defamation   9   5.39  
Public Records   2   1.19  
Wiretap   1   0.59  
Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress   8   4.79  
Discrimination   8   4.79  
Whistle Blower   1   0.59  
Injunctive Relief   1   0.59  
Worker's Compensation   3   1.79  
 
Table 1 identifies the types of legal claims that occur following a hazing incident 
and the breadth of the number of claims that may be brought to court for resolution. Of 
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all claims, issues of tort liability and negligence are most frequent carrying 49.7% of the 
total claims, followed by civil claims related to 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act at 21.56%. Hazing as its own legal issue was challenged in 20.95% of cases 
(constitutionality of the hazing law was challenged in 8 of those cases), Assault was 
associated in 12.57% of cases and Title IX was challenged in 8.98% of cases. These five 
categories and the case law associated with hazing cases will be explained individually in 
the next section. 
Tort Liability and Negligence 
 For a tort claim to be made against an individual or organization there must exist 
some form of wrongdoing done by one party against the other, and the seeking of a 
remedy for that wrong. The most common tort claim associated with incidents of hazing 
is negligence (Kaplin & Lee, 2007). Negligence is defined in the Restatement of Torts 2nd 
as, “conduct which falls below the standard established by the law for the protection of 
others against unreasonable risk of harm” (Areen, 2009, p. 813). For negligence to be 
applied, the plaintiff must show that the defendant did not establish a reasonable level of 
care for the plaintiff during their period of interaction. This standard of care is often 
referred to as a ‘duty’ within the legal environment. The Restatement of Torts (Third) 
establishes that, “an actor ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the 
actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm” (Abraham, 2008, p. 172). The duty 
established by the law is created when an actor of the organization or the organization’s 
actions increase the risk of harm for another who can establish a “relationship” with the 
organization.  
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Relationship is established when there is reasonable interaction between the two 
parties, enough so that it can be shown in a court that the organization or its agents had 
reasonable cause to protect the individual or when an organization or institution 
establishes a special relationship by undertaking an action on behalf of the plaintiff that 
may create a duty to protect (Areen, 2009; Kaplin & Lee, 2007). For example, a general 
passerby of a social fraternity activity would not have an established relationship with the 
organization simply by passing by the event; however, if the actions of the organization 
created a high risk environment for the general passerby, and his or her safety was put in 
danger by actions of the organization that a reasonable individual under the given 
circumstances would recognize as increasing risk, then a relationship may be established. 
Tort claims of negligence hinge on these two established circumstances, duty and 
relationship, and both must be present for a tort claim to be successful in court. 
As a reminder from Chapter 2, for a negligence case to be successful in court, 
four basic elements of negligence must be proven: (1) duty, (2) breach of duty, (3) 
causation and (4) damage. If just one element of a negligence claim is missing, then the 
case is likely to be dismissed. 
“Duty is about setting limits on responsibilities owed to others” (Bickel & Lake, 
1999, p. 67). The concept of duty sets the parameters on the legal relationships 
individuals have with each other. The concept of foreseeability applies most generally if 
the action an individual undertakes could predictably lead to harm, or if the type of 
activity may likely lead to harm. If this is the case, then the individual, organization, or 
institution owes a duty to the individual to protect them from the foreseeable outcome. In 
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the absence of predictable or likely harm, the individual and/or institution does not 
generally owe a duty to protect to the individual.  
 Once duty has been established in a case of negligence, the second question that is 
applied is Was that duty breached? To answer the question of breach of duty, courts 
again apply the reasonable person test. In this application of the reasonable person test, 
the court seeks to discover if the defendant did what was reasonably expected of him/her 
to protect the plaintiff (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & Lee, 2007).  
 If a plaintiff has successfully established that the defendant owed him/her a duty, 
and that the defendant did in fact breach that duty, the third element of a successful 
negligence case must then be proven. This element, causation, is broken down into two 
specific areas, factual causation and proximate causation (Bickel & Lake, 1999; Kaplin & 
Lee, 2007). The fourth element of a negligence case is damage. In most cases, damage is 
shown through either a physical injury, or a form of mental distress and anguish. If it is 
not the case that the causation resulted in either physical or mental injury, then it is not 
likely that a negligence case will be seen through. 
 Once the four elements of a negligence case are proven, the defendant has the 
right to present various forms of affirmative defense, qualified immunity, contributory 
negligence, or assumption of risk (Bickel & Lake, 1999). Contributory negligence is the 
claim that the individual did not use reasonable care in protecting themselves from injury. 
Assumption of risk is, “a plaintiff voluntarily proceeded in the face of known danger 
effectively demonstrating that the plaintiff was willing to accept the responsibility for any 
injury caused by the risk” (Bickel & Lake, 1999, p. 75).  
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Qualified or Sovereign Immunity is another form of defense used in cases of 
negligence and liability. Qualified Immunity “protects officials from constitutional tort 
claims so long as ‘their conduct does not violate clearly established…constitutional rights 
of which a reasonable person would have known’” (Chen, 2006, p. 229). In the cases in 
this study, qualified immunity is used by various governmental entities and governmental 
employees as a defense against hazing activities that were either precipitated by the 
employee or where the plaintiff believes that the employee, school board, city 
government, etc. should have known that hazing was occurring prior to the incident. 
Qualified Immunity acts as a shield for governmental employees against lawsuits where 
the employee was acting within the scope of their job (Bittner, 2016). The defense of 
Qualified Immunity extends to individuals and government organizations if the employee 
is acting within the scope of their government assigned duties. An example in one of the 
cases in this study, Travis v. Stockstill:  
The plaintiff filed a §1983 claim against the coach and other officials of his high 
school, alleging that the defendants allowed other students to commit acts of 
hazing against the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the school – and by extension, 
its agents- had no affirmative duty to prevent an incident without notice of its 
occurrence, citing ‘this single incident is insufficient to establish a pattern, custom 
or practice of defendants ignoring hazing activity.’ (Bittner, 2016, p. 227) 
 
Qualified Immunity is argued in 36 of the cases where negligence and liability were 
claimed in a hazing incident. 
Court Cases Alleging Negligence Following a Hazing Incident 
 Table 2 lists all cases alleging negligence following an incident of hazing between 
the years of 1980-2013. The table includes the name, state of origin, year, and type of 
case for all 83 cases that occurred during this time frame. The cases are organized 
alphabetically by plaintiff. 
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Table 2. Cases Alleging Negligence Following a Hazing Incident 
Case Name Year State of Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
A.W. v. Lancaster County School District 2010 Nebraska Civil 
Alexander v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity 2006 Tennessee Civil 
Alton v. Major General Ted Hopgood 1998 Texas Civil 
Autry v. Hooker 2009 Tennessee Civil 
Ballou v. Sigma Nu Fraternity 1986 South Carolina Civil 
Bizilj v. St. John's Military School 2009 Kansas Civil 
Brueckner v. Norwich University 1999 Vermont Civil 
Bryant v. Rupp 1981 Florida Civil 
C.H. v. Los Lunas Schools Board of 
Education 2012 New Mexico Civil 
Caldwell v. Griffin Spalding County Board 
of Education 1998 Georgia Civil 
Cappello v. Mucke 2012 Connecticut Civil 
Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha 1998 Ohio Civil 
Cerra v. FEX Fraternity Fraternal 
Organization 1986 Wisconsin Civil 
Clifford v. Regents of University of 
California 2012 California Civil 
Cortese v. West Jefferson Hills 2008 Pennsylvania Civil 
Cox v. Thee Evergreen Church 1992 Texas Civil 
Culbertson v. Fletcher Public Schools 2011 Oklahoma Civil 
Day v. James Towle et al 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Del Valle v. United States of America 1988 Puerto Rico Civil 
Delta Tau Delta v. Tracey Johnson 1999 Indiana Civil 
Duitch v. Canton City Schools 2004 Ohio Civil 
E.F. v. Oberlin City School District 2010 Ohio Civil 
Easler v. Hejaz Temple 1985 South Carolina Civil 
Edwards v. Kappa Alpha Psi 1999 Illinois Civil 
Elbaz v. Beverly Hills Unified School 
District 2007 California Civil 
Ex Parte Barran 1998 Alabama Civil 
Foster v. Beta Mu of Beta Theta Pi 1991 Indiana Civil 
Freeman v. Busch 2003 Iowa Civil 
Furek v. University of Delaware 1988 Delaware Civil 
Garofalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha 2000 Iowa Civil 
Gigger v. Delta Sigma Theta 1998 Oklahoma Civil 
Quinn v. Sigma Rho of Beta Theta Pi 1987 Illinois Civil 
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Table 2. Continued    
Case Name Year State of Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
Grand Aerie Fraternal Order of Eagles v. 
Marlene Carneyhan 2005 Kentucky Civil 
Greenfield v. Michigan State University 1996 Michigan Civil 
Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation 2012 Connecticut Civil 
Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha 2007 Pennsylvania Civil 
Haben v. Anderson 1992 Illinois Civil 
Hancock v. North Sanpete School District 2012 Utah Civil 
Harden v. United States 1980 Georgia Civil 
Harden v. United States II 1982 Georgia Civil 
Helbing v. Hunt 2012 Texas Civil 
Hernandez v. Delta Tau Delta 1995 Arizona Civil 
Hilton v. Lincoln Way High School 1998 Illinois Civil 
Jolevare v. Alpha Kappa Alpha  2007 DC Civil 
Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order 1997 Alabama Civil 
Kenner v. Kappa Alpha Psi 2002 Pennsylvania Civil 
Knoll v. Board of Regents Univ of Nebraska 1999 Nebraska Civil 
Kruger v. Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Landmark American Insurance Company v. 
Rider University 2010 New Jersey Civil 
Lapp v. Jackson Township Board of Ed 2006 New Jersey Civil 
Lloyd v. Alpha Phi Alpha 1999 New York Civil 
Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire department 1980 New York Civil 
Marcinczyk v. State of New Jersey Police 
Training Commission 2010 New Jersey Civil 
Martin v. North Metro Fire Rescue District 2007 Colorado Civil 
McCarthy v. Omega Psi Phi 2011 Illinois Civil 
Meeker v. Edmundson 2005 North Carolina Civil 
Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi 1999 Louisiana Civil 
Nisbet v. Bucher 1997 Missouri Civil 
Nkemakolam v. St. John's Military School 2012 Kansas Civil 
Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity 1997 New York Criminal 
Pawlowski v. Delta Sigma Phi Fraternity 2010 Connecticut Civil 
Pelham v. Board of Regents 2013 Georgia Civil 
Perkins v. Commonwealth 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Perkins v. Massachusetts 1995 Massachusetts Civil 
Pik v. The University of Pennsylvania 2010 Pennsylvania Civil 
Poway Unified Schools v. Superior Court of 
San Diego County 1998 California Civil 
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Table 2. Continued 
Case Name Year State of Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
Prime v. Beta Gamma Chapter of Pi Kappa 
Alpha 2002 Kansas Civil 
Quinn v. Sigma Rho of Beta Theta Pi 1987 Illinois Civil 
Redden v. Alpha Kappa Alpha Sorority 2010 Ohio Civil 
Reeves v. Arnold Besonen and Owendale 
Gagetown Area Schools 1991 Michigan Civil 
Rocha v. Faltys 2002 Texas Civil 
Roe v. Gustine Unified School District 2009 California Civil 
Rupp v. Bryant 1982 Florida Civil 
Sharkey v. Board of Regents Univ of 
Nebraska 2000 Nebraska Civil 
Skinner v. City of Miami 1995 Florida Civil 
Smith v. Delta Tau Delta 2013 Indiana Civil 
Travis v. Cayne Stockstill 2013 Mississippi Civil 
Vega v. Sacred Heart University 2012 Connecticut Civil 
Waddill v. Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity 2003 Texas Civil 
Wakulich v. Mraz 2003 Illinois Civil 
Walker v. Phi Beta Sigma Fraternity 1997 Louisiana Civil 
Wencho v. Lakewood 2008 Ohio Civil 
Williams v. Lincoln Tower Associates 1991 Illinois Civil 
Yost v. Wabash College 2012 Indiana Civil 
 
 Table 2 identifies that 82 of the 83 cases (98.79%) alleging negligence appear in 
Civil Court and seek monetary damages following the incident. One case Oja v. Theta 
Chi Fraternity (1997) involved both civil claims of negligence and criminal charges of 
hazing. Additionally, negligence cases were argued in 32 states and 2 districts (DC and 
Puerto Rico) with the State of Illinois having the most number of negligence cases 
(seven), followed by Texas (five), and Georgia (five). This data reveals that negligence 
per se following a hazing case is the most predominantly argued legal claim and occurs 
across the largest number of states. Within negligence per se cases, liability is argued in 
96.39% of cases (80/83), duty is argued in 78.31% of cases (65 of 83), premises liability 
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is argued in 12.05% of cases (10 of 83), sovereign or qualified immunity is used as a 
defense in 43.37% of cases (36 of 83) and agency is argued in 15.66% of cases (13 of 
83).  The next section discusses the cases courts have relied upon to set precedent using 
legal reasoning. 
Ballou v. Sigma Nu (1986) 291 S.C.140; 352 S.E.2d 488 (S.C.) 
 In Ballou v. Sigma Nu the plaintiff, acting on behalf of a deceased pledge who 
died because of acute intoxication from a hazing incident, brought suit against the local 
and national fraternity. The civil trial ensued over issues of negligence, duty, proximate 
cause, and contributory negligence. The Court of Appeals of South Carolina ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff stating, "under South Carolina law, a fraternal organization owed a 
duty of care to its initiates not to cause them injury in the process" (Ballou v. Sigma Nu, 
1986, p. 488). Defendant fraternity claimed that the actions of the deceased led to the 
death and that even if a duty existed, the proximate cause of death was the deceased’s 
consumption of alcohol, not the breach of duty. The court held that the jury could 
reasonably have found that the fraternity was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. 
“Based on evidence, it was reasonable to infer that the decedent would not have 
consumed a fatal amount of alcohol without the prompting of the active brothers" (Ballou 
v. Sigma Nu, 1986, p. 494). 
The court reasoned that the deceased was responsible for a portion of the risk 
(assumption of risk), but the deceased may not have been aware of the full danger 
involved in his intoxication.  
As we view the evidence in the instant case, Barry (deceased) voluntarily 
assumed the risk of the dangers imposed by a situation involving verbal and 
physical hazing and consumption of alcohol to the point of intoxication; however, 
he did not as a matter of law freely and voluntarily with full knowledge of its 
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nature and extent incur the risk of the dangers created by Sigma Nu's action of 
promoting extreme intoxication. (Ballou v. Sigma Nu, 1986, p. 495)  
 
The court ruled that the deceased may have understood that hazing would occur within 
the fraternity (based on previous knowledge of the organization) but assumed only the 
risks associated with verbal and physical abuse, not the risks associated with extreme 
intoxication. The local fraternity was found to have been negligent in its actions, to have 
breached a duty not to injure the deceased, and to have caused actions that led directly to 
the damage (death) of the plaintiff.  
The national fraternal organization was also found by the court to have some 
responsibility in this matter.  
Because it was within Sigma Nu's interest that new members be received, we are 
satisfied that the local chapter in conducting hell night and in requiring the 
pledges to participate in hell night as a condition of membership in Sigma Nu 
acted within the scope of the apparent authority conferred on it by Sigma Nu 
(National). Sigma Nu, then, was bound by the acts of its local chapter in this 
instance since they were performed within the apparent scope of its authority. 
(Ballou v. Sigma Nu, 1986, p. 496)  
 
This was in reaction to the argument by Sigma Nu National Fraternity that the National 
Organization did not owe a duty of care to the plaintiff as the national organization was 
not involved in the day to day operations of the local chapter. This is a common argument 
among national fraternities to escape liability from the actions of a local chapter and in 
this instance, the argument was not successful. The next case, Garafalo v. Lambda Chi 
Alpha (2000) alleged a similar set of circumstances, but the plaintiff was not forced to 
consume alcohol as a part of the hazing and initiation procedures. 
Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha (2000) 616 N.W.2d 647 (Iowa) 
In a similar set of circumstances, Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha (2000) presented 
a case where the local fraternity and national fraternity were found not to have breached a 
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duty in the death of plaintiff Garafalo. This case was heard by the Supreme Court of Iowa 
on appeal of summary judgement regarding breach of duty against a fraternity and its 
members following the death of a new member from pulmonary asphyxiation due to 
alcohol consumption post a Big Brother ritual (Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha, 2000).  
In this case the Supreme Court found that no duty existed because the member 
was not coerced or forced to consume alcohol, but instead was offered alcohol by the 
upper-class members of the organization. The decision was that Garafalo’s decision to 
consume alcohol beyond the point of intoxication was the proximate cause of death and 
the fraternity members did not owe a duty to Garafalo to not allow him to continue 
consumption. This case offered a dissenting opinion to the majority on behalf of the 
Plaintiff:  
We have said that negligence is the breach of duty or obligation recognized by the 
law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the 
protection of others against unreasonable risks. It has been defined as conduct 
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risk of harm. It is immaterial whether the standard is one 
imposed by the rule of common law requiring the exercise of ordinary care not to 
injure one another. (Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha, 2000, p. 656)  
 
The dissenting opinion identified that though there is no legal statute that has specifically 
outlined the duty to protect someone from the specific risk of alcohol assumption, the 
spirit of the law was to protect against ‘unreasonable risks’ such as over-consumption 
that leads to death. An important distinction when reviewing legal cases is the difference 
between decisions made by strict adherence to the law as written, and decisions made by 
interpreting the ‘spirit of the law.’ The next case, Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter (1987), 
provides a court decision in Illinois where social-host liability is provided as a shield for 
the injury of a student. 
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Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter (1987) 155 Ill. App. 3d 231; 507 N.E.2d 1193 (Ill. App.) 
The Appellate Court of Illinois set a new standard for the state of Illinois allowing 
a social host to be considered negligent if (1) consumption of alcohol is coerced and (2) it 
is in relation to a hazing incident (Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter, 1987). In previous case 
law, a social host was considered to have no duty to protect against injury following the 
consumption of alcohol by a guest in the State of Illinois. By adding an additional 
condition “fraternities could be held liable for injuries sustained when requiring those 
seeking membership to engage in illegal and very dangerous activities,” the Quinn ruling 
moved away from Dram-Shop Act and social host laws to a new era of liability (Quinn v. 
Sigma Rho Chapter, 1987, p. 1198).   
The facts describe a fraternity function where plaintiff was required to drink to 
intoxication in order to become a member of the fraternity. We cannot close our 
eyes to the fact that the abuse illustrated in the present case could have resulted in 
the termination of life and the plaintiff was coerced into being his own 
executioner. (Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter, 1987, p. 1197)  
 
The Appellate Court of Illinois provided voice to the joint responsibility for hazing and 
alcohol consumption in this case.  
Plaintiff's actions in participating in the ceremony were voluntary. Yet, 
membership in the defendant fraternity was a 'much valued status.' It can be 
assumed that great social pressure was applied to plaintiff to comply with the 
fraternity's membership qualifications perhaps to the extent of blinding plaintiff to 
any dangers he might face. (Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter, 1987)  
 
The court spoke of the coercive nature of an organizational environment where 
membership in the organization brings additional benefit to the individual. The court 
identified that in this case there is importance in recognizing the action of consuming 
alcohol, the coercion of the surrounding members, and the value of ongoing membership 
in the organization when determining negligence in these cases. The fraternity was 
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deemed to have a duty not to harm the plaintiff during the new member process. The 
provision and consumption of alcohol in this process may divert some assumption of risk 
to the plaintiff, but the organization could not lean on social-host liability as a shield for 
negligence and duty. The next case, Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity (1997) builds upon the 
Quinn ruling in the State of New York. 
Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity (1997) 174 Misc. 2d 966; 667 N.Y.S.2d 650 (N.Y.) 
In the Supreme Court of New York, defendant Theta Chi Fraternity made a 
motion to dismiss the “private right of action” in this criminal case (with civil 
implications) (Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity, 1997). The overall motion to dismiss was 
denied. The court accepted that plaintiff father Oja on behalf of his deceased son alleged 
that the fraternity action of hazing caused the plaintiff to consume alcohol and the 
subsequent death of the plaintiff may have resulted from the negligence of the fraternity. 
Like Illinois, the Supreme Court of New York states:  
No such revulsion (to the rewarding of youthful drunks) seems justified in relation 
to the injuries and deaths sustained by adolescents who trade their insecurities and 
free will for the promise of acceptance, and prestige, that fraternity membership 
appears to confer. A jury might find that the stoic acceptance of pain and 
discomfort by a pledge, as the price of admission to the fraternal mysteries is not 
truly voluntary. (Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity, 1997, p. 652)  
 
Through this case, the State of New York leaned on Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter to set 
precedent for future cases that the promise of status related to fraternity membership can 
overcome social-host liability laws that were put into place to protect against the “self-
indulgence of youthful drunks” (p. 652). This earning of status was enunciated by this 
quote from the court, "Hazing assumes a degree of willingness by college youths to be 
bullied and humiliated in exchange for the social acceptance which comes with 
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membership in a circle which may seem alluring and even exalted" (Oja v. Theta Chi 
Fraternity, 1997, p. 652). 
The Supreme Court of New York provided further commentary about the 
coercive environment of hazing stating, “Courts have recognized the enormous peer 
pressure operating upon young men, who find themselves in the throes of male bonding. 
...the coercive effect of the initiation ritual and related issues of culpable conduct, are 
questions for the trier of fact to resolve" (Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity, 1997, p. 652). With 
this decision, the Supreme Court of New York allowed the members of Theta Chi 
Fraternity to be held both criminally responsible for the death of the plaintiff, and for 
civil actions for negligence and liability to run concurrently. Not all states were as quick 
to adopt and apply the duty of the fraternity to not injure a new member as discussed in 
Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order (1997) and Ex Parte Barran (1998). 
Ex Parte Barran (1998) 730 So. 2d 203 (Ala.)  
Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order (1997) 730 So. 2d 197 (Ala.) 
 
Ex Parte Barran (1998) was a continuation of Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order and 
set a different standard for assumption of risk in a hazing case in the State of Alabama. 
Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order was heard in the Civil Court of Appeals of Alabama, and 
negligence was remanded back to trial court. The trial court ruled that by joining an 
organization known for hazing, the pledge assumed the risk of hazing and could not in 
turn sue the local fraternity for damages associated with the hazing. The reversal of 
summary judgement in the Civil Court of Appeals granted that just because a pledge 
voluntarily continued his membership in a fraternity that engaged in hazing, the pledge 
did not release the individual members and chapter from negligence and duty (Jones v. 
Kappa Alpha Order, 1997). The Civil Court of Appeals stated: 
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We conclude that in today's society numerous college students are confronted 
with great pressures associated with fraternity life and that compliance with the 
initiation requirements places the students in a position of functioning in what 
may be construed as a coercive environment. Thus, we believe that fair-minded 
persons in the exercise of impartial judgment could reasonably infer that Jones's 
decision to remain a pledge, under the circumstances, was, in fact, not voluntary. 
(Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, 1997, p. 200)   
 
The Civil Court of Appeals acknowledged that hazing occurs in an environment that 
coerces the individual to continue in order to gain the social status of association with the 
organization. This environment could lead reasonable individuals to endure activities that 
they would not otherwise endure to continue their membership. The Civil Court of 
Appeals of Alabama asserted a duty upon organizations to conduct membership 
processes free of hazing. "We conclude that the individual KA members had a legal duty 
to conduct a pledging process/initiation ceremony free from hazing tactics, and that civil 
liability may properly arise from a breach of that duty" (Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order, 
1997, p. 203).  
In Ex Parte Barran, the Alabama Supreme Court reversed the decision of the 
Appellate Court and determined that the victim of hazing assumed the risk associated 
with hazing by joining and participating in a voluntary association. With this ruling, the 
fraternity was deemed not to be negligent in the conduct or injury of a pledge following a 
hazing incident; however, the individual hazer may face charges related to assault or 
other criminal offenses, but the organization shall not be named negligent.  
Jones's deposition indicates that before he became a KA pledge he was unfamiliar 
with the specific hazing practices engaged in at KA, but that hazing began within 
two days of becoming a pledge; that despite the severe and continuing nature of 
the hazing, Jones remained a pledge and continued to participate in the hazing 
activities for a full academic year; that Jones knew and appreciated that hazing 
was both illegal and against school rules; and that he repeatedly helped KA cover 
up the hazing by lying about its occurrence to school officials. (Ex Parte Barran, 
1998, p. 206) 
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The Alabama Supreme Court placed the assumption of risk upon Jones for his continued 
involvement in the organization after the hazing began and after seeing other members of 
his pledge class quit the organization. The fact that Jones was ultimately injured by an act 
of hazing only matters in an individual capacity and the organization was freed of any 
duty to protect Jones from injury. The Alabama Supreme Court added that the coercive 
environment did not create proximate cause for Jones’s injury.  
Jones claims a coercive environment hampered his free will to the extent that he 
could not voluntarily choose to leave the fraternity. College students are not 
children. Save for very few legal exceptions, they are adult citizens, ready, able, 
and willing to be responsible for their own actions. (Ex Parte Barran, 1998, p. 
206)  
 
With this decision Alabama became the only state where consent to participate in hazing 
could be used as a defense of hazing by an organization. It is important to note the 
dissenting opinion in Ex Parte Barran (1998):  
I cannot condone a practice that exploits the desire to be admitted to 'the 
fraternity' to the extent it is exploited here. As I understand it, a pledge must be 
willing to undergo the degrading, disgusting, and no doubt, health-threatening 
practices to meet 'the fraternity's' high standards for admission. No one should be 
required to wallow in feces, vomit, and urine to gain admission to any 'club.' The 
sadness is that so many are willing to do so. I believe the legislature meant to 
address this practice by enacting β 16-1-23. (p. 208) 
 
The dissenting opinion does not alter the law as it was adjudicated in Alabama; however, 
it provided a basis for judicial review by other states, one that may alter the interpretation 
of consent as a defense in the adjudication of hazing in the future. Moving to the 
responsibility of universities to protect against injury of students in their care, Furek v. 
Delaware (1991) discusses the role of the University.  
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Furek v. Delaware (1991) 594 A.2d 506 (Del.) 
Furek v. Delaware (1991) involved a student who was injured as part of a 
fraternity-hazing incident where horseplay got out of hand and a cleaning solution was 
poured onto the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Delaware determined that the local and 
national fraternities were not party in this case. The local fraternity had been dissolved 
following the incident and as an unincorporated organization, no person was able to stand 
in representation of the organization.  
The Superior Court granted both motions ruling that in order to serve a defunct 
unincorporated association, as Sig Ep became when its charter was revoked, 
service was required to be made on each of the former members and not simply 
upon a former officer. Because Furek had failed to serve each of the members of 
the local fraternity, the action against the local fraternity was dismissed. (Furek v. 
Delaware, 1991, p. 512)  
 
The national organization was deemed to not have control over the actions of the local 
fraternity when the local fraternity represented itself to the national fraternity as 
following the rules and regulations set forth by the national organization (Furek v. 
Delaware, 1991).  
The University in this case maintained some liability in areas where it had 
attempted to control behavior.  
The evidence in this record strongly suggests that the University not only was 
knowledgeable of the dangers of hazing, but, in repeated communications to 
students in general and fraternities, emphasized the University policy of discipline 
for hazing infractions. The University policy against hazing like its overall 
commitment to provide security on its campus thus constituted an assumed duty 
which became 'an indispensable part of the bundle of services which colleges 
afford their students.' (Furek v. Delaware, 1991, p. 520) 
  
Because the University had knowledge of previous hazing incidents on the campus and 
had instituted policies to address hazing on campus, the University created a duty of care 
and that duty was breached in the injury of plaintiff Furek. Building upon the Furek 
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ruling, Knoll v. University of Nebraska (1991) discusses premises liability and 
foreseeability in a hazing incident. 
Knoll v. Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska (1999) 601 N.W.2d 757 
(Nebraska) 
 In Knoll v. Board of Regents, the trial court ruled that, following a hazing 
incident, the University of Nebraska did not have a duty to protect its students from harm. 
The Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed the decision of the lower court finding that a 
university has a duty to protect against harm in property controlled by the university 
(Knoll v. Board of Regents, 1999). In this incident, the university had been aware of other 
hazing incidents on campus and of the previous misbehavior of a fraternal organization 
prior to the injury of plaintiff during a hazing incident. For this reason, the university was 
found to have been negligent in their oversight and to have breached a duty to protect.  
The University was aware of at least two hazing incidents involving other 
fraternities and was aware of several instances of criminal conduct involving Fiji 
members. There is evidence that the University exercised control over the FIJI 
house by considering it to be a student housing unit subject to the Code of Student 
Conduct. The Code contained regulations prohibiting certain conduct including 
consumption of alcohol; unreasonably dangerous conduct, including but not 
limited to hazing and violation of Nebraska laws, which prohibit hazing and the 
provision of liquor to minors. The facts show that the University was aware of 
prior hazing instances where students had grabbed and physically removed other 
students from buildings, had coerced other students into drinking alcohol, and had 
engaged in other harassing activities. As such we conclude that the University 
owes a landowner-invitee duty to students to take reasonable steps to protect 
against foreseeable acts of hazing, including student abduction on the University's 
property, and the harm that naturally flows therefrom. (Knoll v. Board of Regents, 
1999, p. 764) 
 
Knoll provided that Universities have a duty to provide reasonable care for their students 
in properties owned or overseen by the University, or in properties that have jurisdiction 
to the University Code of Student Conduct. By having knowledge of previous incidents 
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of misbehavior within the FIJI organization, and knowledge of other fraternities 
conducting similar hazing incidents on campus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled 
that a reasonable person could conclude that the injury of plaintiff Knoll was foreseeable 
and liability and negligence on behalf of the institution can be reasonably argued in a trial 
(Knoll v. Board of Regents, 1999). Beyond premises liability lies the discussion of 
Sovereign Immunity by governmental employees and government agencies. Bryant v. 
Rupp (1981) looks at this issue in a high school. 
Bryant v. Rupp (1981) 399 So. 2d 417 (Fla.)   
Rupp v. Bryant (1982) 417 So. 2d. 658 (Fla.) 
 
 Bryant v. Rupp (1981) was heard by the District Court of Appeal of Florida on 
appeal of a trial court decision to “dismiss negligence complaints against appellees school 
board, faculty advisor, and principal” (p. 417) based on sovereign immunity. In this case, 
plaintiff, a high school student, was injured as part of a hazing incident during initiation 
into the Omega Club. Defendant Rupp served as an advisor to the club, and the High 
School had been made aware of previous violations of school board regulations during 
club activities. Additionally, the school had a rule that a faculty advisor must be present 
at all activities that occurred outside the normal school day (Rupp v. Bryant, 1981).  
Appellate court reversed the order of lower court stating: 
Father and son ‘sufficiently alleged proximate cause and foreseeability in 
connection with appellant son's injury at an off-campus, school sponsored 
extracurricular club's initiation ceremony. Appellants alleged that Rupp knew of 
the club's reputation, the planning session, the initiation, and planned the hazing 
ceremony. Assuming these facts to be true, the school board and its agents had a 
duty to execute and implement board policy without negligence.’ (Rupp v. Bryant, 
1981, p. 417) 
 
In reversing the decision, the court identified that Rupp and Principal of the school were 
negligent in their failure to supervise the activities of an organization that was known to 
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conduct activities against school board policy. This negligence in the “willful and 
wanton” failure to perform their duties removed the sovereign immunity from these 
individual actors. 
 Rupp v. Bryant (1982) was heard by the Supreme Court of Florida on appeal of 
the lower court decision. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Court 
in part and reversed in part. The Supreme Court agreed that Rupp and defendant Principal 
Stasco had a responsibility to supervise the activities of the Omega Club and that these 
responsibilities were not discretionary and thus defendants do not enjoy official immunity 
(Rupp v. Bryant, 1982).  
Under the circumstances of this case, the specific duty to supervise the club was 
required by the school board’s own regulations, we have no difficulty in 
denominating such a duty as ministerial. Because the duty does not involve 
discretion in the policy-making sense, neither the principal nor the teacher may 
raise the shield of official immunity. (Rupp v. Bryant, 1982, p. 22)  
 
The court acknowledged that the school had assumed a duty to protect and supervise the 
activities of its students by requiring all student organizations to have an advisor assigned 
to them. Defendant Rupp’s inattention to their initiation planning meeting was 
determined to have some proximate cause in the injury to plaintiff. 
 The Supreme Court of Florida however diverted from the decision of the lower 
court on the issue of “willful and wanton negligence” (Rupp v. Bryant, 1982). The court 
determined that though the plaintiff used language that describes the actions of defendant 
as reckless, this did not make the actions so.  
Gross negligence must be established by facts evincing a reckless disregard for 
human life or rights which is equivalent to an intentional act or a conscious 
indifference to the consequences of an act. The facts alleged simply cannot 
support imputation to defendants of intent or conscious indifference, and therefore 
fail to state a cause of action for exemplary damages. (Rupp v. Bryant, 1982, p. 
36)  
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The Supreme Court ruled that the actions of defendant Rupp were indeed negligent in his 
supervision of the organization but were not indifferent or intent to cause harm upon the 
plaintiff. This distinction altered the level of damages available to the plaintiff and the 
severity of claims against the defendant. This case in the whole identified that negligence 
could be applied to state actors in their individual capacities through the failure to 
perform duties that the state has put in place for the protection of others. Even when 
sovereign immunity is applied, it did not provide the individual actor full protection from 
state tort claims. Harden v. United States (1980 & 1982) looks at the application of 
immunity and the concept of comparative negligence. 
Harden v. United States (1980) 485 F. Supp. 380 (US Dist.) 
Harden v. United States (1982) 688 F.2d 1025 (US App.) 
 
 These cases were first heard in the District Court for the Southern District of 
Georgia and then on appeal by the government in the Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit. The case involved a hazing incident that occurred at a campsite where young 
men were stripped naked, had various food items poured upon them, and were ordered to 
run through other campsites (Harden v. United States, 1980). While on their excursion, 
fellow campers complained to the park ranger who encountered plaintiff son Harden and 
ordered him to stop. When Harden (and friend) did not stop the Ranger moved to fire a 
warning shot, but in the process of firing the shot, his truck stalled, and the Ranger’s gun 
was discharged at Harden mortally wounding him.   
The District Court of Georgia found the Ranger liable for the death of Harden but 
also ruled that Harden was contributorily negligent in his own death.  
I have concluded that the defendant is liable for the death of Clay Harden. 
However, Clay Harden also was negligent. He failed to exercise ordinary care and 
diligence in several ways. He, too, owed a duty to the public and other users of 
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the Ridge Road campsites. It is true that he was only walking along the side of the 
road when he was shot. Nevertheless, he had failed to heed the command to halt 
given by Ranger Strang (Harden v. United States, 1980, p. 391).  
 
Contributory negligence utilizes a percentage of fault and liability for an incident, and in 
this case, the District Court ruled that the Ranger and Army Corps of Engineers (who 
provided the truck that stalled) were 75% responsible for the death of Harden and that 
Harden’s own actions contributed 25% of the fault. This distribution of damages was the 
subject of appeal in Harden v. United States (1982). 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit upheld the decision of the 
District Court that the Ranger and Army Corps of Engineers were 75% liable for death, 
and that Clay Harden was 25% liable for his own death (Harden v. United States, 1982). 
The Court of Appeals remanded the decision for inflationary damages back to the lower 
court based on Georgia state law for percentages of wrongful death suits. Of note in this 
case was the contributory and comparative negligence of the Ranger and of Harden, but 
not the organization that created the hazing environment. 
Conclusion of Tort Liability for Negligence 
 The cases above present judicial opinions in 12 cases across 12 states where tort 
liability for negligence and duty was claimed. The cases represent those cited most for 
future opinions on negligence, liability, and duty when hazing has been alleged as a 
precipitating factor. The cases also present the range of issues associated with incidents 
of hazing in civil cases including, sovereign immunity, premises liability, comparative 
negligence, contributory negligence, social-host liability, and agency. These factors are 
important in considering how the courts may treat incidents of hazing in relation to tort 
liability and negligence. 
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42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was put in place by the Federal Government to 
protect the rights of citizens against public action by the state or by the actions of other 
individuals (Chambers, 2008). This act outlined the prohibition of discrimination “based 
on race, color, sex, religion, and national origin in places of public accommodation, in 
federally assisted programs, in employment, in schools, and with respect to voting rights” 
(Chambers, 2008, p. 326). This seminal piece of legislature set up eleven Titles of 
varying purposes. Some of the original Titles of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 have been 
superseded by subsequent acts, but Titles II, VI, VII & IX are relied upon by the courts 
heavily still today (Chambers, 2008).  
 § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act remains as an “unsettled technical problem of 
litigation” in today’s courts (Kates & Kouba, 1972, p. 131). § 1983, the Civil Action for 
Deprivation of Rights states: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or 
usage, of any State or territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to 
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities 
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in 
any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such 
officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of 
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered a 
statute of the District of Columbia. (Government Publishing Office, Retrieved 
March 14, 2018) 
 
This section of the law provides that citizens of the United States and its territories are 
assured their constitutional rights and the protections provided by law, and that no other 
person within the United States or territories shall be allowed to deprive a citizen of these 
rights. Should a citizen be deprived of their constitutional rights, an action under 42 
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U.S.C. § 1983 may be brought to Federal Civil Court for remedy (Kates & Kouba, 1972; 
Blackman, 1985). Important to note is that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 did not create new rights for 
citizens of the United States but instead guaranteed the rights already provided by the 
United States Constitution and its Amendments. This section of law is used widely as the 
basis for tort claims when a citizen perceives an injury to have occurred (Blackman, 
1985). 
 Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the basic constitutional rights of the United 
States of America are guaranteed. Thirty-seven cases of hazing in the United States from 
1980-2013 have alleged violations of these Constitutional Rights, including violations of 
the First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, 
and general discrimination (as protected by the Civil Rights Act). The First Amendment 
reads, “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting 
the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances” (United States Constitution First Amendment, 1776). The First Amendment 
protects the citizens’ right to freedom of religion, speech, the press, and association. In 
cases alleging hazing, the violation of freedom of association and freedom of speech are 
most often claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  
 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution states, “The right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” (United States Constitution Fourth 
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Amendment, 1776). The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures by the government or by another individual. In cases alleging hazing, the 
violation of unreasonable seizure is most often claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The 
Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution states,  
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, 
unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in 
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or 
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put 
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. (United States Constitution Fifth Amendment, 1776)  
 
The Fifth Amendment protects against self-incrimination and double jeopardy within the 
United States judicial system. In cases alleging hazing, the violation of self-incrimination 
is most often claimed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In some states, hazing is required to be 
reported and those who fail to report hazing are subject under the law to be in violation. 
The fifth amendment comes into play as the victim of a hazing case would be committing 
self-incrimination by reporting that he/she had participated in the hazing. Section one of 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution states: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No 
state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. (United States Constitution 
Fourteenth Amendment, 1776).  
 
The Fourteenth Amendment provides the citizens’ equal protection to due process of law 
and to not be punished without the due process of the law. In cases alleging hazing, the 
violation of punishment without due process and equal protection is most often claimed 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
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 Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 states, “No person in the 
United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any 
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance” (Civil Rights Act Online). 
This is the first mention of non-discrimination based on race, color, or national origin by 
the federal government. The government would go on to add protections against 
discrimination based on sex, religion, age, and disability in subsequent legislation. In 
cases alleging hazing, violations of non-discrimination are claimed based on the belief 
that certain members of a group, company, organization, team, etc. were hazed because 
of their race, color, national origin, sex, religion, or other protected status.  
Court Cases Alleging Violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
Table 3 lists all cases alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights 
Act following an incident of hazing between the years of 1980-2013. The table includes 
the name, state of origin, year, and type of case for all 36 cases that occurred during this 
time frame. The cases are organized alphabetically by plaintiff. 
Table 3 identifies that 36 of 37 cases (97.29%) alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 
§1983 of the Civil Rights Act appear in Civil Court and seek monetary damages 
following the incident. One case, Missouri v. Allen, (1995) appears as a Criminal case 
that also alleges Civil Rights violations. Additionally, violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of 
the Civil Rights Act were argued in 21 states with California, Massachusetts, and Texas 
each having four cases. This data reveals that violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act following a hazing case is the second most predominantly argued legal claim. 
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Table 3. Cases Alleging Violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights Act  
Case Name Year 
State of 
Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
Alton v. Major General Ted Hopgood 1998 Texas Civil 
Alton v. Texas A&M 1999 Texas Civil 
Autry v. Hooker 2009 Tennessee Civil 
Cardenas v. Tulare County Sheriff's Department 2013 California Civil 
Chisler v. Johnston 2010 Pennsylvania Civil 
Cioffi v. Averill Park Central School Board 2005 New York Civil 
Clifford v. Regents of University of California 2012 California Civil 
Culbertson v. Fletcher Public Schools 2011 Oklahoma Civil 
Davis v. Carmel Clay Schools 2013 Indiana Civil 
Day v. James Towle et al 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard 1999 Massachusetts Civil 
Diaz v. City of Springfield Illinois 1998 Illinois Civil 
Dixon v. Picayune School District 2013 Mississippi Civil 
Fink v. California State University Northridge 2006 California Civil 
Givens v. Quinn 2005 Virginia Civil 
Greenfield v. Michigan State University 1996 Michigan Civil 
Hancock v. North Sanpete School District 2012 Utah Civil 
Hilton v. Lincoln Way High School 1998 Illinois Civil 
Johnson v. Atlantic County 2010 New Jersey Civil 
Martin v. North Metro Fire Rescue District 2007 Colorado Civil 
Meeker v. Edmundson 2005 North Carolina Civil 
Mentavlos v. Anderson 2001 South Carolina Civil 
Mentavlos v. Anderson 2000 South Carolina Civil 
Missouri v. Allen 1995 Missouri Criminal 
Perkins v. Commonwealth 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Perkins v. Massachusetts 1995 Massachusetts Civil 
Phelps v. Colby College 1990 Maine Civil 
Pik v. The University of Pennsylvania 2010 Pennsylvania Civil 
Reeves v. Arnold Besonen and Owendale Gagetown  1991 Michigan Civil 
Roe v. Gustine Unified School District 2009 California Civil 
Seamons v. Snow 1996 Utah Civil 
Sechrist v. Unified Government of Wyandotte  1999 Kansas Civil 
Skinner v. City of Miami 1995 Florida Civil 
Travis v. Cayne Stockstill 2013 Mississippi Civil 
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Company 1982 Texas Civil 
Williams v. Walter 2008 Illinois Civil 
Wolf v. Webb 2012 Texas Civil 
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cases (13/37), violations of the Fourth Amendment (unreasonable search and seizure) is 
argued in 27.02% of cases (10/37), violations of First Amendment (freedom of speech 
and freedom of association) are argued in 13.51% of cases (5 of 37), and discrimination-
based race or gender is argued in 18.92% of cases (7 of 37).  It is important to note that 
cases are not mutually exclusive of each other and there is overlap between the alleged 
violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights Act. The next section provides a look at 
the cases used to set precedent that allege violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 following a hazing incident. 
Seamons v. Snow (1996) 84 F.3d 1226 (US App.) 
 This case was brought before the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit on appeal from the US District Court for the District of Utah. Plaintiff Seamons 
was the victim of a hazing incident associated with his membership on the football team 
at his local high school. The incident alleged that Seamons was tied naked in the locker 
room and exhibited to other students (Seamons v. Snow, 1996). Following the incident, 
Seamons reported the incident to the school administration and was eventually dismissed 
by defendant Snow from the team for failure to apologize to the team for making the 
report. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered additional harassment from other students after 
the football team was forced to forfeit the post-season game due to their involvement in 
the incident. Upon hearing the complaints from plaintiff, administrators at the High 
School encouraged plaintiff to attend a different school in a different city to escape and 
avoid the harassment at plaintiff’s original high school (Seamons v. Snow, 1996).  
Seamons brought forth allegations of violations of his constitutional rights based 
on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming he was deprived of his Fourth Amendment right to 
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protection against unreasonable search and seizure, First Amendment rights to freedom of 
speech, and violations of Title IX for sex and gender-based discrimination (Seamons v. 
Snow, 1996). The district court dismissed all claims based on failure to state a claim, and 
US Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the decision related to the Fourth 
Amendment and Title IX claims and reversed and remanded the decision on the First 
Amendment. For Title IX the court stated:  
There is an important difference between (1) a 'hostile' environment created 
primarily by a student body which disapproved of Brian's response to his assault 
and which, rightly or wrongly, attributed responsibility to Brian for the 
cancellation of the school's post-season football game, and (2) a sexually charged 
hostile environment cognizable of sexual harassment. (Seamons v. Snow, 1996, p. 
1232).  
 
The court determined that Seamons’s claim of discrimination based on sex was not valid 
and there was a difference between a student body that was hostile toward an individual 
and a culture of sex-based discrimination where students are kept from certain rights and 
privileges because of their sex. 
 On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court ruled that plaintiff Seamons “failed to 
allege facts to support the defendants (coach, administrators, and school board) acted 
with an intent to harm him. In fact, the case showed that school officials attempted to 
punish the football team for the assault on Brian” (Seamons v. Snow, 1996, p. 1236). 
Plaintiff’s claim that his due process rights were violated failed due to a failure to allege 
facts that he was harmed by the actions of the principal and school board following the 
incident. The court also determined that plaintiff did not have a right to attend a specific 
school in a specific school district and his choice to change schools did not equate to a 
loss of constitutionally provided rights or privileges (Seamons v. Snow, 1996). 
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The Court of Appeals did however reverse the decision of the lower court related 
to the first amendment, stating that it was Seamons's right to report the physical assault 
and he should not have been denied that right by administrators (Seamons v. Snow, 1996). 
“In regard to Brian, it appears he was denied a benefit (participation on the football team) 
because of his decision to tell his parents and school officials about the incident in the 
locker room. Brian’s actions certainly constitute speech (Seamons v. Snow, 1996, p. 
1237). By removing plaintiff from the team following his report to school officials, the 
coach and others involved violated the plaintiff’s right to free speech as it was in his 
interest to speak out against the physical assaults he was party to and Seamons should not 
have feared any repercussions for doing so. On this count, the Coach and other 
defendants did not enjoy qualified immunity and could be held liable for their actions 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 
Missouri v. Allen (1995) 905 S.W.2d 874 (Mo.) 
 This case was brought before the Supreme Court of Missouri on appeal from the 
Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. Defendant Allen in this case was convicted by the 
trial court on five counts of hazing and brought this challenge before the court claiming 
that his constitutionally protected rights (First, Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth 
Amendments) were violated by the hazing law (Missouri v. Allen, 1995). Additionally, 
the defendant claimed that the law itself was over-broad, vague, and underserving. The 
Supreme Court of Missouri affirmed the convictions and upheld the hazing law.  
Allen claimed that the hazing law itself was “vague, unclear and overbroad” and 
invoked challenges to the Fifth Amendment guarantee of due process which was “made 
applicable to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment” (Missouri v. Allen, 1995, p. 
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876). Challenges in the court for overbreadth and vagueness are commonly related to 
hazing statutes and the Supreme Court of Missouri dismisses them stating,  
It is of course virtually impossible for the legislature to employ the English 
language with sufficient precision to satisfy the mind intent on conjuring up 
hypothetical circumstances in which commonly understood words seem 
momentarily ambiguous. The constitution however, does not demand that the 
General Assembly use words that lie beyond the possibility of manipulation. 
Instead, the constitutional due process demand is met if the words used bear a 
meaning commonly understood by persons of ordinary intelligence. (Missouri v. 
Allen, 1996, p. 877)   
 
This statement by the court revealed that arguing over language and words that can be 
manipulated to mean anything does not make a piece of legislation vague nor overbroad. 
The court utilized the common person’s test to examine the language in the law and 
deemed that an ordinary person would be able to understand the wording of the law. This 
decision dismissed the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment claims from the case. 
Allen’s next claim was that the overbreadth of the law impeded upon his freedom 
of association as guaranteed by the First Amendment (Missouri v. Allen, 1995). The court 
again dismissed this claim outlining that in no part of the legislation are a student’s rights 
to assemble infringed upon, nor does the law prevent the organization from using 
protected speech.  
The statute informs the organization that it and its members may not recklessly 
endanger the mental or physical health or safety of a prospective member as a 
condition of admission into or preservation of membership in the fraternity. Allen 
does not produce, nor does our independent research reveal, any case in which a 
court has recognized a constitutional right in members of an organization to 
recklessly endanger the mental or physical health or safety of members or 
potential members of that organization by physically beating them. (Missouri v. 
Allen, 1995, p. 878) 
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Here the court discussed that the limitation of reckless endangerment did not limit 
speech, and there was no constitutional right to the reckless endangerment of another 
citizen. 
Allen’s final claim was that the law was under-serving because it only applied to 
students in institutions of Higher Education, and not to students in secondary schools 
(Missouri v. Allen, 1995). The court responded with reasoning:  
Students attending secondary education institutions generally live under the 
watchful, concerned care of parents with whom they have frequent and regular 
contact. These proximate parents are often able to discover bruises and detect 
other signs of mental and physical abuse and can protect their child from an 
organization that conditions membership on hazing. The General Assembly could 
reasonably conclude that the threat of criminal liability was a necessary and 
appropriate measure to protect students from hazing by organizations in colleges 
and universities while students were distanced from their parents' presence. 
(Missouri v. Allen, 1995, p. 878) 
 
The distinction between post-secondary education and secondary education was outlined 
as related to the ability of a watchful adult to monitor the behavior and general welfare of 
a student in secondary education; however, as institutions of higher education do not 
stand in loco parentis for students, it was important for the legislature to provide 
protection against the criminal act of hazing. The next two cases Reeves v. Besonen 
(1991) & Meeker v. Edmundson (2005) will explore allegations of Civil Rights 
Violations by high school officials. 
Reeves v. Besonen (1991) 754 F. Supp. 1135 (US Dist.) 
 This case was presented in the United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Michigan, Southern Division on appeal from a Magistrate’s Document. Plaintiff 
Reeves was a high school football player at Owendale Gagetown Areas Schools and was 
allegedly subject to a hazing ritual on a school bus following a school football game 
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(Reeves v. Besonen, 1991). Defendant Besonen was the head football coach for the team 
and bus driver. During the hazing ritual, older members of the team called Reeves to the 
back of the bus and subsequently punched and kicked him ultimately breaking his nose. 
Reeves claims that his Fourth Amendment right to protection against unreasonable search 
and seizure and his Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection from substantive due 
process were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Reeves v. Besonen, 1991).  
The District Court granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the 
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment claims. On the Fourth Amendment claim, the court 
found no evidence that a search or seizure occurred by any person acting on behalf of the 
State (Reeves v. Besonen, 1991). The simple act of riding a bus did not qualify as a 
seizure, capture, or incarceration in the eyes of the court. On the Fourteenth Amendment 
claim, the judge wrote, "[the] Supreme Court has made very clear that substantive due 
process does not entitle every individual under the care of state authorities to protection 
from physical injuries" (Reeves v. Besonen, 1991, p. 1139). The participation in an 
activity hosted by the state or under guidance of a state official does not provide the 
participant protection from injury and/or equate to a violation of constitutional rights if an 
injury occurred. The participant must acknowledge their own voluntary status in the 
participation in an activity, otherwise there would be no difference between State 
activities and Constitutional protections.  
If the court were to accept the plaintiff’s argument here that the Constitution 
somehow imposes a duty on school officials to provide for the safety of students 
with respect to extracurricular activities…then there would no longer be any 
practical distinction between ordinary state-law negligence claims and federal 
constitution violations. (Reeves v. Besonen, 1991, p. 1140)  
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The court specified here that the coach of the team could not be held responsible for the 
actions of the student participants that he did not have knowledge of. State actors are not 
mandated to protect individuals from injury just because the individuals are under their 
care. The next case Meeker v. Edmundson (2005) will highlight this important distinction 
Meeker v. Edmundson (2005) 415 F.3d 317 (U.S. App.) 
 This case was heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit 
on appeal of a decision by the district court that denied qualified immunity to a wrestling 
coach at a local high school for his role in the hazing of plaintiff Meeker. The Court of 
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and determined that enough evidence 
existed that a trial court could find the defendant liable for violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005). Plaintiff claimed that his 
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights and Fourth Amendment constitutional right of 
unreasonable search and seizure were violated. Additionally, the plaintiff alleged that 
defendant Edmundson was liable for negligence and breach of duty. The facts of the case 
alleged that Edmondson “frequently initiated and encouraged abuse of Meeker” at least 
“twenty-five times during the few months while he was on the team” by way of having 
teammates “pull up or remove his clothing and take turns repeatedly beating his bare 
torso” (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 319). These acts were used as a means of 
discipline on the team or to force weaker members of the team to quit. 
The court found in favor of the plaintiff on the allegations of violations to the 
Fourteenth Amendment stating:  
The fact that the beatings were not administered pursuant to an established 
procedure, but instead arbitrarily ordered for no legitimate disciplinary purpose, 
makes it more, not less, likely that they constitute a malicious abuse of power 
violative of the Due Process Clause. (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 324)  
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This statement by the court acknowledged that Edmundson’s actions of using physical 
violence to remove students from his wrestling team clearly violated those students’ 
constitutional rights to due process and right to a fair disciplinary proceeding. The 
defendant argued on behalf of two other prior cases (Deshaney v. Winnebago County, 
1989 & Reeves v. Besonen, 1991) that he did not have a duty to protect Meeker from 
violence conducted by another person. The court did not agree:  
Contrary to Edmundson's contentions, and unlike the plaintiffs in DeShaney and 
Reeves, Meeker does not allege that a state actor merely failed to come to his 
defense or protect him from harm inflicted by others. Rather, Meeker's complaint 
asserts that Coach Edmundson used students as his ‘instruments’ to abuse 
Meeker. The complaint states that Edmundson 'initiated and encouraged the 
student wrestlers to seize and beat' Meeker; that he 'instituted, permitted, 
endorsed, encouraged, facilitated, and condoned' the beatings of Meeker; that he 
warned Meeker that the beatings would continue until he 'toughened up' and that 
on at least one occasion, he even informed Meeker in advance that he would be 
beaten by team members. (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 322) 
 
The Court of Appeals made clear that the use of another individual or individuals to carry 
out punishments without due process was a violation of 42 U.S.C. §1983. The coach as a 
state actor did not have the authority to issue punishments maliciously without cause to 
anyone under his care. "Edmundson cannot escape liability simply because he did not 
administer the beatings with his own hands" (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 323).  
 Meeker’s Fourth Amendment complaint was abandoned from the case for failure 
to state a claim. In Meeker’s initial brief, he made two references to a violation of his 
“rights to be free from unreasonable seizures and excessive force” (Meeker v. 
Edmundson, 2005, p. 325) but failed to cite any relevant case law or reasons for the 
complaint.  This did not mean that a Fourth Amendment violation might not have 
occurred, but simply that the requisite arguments were not presented before the court. 
The court could not rule on complaints alone and must have reason and evidence to 
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support the claims. Lastly, Edmundson attempted to claim qualified immunity as a state 
actor:  
The law is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes not only when ‘the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful,’ but also when ‘pre-
existing law’ makes the ‘unlawfulness’ of the act apparent. The question is 
whether a reasonable educator could have believed that repeatedly instituting the 
unprovoked and painful beatings of one of his students was lawful, in light of 
clearly established law. (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 323)  
 
The court found that these beatings were unlawful, and the law clearly provided guidance 
relevant to this ruling. Edmundson’s actions in ordering the beatings of his students 
vacated his qualified immunity status. The next case(s) Alton v. Hopgood (1998) & Alton 
v. Texas A&M (1999) will expand upon qualified immunity of state actors. 
Alton v. Hopgood (1998) 994 F. Supp. 827 (US Dist.)  
Alton v. Texas A&M (1999) 168 F.3d 196 (5th Cir.) 
 
 In the case of Alton v. Hopgood (1998), a cadet student at Texas A&M 
University, “alleged that he was beaten and mistreated by the students during activities of 
a cadet corps” (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998, p. 829). The plaintiff, Alton, claimed that his 
14th Amendment right to bodily integrity was violated under 42 U.S.C. §1983 by the 
student hazers and that non-student defendants, Hopgood et al., were negligent in their 
responsibility to supervise the activity of the Corps and their failure to supervise equated 
to deliberate indifference. Defendant Hopgood et al. moved to dismiss the claims via 
qualified immunity. The case was heard on appeal of the trial court decision by the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998) 
and again on appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth District (Alton v. 
Texas A&M, 1999). The District Court granted the defendants’ motion for summary 
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judgment for University Officials named in the case but denied summary judgment 
regarding the student defendants.  
 To understand the decision of the case and the claims made by Alton, it is 
important to understand the composition of the Texas A&M Corps of Cadets and their 
purpose. The Texas A&M Corps of Cadets is “a voluntary military training organization 
consisting of approximately 2100 of the school’s 40,000 students. Members of the Corps 
live together, wear uniforms, participate in daily drill, stand for inspections, and 
physically train on a daily basis” (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998, p. 830). “Organized much like 
the military, the Corps has a rigid chain of command which ultimately ends with the 
cadet Corps Commander, a senior student, who answers to the Commandant of the Corps, 
a retired General employed by the University. Many Corps members receive ROTC 
scholarships, and many more enter active military service upon graduation” (Alton v. 
Hopgood, 1998, p. 830). These facts are important in the allegations of the case as the 
retired general was a state employee of Texas A&M University and retained all rights as 
other state employees but was not considered a military employee and did not retain the 
rights common with military doctrine.  
During the incidents in question, Alton was regularly hazed by older members of 
the Fish Drill Team, and prior to the final incident Alton spoke to Captain Dalton 
(another university employee) but downplayed any alleged hazing (Alton v. Hopgood, 
1998). The following weekend, Alton was significantly injured in a more severe incident. 
During this time, Captain Dalton spoke with other university officials to investigate 
further the rumors of hazing. On Monday morning following the incident, General 
Hopgood met with student Alton and recognized he had been beaten and immediately 
101 
 
took him to the police department to file charges. The nine student advisors to the Fish 
Drill Team were subsequently suspended and expelled for their involvement in the 
beatings. 
Alton’s legal claim against General Hopgood et al. was based on the University’s 
failure to stop the last incident from occurring, the negligent response to the rumors of 
hazing, and the alleged deliberate indifference to Alton’s situation. These claims were 
brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983. The non-student defendants in this case were granted 
qualified immunity by the court based on their status as government employees and the 
failure of Alton to substantiate evidence that the defendants were negligent in their 
actions. The court had this to say: "This case consists of those actions taken by the 
nonstudent defendants to prevent hazing and those actions taken by the nonstudent 
defendants once hazing was reported. The court finds that reasonable officials in the 
shoes of the nonstudent defendants, could have concluded that their actions would 
prevent constitutional violations" (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998, p. 836). Based on the 
evidence provided, the defendants showed that they acted upon the initial rumor of 
hazing, were misled by plaintiff’s own statement, continued to investigate despite this 
information, and ultimately helped the plaintiff file his claims with the police. These 
actions proved that the defendants were in fact acting within the color of the law and on 
behalf of the plaintiff. 
The court acknowledged that though the defendants in this case were granted 
qualified immunity, there was more that could have been done to prevent the injury of 
Alton and issued this charge to the Texas A&M administration:  
There is a vast difference between the rigorous training required to equip future 
soldiers with the mental and physical skills they need to "close with and destroy 
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the enemy," and the equally valid desire of the University to matriculate persons 
with the compassion and enlightened skills necessary to succeed in modern 
society and business. American society's desire to have a strong and capable 
military must be carefully balanced against its equally valid desire to treat others 
with respect in accordance with evolving societal norms. When those charged 
with balancing these equally valid concerns are no more than twenty years old, 
serious mistakes are sometimes made, and as in this case, the victims are starry-
eyed children. (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998, p. 838) 
 
The intent of the court was to remind the administrators that, though they were 
technically found at fault, the university may have had a duty to be more engaged with 
the day to day operations of the Corps of Cadets and should consider a stronger presence 
in the training of new members of the Corps of Cadets. For final record, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the decision of the lower court without 
prejudice (Alton v. Texas A&M, 1999). The next case(s) will explore protections provided 
by the constitution to military personnel via the Feres Doctrine. 
Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard (1999) 167 F.3d 678 (US App.)  
Day v. Towle (Mass. Super. 2001) 
 
 On appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Massachusetts, 
the case of Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard (1999) alleged violations of 42 
U.S.C. §1983 where he was subjected to at least two different incidents of hazing during 
his military service. Day also alleged violations of Massachusetts state laws of “assault, 
battery, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress and negligent enlistment 
and supervision” (Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard, 1999, p. 679). These claims 
were ruled upon in Day v. Towle (2001).  
 In this incident, the specific actions of the individual defendants were not 
important. The district court dismissed all federal claims against all defendants citing the 
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Supreme Court ruling Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 95 L. Ed. 152, 71 S. Ct. 153 
(1950).  
In Feres, Federal Tort Claims Act did not extend to a suit by a deceased soldier’s 
estate for the negligent medical treatment by army surgeons resulting in the 
soldier’s death…no precedent allowed a soldier to recover for negligence against 
his superiors or his government, and…he concluded that the statute did not extend 
to suits for “injuries to servicemen where the injuries arise out of or are in the 
course of activity incident to service.” (Day v. Massachusetts Air National Guard, 
1999, p. 681)  
 
The Feres doctrine protects the United States Government and its actors from federal 
torts that occur during or in the act of service to the military. The Court of Appeals for 
the First Circuit cited the Feres doctrine as its reasoning for dismissal of Federal Tort 
claims in this case as the hazing occurred during Day’s service to the military and on 
property owned by the military. There was an important distinction in this case that the 
court identified:  
The Supreme Court has not yet taken the step of converting Feres into immunity 
for individuals against state law claims. To do so would mean that military service 
personnel who were victims of serious intentional torts inflicted by other service 
personnel on base would effectively be denied any civil remedy against a 
wrongdoer who was not acting within the scope of his military employment. (Day 
v. Massachusetts Air National Guard, 1999, p. 684) 
  
The court outlined this difference to vacate the decision of the lower court on the grounds 
of state law claims and remanded the case to the lower court for further proceedings and 
decisions. By making this decision, the court chose not to expand the Feres doctrine 
beyond the civil rights claims originally alleged and left open the ability of future military 
service personnel to seek remedy under state tort liability. To this end, Day v. Towle 
(2001) resulted in the awarding of $1,500,000 for assault and battery, intentional 
infliction of emotional distress, and negligent infliction of emotional distress against the 
individual actors responsible for the injury. The last case in this section, Martin v. North 
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Metro Fire Rescue District (2007) will look at civil rights claims related to sexual 
harassment. 
Martin v. North Metro Fire (2007) 102 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 696 (US Dist.) 
 The case of Martin v. North Metro Fire (2007) was presented in the United States 
District Court for the District of Colorado and alleged violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that 
the “Defendants violated his constitutional rights under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment based on both his probationary status as a firefighter and 
based on his gender” (Martin v. North Metro Fire, 2007, p. 1). Defendants motioned to 
dismiss all claims of this case and the court denied defendant motion. The court found 
substantial evidence that violations of the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause 
and sexual harassment may have occurred and allowed the case to move forward to a 
trial.  
 The initial claims of equal protection based on the plaintiff’s status as a 
probationary firefighter did not meet the protected classes of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Martin v. 
North Metro Fire, 2007). The court moved then to a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim 
where the plaintiff must show evidence that he was “singled out for persecution due to 
some animosity, meaning that the actions of [defendants] were a spiteful effort to get 
[plaintiff] for reasons wholly unrelated to any legitimate state activity” (Martin v. North 
Metro Fire, 2007, p. 7) Under this claim the plaintiff set forth evidence that probationary 
firefighters were treated substantially different than non-probationary firefighters, and 
there was significant history of the disparate treatment. For these reasons, the judge ruled 
the case could move forward on violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. Additionally, 
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the nature of the activities or methods used to provide the disparate treatment were 
consistently of a sexual nature which allowed the sexual harassment charge to continue. 
Conclusion of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Civil Rights Act of 1964 
 The cases above present judicial opinions in nine cases across seven Federal 
Court Districts where violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were 
claimed. The cases represent those cited most for future opinions on violations of the 
First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, Fifth Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, and 
discrimination when hazing has been alleged as a precipitating factor. These factors are 
important in considering how the courts may treat incidents of hazing in relation to 
violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 
Hazing Law as Specifically Alleged in Cases of Hazing 
 To date the federal government has not taken up legislation to unify hazing as a 
legal issue and has left hazing to the states to legislate on their own (Crow and Phillips, 
2004). As of 2018, 44 states have adopted hazing laws and policies independent of one 
another, and each state law defines hazing differently from the other (stophazing.org, 
2012). As noted in Chapter 2, anti-hazing legislation saw its greatest period of growth in 
the 1980s and 1990s “due in large part to the efforts of the Committee to Halt Useless 
College Killings (C.H.U.C.K.) and similar organizations” (Acquaviva, 2007, p. 312) 
States during this period began to make efforts that would prohibit and/or criminalize 
hazing behaviors in response to an increase in hazing-related deaths at the college level 
(Carroll et al., 2009; Lewis, 1991). The laws created during this time varied dramatically, 
and still lack uniformity today (Crow & Rosner, 2002; Lewis, 1991). An analysis of 
current state hazing statutes demonstrates the following:  
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1. The majority of states consider hazing to be a misdemeanor that does not change 
the penalty or definition of any activity covered by other criminal statutes. 
2. Statutes in only seven of the forty-three (now forty-four) states with anti-hazing 
laws include language that bars observing or participating in hazing and failing to 
notify authorities. 
3. Thirteen states with anti-hazing laws require only that anti-hazing policies be 
developed and disseminated at public schools. 
4. Twenty states specifically state in their codes that implied or express consent, or a 
willingness on the part of the victim to participate in the initiation is not an 
available defense. (Crow & Rosner, 2002, p. 89) 
 
In Table 4, a state by state comparative analysis is provided to explore the variety of 
issues that are addressed in hazing laws across the United States. This table was 
originally presented in Nicholas Bittner’s 2016 article A Hazy Shade of Winter: The 
Chilling Issues Surrounding Hazing in School Sports and the Litigation That Follows. 
This table serves as a visual representation of the differences in how states have legislated 
hazing. 
 Table 4 presents the areas of hazing legislation the courts must be aware of when 
a hazing incident occurs. In 77.27% of states with an anti-hazing law (34/44), hazing is a 
misdemeanor offense and can result in jail time. In 34.09% of states with anti-hazing 
legislation (15/44), the aggravated risk of injury as a result is specifically outlined and 
more severe penalties for committing hazing are available to the prosecution (Bittner, 
2016). Failure to report hazing to a proper authority is specified in 15.91% (7/44), of 
hazing laws, and the offender can be held monetarily liable for having knowledge of 
hazing and not reporting. 59.09% of states have specifically said that consent to 
participate in hazing cannot be used as a legal defense by the perpetrator of hazing. 
Seventeen states (38.64%) have created legislation that holds a third party liable 
for the injury of another following a hazing incident if the third party had prior 
knowledge of the incident (Bittner, 2016). 54.54% (24/44) of states with anti-hazing 
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Table 4. State Hazing Law Characteristics 
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Alabama x  x   x  x x    1981 
Arizona    x x x  x x   x 2001 
Arkansas x  x  x x  x x    1983 
California x x     x x     1976 
Colorado x       x     1999 
Connecticut    x    x x  x  1988 
Delaware x   x    x x    1992 
Florida x x x x    x  x   2002 
Georgia x   x    x     1988 
Idaho x    x x  x x    1991 
Illinois x x x          1901 
Indiana x x        x   1976 
Iowa x x  x      x   1989 
Kansas x       x  x   1986 
Kentucky        x x x x x 1986 
Louisiana    x  x  x x x   1920 
Maine         x x   1989 
Maryland x   x      x   2002 
Massachusetts   x x  x  x x x   1985 
Michigan x x  x      x   1931 
Minnesota      x  x  x  x 1997 
Mississippi x         x   1990 
Missouri x x  x     x x x  1987 
Nebraska x   x     x x   1994 
Nevada x x  x      x   1999 
New Hampshire x  x x  x  x x x   1993 
New Jersey  x  x  x  x  x   1980 
New York x x        x   1983 
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Table 4. State Hazing Law Characteristics Continued      
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North Carolina x       x x   x         1913 
North Dakota x x             x x     1995 
Ohio x     x   x x   x x     1982 
Oklahoma x     x         x x     1990 
Oregon x     x x         x     1983 
Pennsylvania x     x         x x x   1986 
Rhode Island x x       x   x x x     1909 
South Carolina x   x x   x   x   x     1987 
Tennessee         x       x   x   1995 
Texas x     x   x   x x x     1995 
Utah x x   x   x   x x x     1989 
Vermont       x x x x x x       1999 
Virginia x     x     x     x     1975 
Washington x         x   x x x x   1993 
West Virginia x x   x         x x x   1995 
Wisconsin x x   x           x     1983 
 
legislation provide for liability only if there was intent to harm the victim during the 
hazing incident. Four states (9.09%) have specified a specific civil action in response to 
incidents of hazing within their legislation, and twenty-four (54.54%) states have 
provided that creating mental harm (not just physical harm) can be considered as a 
violation of hazing law. In 70.45% of states (31/44), the victim of a hazing incident must 
be able to prove that the perpetrator of hazing was reckless in their action. 
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 In a special class of hazing legislation are the seven states where hazing law only 
applies to student defendants or to initiation into student organizations. In these states, 
hazing is not legislated in organizations, teams, work environments, etc. that are not 
student related (Bittner, 2016; Crow & Phillips, 2004; Guynn, 2002). Additionally, there 
are seven states where hazing is only legislated in environments of Higher Education and 
the law does not apply to High School students, police academies, professional sports 
teams, or other relevant groups. In three states (Arizona, Kentucky, and Minnesota), 
hazing is not a criminal offense in any way and the state legislation only states that 
institutions of higher education and schools must have policies against hazing (Bittner, 
2016; Crow & Phillips, 2004; Guynn, 2002).   
Bittner (2016) provides a caution to the interpretation of hazing law through 
tables alone stating, “this representation downplays the differences between the various 
states. While many states share similar wording or approaches, other states have 
significant limitations on their statutes which a general categorization does not reflect” 
(p. 217). Inside of the various categories Bittner creates, states may still have wide and 
varying disparities in how they have legislated hazing and it is important to go directly to 
the law for questions regarding how a state has treated hazing (Carroll et al., 2009; Crow 
& Phillips, 2004; Guynn, 2002). These discrepancies in law between the states make it 
difficult for courts to use precedent from court decisions in other states as the anti-hazing 
laws may be vastly different.  In that case the state courts may be reliant only on the case 
law within their own state first to make judicial opinions.  
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Court Cases Alleging Violations of Hazing Law 
Table 5 lists all cases alleging violations of hazing following an incident of hazing 
between the years of 1980-2013. The table includes the name, state of origin, year, and 
type of case for all 35 cases that occurred during this time frame. The cases are organized 
alphabetically by plaintiff. 
Table 5 identifies that 19 of 35 cases (54.29%) alleging violations of hazing 
appear in Civil Court and seek monetary damages following the incident. Criminal cases 
are represented in 16 of 35 cases (45.71%). Additionally, violations of hazing law were 
argued in 14 states with Texas (five), Ohio (four), and Illinois (four) having the most 
cases. This data reveals that violations of hazing law following a hazing incident is the 
third most predominantly argued legal claim. The next section provides a look at the 
cases used to set precedent that allege violations of hazing law following a hazing 
incident. 
Haben v. Anderson (1992) 232 Ill. App. 3d 260; 597 N.E.2d 655 (Ill.) 
Illinois v. Anderson (1992) 148 Ill.2d 15; 591 N.E.2d 461 (Ill.) 
 
 Perhaps the most often cited hazing case of hazing law is Haben v. Anderson 
(1992), which was heard in the Appellate Court of Illinois on appeal from the trial court 
of the dismissal of plaintiff’s wrongful death suit and defendants’ voluntarily assumed 
duty to care. The appellate court reversed the decision of the trial court and remanded 
case on grounds that the negligence and wrongful death suits had merit. The facts of the 
case alleged that members of a lacrosse team used forced alcohol consumption and 
hazing as a practice of bringing new members into the team (Haben v. Anderson, 1992). 
The appellate court determined that individuals on the lacrosse team should stand trial for 
their involvement in this action and their negligence in providing care to Haben once it  
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Table 5. Cases Alleging Violations of Hazing Law 
Case Name Year 
State of 
Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
Auto Owners v. American Central 1999 Alabama Civil 
Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha 1998 Ohio Civil 
Duitch v. Canton City Schools 2004 Ohio Civil 
E.F. v. Oberlin City School District 2010 Ohio Civil 
Edwards v. Kappa Alpha Psi 1999 Illinois Civil 
Ex Parte Barran 1998 Alabama Civil 
Ex Parte Cornelious Smith 2006 Texas Criminal 
Ex parte Filmon Fasil Berhe 2004 Texas Criminal 
Ex Parte Smith  2004 Texas Criminal 
Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation 2012 Connecticut Civil 
Haben v. Anderson 1992 Illinois Civil 
Helton v. State of Indiana 1993 Indiana Criminal 
Hilton v. Lincoln Way High School 1998 Illinois Civil 
Hunt v. County of Sacramento 2008 California Civil 
Illinois v. Anderson 1992 Illinois Criminal 
Jones v. Kappa Alpha Order 1997 Alabama Civil 
Landmark American Insurance Company v. 
Rider University 2010 New Jersey Civil 
McKenzie v. State of Maryland 2000 Maryland Criminal 
Missouri v. Allen 1995 Missouri Criminal 
Morrison v. Kappa Alpha Psi 1999 Louisiana Civil 
Morton v. Florida 2008 Florida Criminal 
Ohio v. Brown 1993 Ohio Criminal 
Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity 1997 New York Criminal 
People v. Lenti 1965 New York Civil 
Perkins v. Commonwealth 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Perkins v. Massachusetts 1995 Massachusetts Civil 
State v. Khalil H.  2010 New York Criminal 
Texas v. Boyd 2001 Texas Criminal 
Texas v. Zascavage 2007 Texas Criminal 
United States v. Hill 2012 Military Criminal 
United States v. Ryan 2007 Military Criminal 
United States v. Zacatelco 2008 Military Criminal 
Vinicky v. Pristas 2005 Ohio Civil 
Waddill v. Phi Gamma Delta Fraternity 2003 Texas Civil 
Yost v. Wabash College 2012 Indiana Civil 
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was determined that his safety was in danger. The court also found that by forcing Haben 
to drink as part of the initiation, the team members placed Haben in danger. The members 
of the team assumed an additional duty of care by taking Haben back to their dormitory 
room and allowing Haben to sleep on the team members’ floor but failing to check on 
him throughout the night (Haben v. Anderson, 1992). This ruling remanded the Civil 
Case back to the lower court for further proceeding. 
 Illinois v. Anderson (1992) handled the criminal case in this matter and was heard 
by the Supreme Court of Illinois. The criminal case was heard on appeal following the 
trial court dismissal of hazing charges claiming the law was unconstitutional. The trial 
court ruled that the legislation was overbroad, vague, and violated equal protection 
(Illinois v. Anderson, 1992). The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed the decision of the 
trial court and remanded the proceedings for further hearing. The following sections are 
the response of the Supreme Court to the defendants’ challenges of the law. 
 The first challenge to the law was overbreadth and a violation to the defendants’ 
rights to protection under the First and Fourteenth Amendment (Illinois v. Anderson, 
1992). The court dismissed this argument stating, “we believe the intention was to deter 
conduct that is likely to result in injury by punishing conduct which causes injuries that 
could have been avoided…we believe the statute was intended to deter reckless (or 
worse) conduct resulting in injury and the State must prove recklessness or intent” 
(Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 465). This section dismissed the defendants’ claim the 
hazing was an absolute liability offense and that the language of the law was written to 
provide remedy for any injury perceived or real. The court then moved:  
Viewing the hazing statute interpreted correctly, it is clear that defendants’ 
overbreadth argument fails. The hazing statute reaches only conduct which 
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recklessly, knowingly or intentionally results in bodily injury of a person…[and] 
it is unlikely to implicate speech or conduct protected by the first amendment at 
all. (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 466)  
 
The court moved in this statement to define the law and dismiss the hypothetical 
situations which the defendants brought before the court. 
 The next argument for defendants was vagueness and failure to clearly define 
whom the law applies to and what activities might be considered “pastime or 
amusement” and “hold up to ridicule” (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 467). The court 
again dismissed the defendants’ claims as the hazing law clearly stated that it applied to 
students at universities within the state and that “we will not require the legislature to 
specify every activity that could be a ‘pastime or amusement’ or in which a person might 
be held up to ridicule” (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 467). The defendants’ claim that 
these phrases were too vague and attempted to set the expectation that the legislature 
must clearly define every activity that could be considered illegal. The court understood 
that this expectation was set too high for common word usage.  
 Finally, the defendants claimed that the law violated their Fourteenth Amendment 
right to Equal Protection as it only applied to people connected with educational 
institutions in the state (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992). The court again dismissed this claim 
asserting:  
The State certainly has a legitimate interest in protecting people from physical 
injury, and we conclude that there is a rational basis for limiting the reach of the 
hazing statute since it is reasonable to assume that most hazing occurs in colleges, 
universities, and other schools. (Illinois v. Anderson, 1992, p. 469)  
 
For this reason, the equal protection violation claim was dismissed as the State of Illinois 
has recognized a specific interest in protecting citizens from hazing in educational 
institutions. This limitation in the scope of the law did not create a violation of equal 
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protection as there was a legitimate public interest in providing these specific protections 
to this specific population. The next two cases, McKenzie v. State of Maryland (2000) 
and Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha (1998), examined challenges to the Maryland and Ohio 
state hazing laws for overbreadth and vagueness. Maryland Courts have a similar finding, 
but results in the Ohio Courts differed slightly from the Illinois Courts. 
McKenzie v. State of Maryland (2000) 748 A, 2d 67 (Md.) 
 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals heard this case on appeal from the lower 
court when plaintiff’s motion for dismissal was denied and he was “convicted and 
sentenced after pleading guilty to an agreed statement of facts” (McKenzie v. State of 
Maryland, 2000, p. 67). Appellant issued a challenge to the Maryland Code Ann. Art. 27, 
β 268H for overbreadth and vagueness and violations of plaintiff rights to First 
Amendment freedom of speech and Fourth Amendment equal protection. The Court of 
Appeals of Maryland affirmed the decision of the lower court that the hazing statute did 
not infringe a citizen’s rights and was not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. 
 Like Illinois and Ohio, the Maryland Court ruled the “statute was not void for 
vagueness because the definition of hazing provided sufficient notice of the prohibited 
conduct and the statute did not authorize arbitrary enforcement” (McKenzie v. State of 
Maryland, 2000, p. 67).  The vagueness argument did not hold up to the hazing statute as 
it applied only to conduct and behavior that was already prohibited by other state laws 
and existed to add the “consent is not a defense clause to those previously proscribed 
offenses.  
The statute reaches only conduct that is already proscribed under other Maryland 
criminal statutes. In fact, its real effect is to bar a narrow band of actors from 
using the defense of consent for such criminal conduct. The statute does not reach 
such conduct as yelling at or insulting pledges. It does not reach such conduct as 
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requiring pledges to don matching tee shirts, memorize silly songs, or run errands 
for and serve meals to regular members. It does not reach such conduct as 
requiring pledges to tutor underprivileged children or play intramural sports. The 
statute only reaches conduct “which recklessly or knowingly subjects a student to 
the risk of serious bodily injury.” Secondly enforcement only occurs when hazing 
actually causes serious bodily injury. “A person who hazes a student so as to 
cause serious bodily injury” is the only person reached under the statute. 
(McKenzie v. State of Maryland, 2000, p.72) 
 
The opinion of the court outlined that the only activities that result in a violation of the 
hazing statute are those that result in serious bodily harm and used examples of activities 
that were not hazing under the color of the law, but that may be considered hazing by a 
social science definition. This set the threshold an activity must reach to be considered a 
violation of the hazing statute. This distinction is the important point of emphasis for the 
case of McKenzie v. State of Maryland (2000). Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha (1998) 
discussed the issue of whether mental harm was proscriptive enough to be applied by 
law. 
Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha Fraternity, (1998) 718 N.E.2d 1007 (Ohio) 
 Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha (1998) was heard by the Court of Common Pleas in 
the State of Ohio on a challenge by the defendant fraternity to dismiss a lawsuit against 
the fraternity for violations of the civil hazing statute. The Court of Pleas granted the 
defendant motion in part and denied in part the motion to dismiss acknowledging the 
hazing statute was not facially overbroad, but that certain protections provided in the civil 
statute (Ohio Rev. Code Ann β2307.44) may be unconstitutionally vague (Carpetta v. Pi 
Kappa Alpha, 1998). The defendants also challenged that the statute violated their First 
Amendment right to Free Speech. The relevant discussion follows. 
 The court first reviewed the claim that the Ohio Statute for hazing was overbroad, 
and the court determined that it is not (Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha, 1998).  
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First, the unambiguous scope of the statute addresses acts that cause harm. The 
hazing statute does not expressly proscribe First Amendment freedoms. Second, 
the hazing statute was enacted to strike at a specific social threat; society is well 
aware of the dangers facing student and other initiates…and [seeks] to protect the 
health and safety of the public by proscribing conduct rather than First 
Amendment expressions. (Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha, 1998, p. 53) 
  
The court leaned upon the decisions in Missouri v. Allen (1995) and Illinois v. Anderson 
(1992) to determine that the hazing statute stated specifically the conduct that was 
dangerous to the safety of its citizens and did not interfere with its citizens’ rights to 
freedom of expression. This determination drew a line between acts of individual 
expression of thought and conduct that may be harmful to the physical safety of another 
individual.  In general, conduct and expression were ruled to be different in the eyes of 
the court. The court went on to say that:  
In allegations of hazing various occurrences of solely offensive and insulting 
speech may be protected expressions. Thus, the expressions would not properly 
constitute incidents of hazing…Evidence regarding the exact nature of the 
expressions must be proffered before a determination can be made as to whether 
these expressions are constitutionally protected. (Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha, 
1998, p. 55)  
 
This clarification by the court ruled that there may be instances where speech and 
expression are used in or interpreted as an incident of hazing. These incidents may be 
determined to include protected speech, and if so would be deemed to not be violations of 
the hazing statute, but in those incidents, the court must review the evidence to make that 
determination. The court refused to rule the whole statute as void for overbreadth for the 
few instances of protected speech that may occur and reserves the right to review these 
incidents on a case-by-case basis. 
Moving to the defendant claim of vagueness, the court determined that most of 
the claims defendants make are not vague (challenges for the terms: coercion, acts of 
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initiation, mental harm, and substantial risk of mental harm), but the court agreed that the 
term mental harm is problematic (Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha, 1998).  
Unlike physical harm, mental harm is not defined in R.C. Title 29, in R.C. 
2903.31 or in Ohio case law…The court finds that the phrase ‘mental harm’ is too 
unclear and imprecise to afford either, notice to persons of what is prohibited or 
clear and exact enforcement standards to law enforcement officers. (Carpetta v. 
Pi Kappa Alpha, 1998, p. 57)  
 
This ruling by the Ohio Court determined that the hazing statute could only apply to 
physical injury and not to mental injury as mental injury had not been defined clearly 
enough by the state legislature in any related code. Thus, an act of hazing in Ohio must 
result in a form of physical injury of the victim to be susceptible to criminal or civil 
litigation. The next case explored the Ohio hazing statute as it applied to high school 
students and how membership in an organization is defined. 
Duitch v. Canton City Schools (2004) 809 N.E.2d 62 (Ohio) 
 Duitch v. Canton County Schools (2004) was heard on appeal of summary 
judgment by the Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth Appellate District. The plaintiff (mother 
of juvenile son) alleged that freshmen at the local high school, Canton County Schools, 
had been subjected to hazing by physical assault by older students during the first few 
days of the school year (Duitch v. Canton County Schools, 2004). The lower court 
granted summary judgment in favor of the School Board stating that “the behavior was 
not governed by Ohio Rev. Code Ann β 2903.31 and Ohio rev. Code Ann. Β 2307.44” 
(Duitch v. Canton County Schools, 2004, p. 61). The appellate court affirmed the decision 
of the lower court. 
The trial court found R.C. 2307.44 provides a civil liability for hazing and refers 
to initiation activities or hazing as it relates to student organizations. The trial 
court found undisputed facts of this case are not contemplated by the statute. The 
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court found student organization, means specific organizations, as opposed to the 
entire student body (Duitch v. Canton County Schools, 2004, p. 64) 
  
The appeals court confirmed the finding of the trial court that a student organization 
means exactly a student organization and not the entire student body. Hazing as initiation 
into the student body was not specified in the legislation and resulted in the claim of 
plaintiff being dismissed. The appeals court added further context to student organization 
stating: 
We find initiation into an organization implies membership in the organization is 
voluntary, and that the victim has through his or her actions or otherwise, 
consented to the hazing. This is the reason why the legislature chose to include 
the language finding negligence, consent, and assumption of the risk by the 
plaintiff are not defenses (Duitch v. Canton County Schools, 2004, p. 66) 
  
The court’s elaboration interpreted the intent of the legislature to say that the denial of 
consent as a defense implied that consent must be given for hazing to occur. If 
membership was not voluntary, and the participant did not willingly participate (whether 
via negligence or assumption of risk) then an activity, while deplorable, may not be 
considered hazing. The next case looked at the applicability of hazing law to police 
academies in the State of Massachusetts, and the ability of an employee to file a civil 
action for hazing. 
Perkins v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Public Safety (Mass. Super. 1998)  
Perkins v. Commonwealth (2001) 752 N.E.2d 761 (Mass. App.) 
 
 Perkins v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety 
(1998) handled the case of a police academy trainee who sought damages based on her 
allegations for wrongful termination and alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for 
hazing. The defendant police academy filed a motion for summary judgment in this case 
which was granted by the Superior Court of Massachusetts. The pertinent question in this 
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case was the applicability of the hazing statute to a Training Academy as it is not a 
student organization. The Superior Court of Massachusetts interpreted that the law does 
apply to police academies:  
This court begins by concluding that the hazing statute does apply to the 
Academy. The hazing statute prohibits initiation into a student organization…The 
Academy trains individuals to perform the role of Massachusetts State Troopers. 
There is an application process, and acceptance to the Academy. From these 
minimal characteristics, it is not erroneous to consider the Academy an 
organization of students seeking training for their desired field. (Perkins v. 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, 1998, p. 17)  
 
The Superior Court laid out criteria for being considered as a student organization to 
mean a collection of students who have applied and been accepted into training for a 
shared interest. This interpretation appeared facially to expand the definition of the 
statute beyond student organizations as they were generally understood.  
 The interpretation of the hazing statute as applicable to the Academy did not 
however assist the plaintiff in her claim that her constitutional rights were violated 
because of hazing. The court clearly enumerated that the hazing statute only outlined 
criminal hazing activity and did not confer civil protections upon the victim of hazing 
(Perkins v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts Executive Office of Public Safety, 1998). 
For this reason, the defendant motion for summary judgment was granted.  
On plaintiff appeal to the Appeals Court of Massachusetts, Perkins v. 
Commonwealth (2001), affirmed the decision of the Superior Court but disagreed about 
the interpretation of the Police Academy as a student organization.  
There is no Legislative directive or enunciated public policy that precludes the 
Academy, a quasi-military training institution, from discharging a cadet who 
cannot tolerate the rigors and discipline required of other recruits…the hazing 
statute is not applicable to the Academy, as it is not a student organization, but 
rather a school, an educational institution. (Perkins v. Commonwealth 2001, p. 
180-181) 
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The appeals court took a narrower interpretation of the term student organization and 
determined that the hazing statute was not applicable to the Police Training Academy as 
the academy itself was an educational institution and had purpose beyond the scope of a 
student organization. The next case State of New York v. Khalil H (2010) further explored 
the idea of what constitutes an organization. 
State of New York v. Khalil H. (2010) 80 A.D.3d 83; 910 N.Y.S.2d 553 (New York) 
 This hearing in the Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, State of 
New York v. Khalil H. (2010) discussed whether initiation into a gang was considered 
under the New York hazing statute. Plaintiff, a juvenile, was convicted on actions that (if 
committed by an adult) would have “constituted the crimes of conspiracy in the sixth 
degree and attempted hazing in the first degree” (State of New York v. Khalil H., 2010, p. 
553). At discussion was the ruling of whether a gang is an organization covered under the 
hazing statute. 
 On discovery, the gang Lost Boys was determined to have specific requirements 
for admission including an initiation process, related paraphernalia to identify gang 
members, and members received benefits of membership from each other (State of New 
York v. Khalil H., 2010). The prosecuting agency argued that these elements created the 
gang as an organization covered under the law. The defendant argued that there is no 
stated purpose for the organization and the law is not specific in its definition of an 
organization. The court determined that though the legislature had never defined an 
organization, its intent in including the term organization in the law was to employ the 
common meaning of the word. “Any organization is thus defined as a body of 
persons…formed for a common purpose. The hazing statute’s legislative history supports 
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the interpretation that organization should be given a broad and inclusive meaning” (State 
of New York v. Khalil H., 2010, p. 558). The fact that the gang met regularly for the 
common purpose of protection and the common wearing of paraphernalia made the gang 
an organization considered under the color of the hazing law. The next two cases looked 
at challenges to the Texas hazing statute, one (Texas v. Boyd, 2001) for unconstitutional 
deprivation of Fifth Amendment Rights against self-incrimination, and one (Texas v. 
Zascavage, 2007) discussion of the vagueness challenge that is upheld. 
Texas v. Boyd (2001) 38 S.W.3d 155 (Texas) 
 Texas v. Boyd (2001) was a review by the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas on 
the state’s petition for discretionary review of the Texas Hazing Statute section 
37.152(a)(4). The trial court requested review of a Fifth Amendment challenge for self-
incrimination of the Texas hazing law that required defendants “report information about 
activity which they could reasonably believe would be available to prosecuting 
authorities, and which would surely provide a significant link in a chain of evidence 
tending to establish their own guilt in the criminal offense of hazing” (Texas v. Boyd, 
2001, p. 156). The argument and challenge to the hazing statute was that by providing the 
evidence pertinent to this case, the defendants would ultimately be required to provide 
information related to their own culpability in the actions. The Court of Criminal Appeals 
disagreed with this interpretation. 
 The lower court used a ruling from another case Marchetti (1968) to set the test 
for compelled disclosure and released a preliminary determination that if Marchetti is 
applied, then Texas Hazing Statute section 37.152(a)(4) is unconstitutional (Texas v. 
Boyd, 2001). The Court of Criminal Appeals replied, “Applying the test in 
122 
 
Marchetti…standing alone, violates the Fifth Amendment’s constitutional protection 
against self-incrimination. However, the Court of Appeals failed to analyze sufficiently 
the immunity provision to the hazing statute in Tex. Educ. Code Ann. Section 37.155” 
(Texas v. Boyd, 2001, p. 156). The immunity section of the Texas statute allowed the 
court to grant immunity from judicial action to those individuals who brought forward 
information related to a hazing incident. The inclusion of provision 37.155 allowed 
provision 37.152 to be applied by the courts and made null the argument of the law being 
unconstitutional. 
Texas v. Zascavage (2007) 216 S.W.3d 495 (Texas) 
 Texas v. Zascavage (2007) was argued in the Court of Appeals of Texas, Second 
District on appeal by the state from the lower court. The lower court dismissed the 
indictment of defendant Zascavage, a high school wrestling coach who attended a student 
a party and was witness to several student members of the wrestling team slapping and 
striking other members of the team as a form of initiation (Texas v. Zascavage, 2007). 
The trial court posture was that Texas Educational Code Annotated β 37.152(a)(3) was 
unconstitutional. The State appealed.  
The Court of Appeals of Texas affirmed the decision of the trial court stating, "In 
affirming the decision to dismiss the indictment, the reviewing court agreed with the trial 
court that β 37.152(a)(3) was unconstitutionally vague on its face. The court reasoned 
that the statute failed to identify any person or class of persons upon whom a duty to act 
was imposed; instead, it simply imposed a duty on every living person in the universe to 
prevent hazing” (Texas v. Zascavage, 2007, p. 498). The vagueness challenge was upheld 
in this case because the language of the statute stated only that a duty to act to prevent 
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hazing existed, but the statute does not place that duty upon any one class of persons. The 
Court of Appeals identified that this lack of definition is too vague for the law to be 
applied to any one person.  
The Court of Appeals went on to clarify that the statute was also unconstitutional 
as applied to the defendant. “While educators could stand in loco parentis under 
immunity cases, it was unclear whether they could be criminally charged for failing to 
prevent hazing. It was also unclear whether defendant as a wrestling coach was an 
"educator." Even if defendant was an educator under the circumstances of the party, he 
assumed neither actual care nor custody of the students because the party was not 
mandatory, and the students' parents were not excluded from attending" (Texas v. 
Zascavage, 2007, p. 499). The assumption by the state was that the law meant to impose 
a duty to protect upon educators associated with schools in the state of Texas, but the 
court failed to adopt this argument. Educators may be interpreted by reasonable persons 
to include only teachers and administrators, but not coaches. For this reason, the 
vagueness challenge was again upheld. 
Conclusion of Application of Hazing Law 
 The cases above present judicial opinions in 10 cases across 6 states where 
challenges to the Hazing Law were claimed. The cases represent those cited most for 
future opinions on violations of hazing law and the constitutionality of those laws. This 
section did not include previously discussed cases, Missouri v. Allen (1995) and Ex Parte 
Barran (1998) which were discussed in previous sections of this chapter, nor discussion 
of Morton v. Florida (2008) which did not add new knowledge to the discussion. The 
issues of overbreadth, vagueness, equal protection, applicability, and freedom of 
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expression are important factors in considering how the courts may treat incidents of 
hazing and the application of state hazing statutes. 
Assault and Battery as Alleged in Cases of Hazing 
 Assault and battery is a state’s law issue that is adjudicated in the state in which 
the offense occurs (Currul-Dykeman, 2014). Assault is defined differently by the 
different states but is generally referenced as the intent to injure or threat to injure another 
person (Currul-Dykeman, 2014). Battery is the act of striking or harming another person 
or group of persons (Currul-Dykeman, 2014). Assault and battery are alleged in incidents 
of hazing 21 times between the years of 1980-2013. Assault is used in hazing incidents as 
the physical threat of violence or intent to injure that victim. 
Court Cases Alleging Violations of Assault & Battery in Incidents of Hazing 
Table 6 lists all cases alleging violations of assault and battery in incidents of 
hazing between the years of 1980-2013. The table includes the name, state of origin, year, 
and type of case for all 21 cases that occurred during this time frame. The cases are 
organized alphabetically by plaintiff. 
Table 6 identifies that 11 of 21 cases (52.38%) alleging violations of assault and 
battery appear in Criminal Court and 10 of 21 cases (47.62%) appear as Civil cases. 
Additionally, violations of assault and battery in hazing incidents were argued in 14 states 
with the Texas having the most cases (four). Three cases alleging assault and battery 
appear in Military Court as well. This data reveals that allegations of assault and battery 
following a hazing incident is the fourth most predominantly argued legal claim. The next 
section provides a look at the cases used to set precedent that allege violations of assault 
and battery following a hazing incident. 
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Table 6. Cases Alleging Assault & Battery in Hazing Incidents 
Case Name Year 
State of 
Origin 
Type of 
Claim 
Alexander v. Kappa Alpha Psi Fraternity 2006 Tennessee Civil 
Culbertson v. Fletcher Public Schools 2011 Oklahoma Civil 
Day v. James Towle et al 2001 Massachusetts Civil 
Durr v. Mississippi 1998 Mississippi Criminal 
Ex Parte Barran 1998 Alabama Civil 
Ex Parte Cornelious Smith 2006 Texas Criminal 
Ex parte Filmon Fasil Berhe 2004 Texas Criminal 
Ex Parte Smith  2004 Texas Criminal 
Griffen v. Alpha Phi Alpha 2007 Pennsylvania Civil 
Hancock v. North Sanpete School District 2012 Utah Civil 
Helton v. State of Indiana 1993 Indiana Criminal 
Hilton v. Lincoln Way High School 1998 Illinois Civil 
Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire department 1980 New York Civil 
Nkemakolam v. St. John's Military School 2012 Kansas Civil 
Ohio v. Brown 1993 Ohio Criminal 
Pelham v. Board of Regents 2013 Georgia Civil 
Peters v. New York 2007 New York Criminal 
Texas v. Boyd 2001 Texas Criminal 
United States v. Johanson 2012 Military Criminal 
United States v. Ryan 2007 Military Criminal 
United States v. Zacatelco 2008 Military Criminal 
 
Ex Parte Smith (2004) 152 S.W.3d 170 (Texas)   
Ex Parte Smith (2006) 185 S.W.3d 887 (Texas) 
 
 Ex Parte Smith (2004) was heard on appeal from the trial court in the matter of 
defendant Smith’s involvement in the hazing of a fellow Southern Methodist University 
student who was hospitalized after being forced to consume large quantities of water 
during his initiation. Smith challenged the charge of aggravated assault and requested that 
his original charge be reviewed under the hazing statute and not the aggravated assault 
statute because “the hazing statute was more specific” (Ex Parte Smith, 2004, p. 171). 
Because the hazing statute was a misdemeanor, appellant argued, the district court had no 
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jurisdiction over the prosecution. Defendant Smith argued that there because there was a 
statute that specifically addressed hazing and that because that statute only carried with it 
a misdemeanor charge (instead of the felony aggravated assault charge), that a violation 
of hazing should have been his only charge. The Court of Appeals of Texas Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the trial court decision stating: 
There is a valid statute under which the aggravated assault protection is being 
brought. Appellant does not raise a challenge that would render his prosecution 
void. He does not assert the aggravated assault statute is unconstitutional on its 
face or that the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. (Ex Parte Smith, 
2004, p. 172) 
 
The court opinion was that despite there being a statute for hazing which may also cover 
the offense in question, the prosecution had the right to choose which offense to charge 
the defendant with. The facts of the case alleged that the defendant violated the statute of 
aggravated assault as well as hazing, and aggravated assault, carrying a stricter penalty, 
was the charge brought to trial.  
Ex Parte Smith (2006) was the response of the Court of Criminal Appeals of 
Texas to the defendant’s continued appeal via the in pari materia doctrine.  
This doctrine is a rule of statutory construction for determining which statutory 
provision controls when a general statutory provision and a more specific 
statutory provision deal with the same subject matter and they irreconcilably 
conflict. It would appear the aggravated assault statute and the hazing statute do 
not deal with the same subject matter. The aggravated assault statute defines a 
result-oriented offense and is generally implicated when it is the actor's conscious 
desire to harm another. The hazing statute defines a conduct-oriented offense and 
is generally implicated when the actor intentionally engages in conduct that harms 
another irrespective of whether it is the actor's conscious desire to harm another. 
In other words, the hazing statute might not be implicated if the prosecution can 
prove that it was the appellant's conscious desire to seriously injure the victim. 
(Ex Parte Smith, 2006, p. 888) 
 
The Criminal Court of Appeals made the distinction evident between the two statutes by 
outlining the intent of the perpetrator as a defining characteristic. For a case of 
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aggravated assault to be successfully tried, the prosecution must prove that it was the 
defendant’s intent to harm the victim, whereas the hazing statute defined behavior that 
one intentionally engages in that may or may not result in injury to the victim. The layer 
of intent to harm became the defining factor between the two statutes, and the Criminal 
Court of Appeals did not rule out that a trial court may choose to return a verdict for 
hazing and not aggravated assault if the prosecution could not prove intent. The next 
case, Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire Department (1980), discussed the difference 
between intent to commit an act and intent to harm. 
Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire Department (1980) 50 N.Y.2d 535 (New York) 
Plaintiff Maines case was heard on appeal to the Court of Appeals of New York 
after a lower court deemed he could not bring a civil suit against his fellow firemen for 
their role in his injury when he had already filed a workers’ compensation claim (Maines 
v. Cronomer Valley Fire, 1980). The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the lower 
court, allowing the civil suit to move forward. Civil suit and Worker’s Compensation 
claims aside, the case alleged “defendants ‘in concert with one another caused the 
plaintiff to be physically restrained, and failed to discontinue their actions upon plaintiff’s 
resistance, requests and cries, and used physical force on the plaintiff for no legitimate or 
lawful purpose" (Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire, 1980, p. 545). In reversing the 
decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals of New York identified that defendants’ 
actions were not in line with their day-to-day duties and constituted an intentional action 
taken upon plaintiff Maines despite his protestations. This act of negligence outside the 
scope of duties allowed the civil case to move on. 
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Additionally, the court takes up the idea of intent to injure versus intent to engage 
in an action that may cause injury:  
The complaint could be interpreted as alleging that the individual defendants in 
throwing plaintiff into the dumpster committed an intentional assault upon him; 
moreover, plaintiff need not allege that defendants intended to bring about the 
harmful consequences that ensued, since the complaint in an action against a co-
employee for an assault committed outside the scope of the co-employee's 
employment need only allege deliberate intent or conscious choice to do the act 
which results in the injury. (Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire, 1980, p. 538) 
 
The intentional act of restraining the plaintiff and throwing him in the dumpster resulted 
in the injury to the plaintiff. This original intent to engage in the activity constituted a 
violation of the assault statute. The next case Helton v. State of Indiana (1993) discussed 
the difference between misdemeanor assault and battery associated with the hazing 
statute and felony criminal recklessness as associated with the Indiana Criminal Gang 
Statute. 
Helton v. State of Indiana (1993) 624 N.E.2d 499 (Indiana) 
 On appeal to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, plaintiff Helton challenged his 
conviction under the Indiana Criminal Gang Statute for committing battery on another 
individual (Helton v. Indiana, 1993). Helton brought a challenge to the Gang Activity 
Statute for vagueness and overbreadth and claimed that he should be charged with a 
misdemeanor under the Hazing Statute. The following discussion is pertinent to this 
study:  
Hazing is a Class B misdemeanor if the act involved creates only a risk of 
substantial bodily injury to another person. A person commits criminal 
recklessness, a class D felony, if the hazing act results in serious bodily injury to a 
person. A person may be prosecuted under the Gang Statute for a class D felony, 
if among other requirements, he is a member of a group which consists of five or 
more persons which requires the commission of a felony or an act that would be a 
felony if committed by an adult or a battery as a condition for membership or 
continued membership. (Helton v. Indiana, 1993, p. 512) 
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A couple of important points stood out from the judge’s opinion on this case. First there 
was a difference between engaging in activity that created a risk of bodily harm and an 
activity that resulted in serious bodily injury. Again, a state specified intent to engage in 
an activity as a violation of the hazing statute. This case set up future case law where a 
hazing activity that resulted in injury is adjudicated under the Criminal Recklessness 
statute. The court also outlined that the Criminal Gang Activity Statute automatically 
results in a felony charge if the activity is consistent with battery as a condition of 
membership. In the opinion, the court went on to identify that fraternities, sororities, and 
other organizations could also have charges brought under the Criminal Gang Activity 
statute if the prosecution chose to do so (Helton v. Indiana, 1993). The next case Pelham 
v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia (2013) dealt with assault and 
battery as performed by a third party and a state actor’s involvement in this action. 
Pelham v. Board of Regents of the University System (2013) 743 S.E.2d 469 (Georgia) 
 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia, Plaintiff Pelham appealed the decision of the 
lower court to dismiss his claim of negligence, negligence per se and negligent training 
and supervision (Pelham v. Board of Regents, 2013). The facts stated that Pelham was a 
member of the football team at Georgia Southern University and was injured at football 
practice when the “head coach ordered Pelham and other players to fight each other 
during practice” (Pelham v. Board of Regents, 2013, p. 791). The lower court dismissed 
the claims relying on Georgia Tort Claims Act, OGCA § 50-21-20 et seq. (GTCA). In the 
GTCA, there was an assault and battery exception and this exception “has been 
interpreted to mean that where a loss results from assault and battery, there is no waiver 
of sovereign immunity, even though a private individual or entity would be liable under 
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like circumstances” (Pelham v. Board of Regents, 2013, p. 794). This exception barred 
plaintiff claims against the coach and against the Board of Regents as the facts alleged an 
assault by a third party fellow student and not at the hands of the coach himself. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and provided this important 
distinction in reviewing hazing cases that alleged assault and battery.  
Conclusion of Assault and Battery as Alleged in Cases of Hazing 
 The cases above present judicial opinions in five cases across four states where 
assault and battery are alleged in cases of hazing. The cases represent those cited most for 
future opinions on assault and battery as alleged in a hazing incident. This section did not 
include previously discussed cases, Day v. Towle (2001) and Texas v. Boyd (2001), which 
were discussed in previous sections of this chapter. The issues of intent to commit an act, 
intent to injure, criminal recklessness, aggravated assault, and immunity from tort 
liability are important factors in considering how the courts may treat incidents of assault 
and battery as alleged in hazing. 
Title IX of the Civil Rights Act as Alleged in Cases of Hazing 
 Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 “is a comprehensive Federal law 
that prohibits discrimination based on sex in federally funded education program or 
activity” (Justice Department, Retrieved 3/17/18). Title IX was created to ensure the fair 
distribution of resources at educational institutions where federal funding is received and 
avoid the use of resources to promote sexual discrimination in educational institutions 
(Kaplin & Lee, 2007). Claims of violations of Title IX at institutions of higher education 
began under the disparate access to resources section of Title IX, but more recently 
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claims of violations of Title IX are more likely to be related to sexual harassment, hostile 
environment or sexual assault (Kaplin & Lee, 2007).  
An institution would be liable under Title IX for a student’s sexual harassment of 
another student if: ‘(i) a hostile environment exists in the school’s programs or 
activities, (ii) the school knows or should have known of the harassment, (iii) the 
school fails to take immediate and appropriate corrective action.’ (62 Fed. Reg. at 
12039 in Kaplin & Lee, 2007, p. 314)  
 
These three characteristics are the foundations of most instances of hazing that allege 
violations of Title IX in an educational environment.  
Court Cases Alleging Violations of Title IX in Incidents of Hazing 
Table 7 lists all cases alleging violations of Title IX in incidents of hazing 
between the years of 1980-2013. The table includes the name, state of origin, year, and 
type of case for all 15 cases that occurred during this time frame. The cases are organized 
alphabetically by plaintiff. 
Table 7 identifies that 15 of 15 cases (100%) alleging violations of Title IX 
appear in Civil Court. Additionally, violations of Title IX in hazing incidents were argued 
in 11 states with the State of California having the most cases (three). This data reveals 
that allegations of Title IX following a hazing incident is the fifth most predominantly 
argued legal claim. The next section provides a look at the cases used to set precedent 
that allege violations of Title IX following a hazing incident. 
Greenfield v. Michigan State University (1996) No.180170 (Michigan) 
 The first case was heard in the Court of Appeals of Michigan on plaintiff appeal 
from the trial court. Lower Court decision granted the university and employees summary 
disposition for student claims of sexual harassment, gross negligence, and intentional 
infliction of emotional distress (Greenfield v. Michigan State, 1996). The allegations for 
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Table 7. Cases that Allege Violations of Title IX in Incidents of Hazing 
Case Name Year 
State of 
Origin Type of Claim 
C.H. v. Los Lunas Schools Board of 
Education 2012 New Mexico Civil 
Clifford v. Regents of University of 
California 2012 California Civil 
Cortese v. West Jefferson Hills 2008 Pennsylvania Civil 
Davis v. Carmel Clay Schools 2013 Indiana Civil 
Greenfield v. Michigan State University 1996 Michigan Civil 
Hoffman v. Saginaw Public Schools 2012 Michigan Civil 
Infante v. County of Los Angeles Civil 
Service Commission 2003 California Civil 
Mentavlos v. Anderson 2001 South Carolina Civil 
Perkins v. Alamo Heights Independent 
School District 2002 Texas Civil 
Roe v. Gustine Unified School District 2009 California Civil 
Sanches v. Carrollton Farmers Branch 2011 Texas Civil 
Seamons v. Snow 1996 Utah Civil 
Sechrist v. Unified Government of 
Wyandotte County 1999 Kansas Civil 
Wencho v. Lakewood 2008 Ohio Civil 
Zaccaro v. Parker 1996 New York Civil 
 
sexual harassment presented at trial were “band staff members participated in, tolerated, 
or had knowledge of the following band activities: giving and using nicknames of a 
sexual nature, discussing masturbation techniques and sexual preferences, requiring 
plaintiff to participate in ‘assing’ and simulated masturbation” (Greenfield v. Michigan 
State, 1996, p. 1).  
The court ruled that while these allegations were offensive, they did not state a 
sexual harassment claim under Title IX (Greenfield v. Michigan State, 1996). To meet the 
criteria for a claim of sexual harassment, the complaint must have alleged “conduct of the 
same nature as sexual advances or sexual favors” and harassment based on the plaintiff’s 
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gender was insufficient (Greenfield v. Michigan State, 1996, p. 5). The simple inclusion 
of a discussion of activities that may make the plaintiff uncomfortable did not equate to 
sexual advances or sexual favors. For this reason, the Court of Appeals affirmed the 
lower court decision to dismiss sexual harassment. In Mentavlos v. Anderson (2001 & 
2001) a discussion of students as state actors was highlighted.  
Mentavlos v. Anderson (2001) 249 F.3d 301 (4th Cir.)   
Mentavlos v. Anderson (2000) 85 F. Supp 2d 609 (South Carolina) 
 
 Mentavlos v. Anderson (2000 & 2001) dealt with the issue of gender-based 
discrimination in the treatment of hazing by cadets at The Citadel. The Citadel is a state 
funded institution of higher education that uses a military-based structure as a part of its 
educational process. Plaintiff Mentavlos claimed that she was treated differently and 
more harshly during her time at the Citadel by two upper class students (Anderson and 
Saleeby) and that the administration of the Citadel had knowledge of this disparate 
treatment (Mentavlos v. Anderson, 2000 & 2001). The defendants’ motion for summary 
judgment was initially heard by the United States District Court for the District of South 
Carolina in 2000 and again on plaintiff appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Fourth Circuit in 2001. The Fourth Circuit Court affirmed the granting of summary 
judgment by the District Court based on Mentavlos failing to state a claim of gender-
based harassment.  
 The court opinion was based on two main points: (1) the defendants in question 
were not state actors and (2) there was no evidence to support gender-based harassment 
(Mentavlos v. Anderson, 2000 & 2001). First, The Citadel education is based on what is 
called the Fourth-Class System whereby the seniors at the Citadel are given leadership 
roles in the control and discipline of the lower three classes (Mentavlos v. Anderson, 2000 
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& 2001). Each subsequent class has a higher rank at the institution and has responsibility 
for similar upholding of discipline by the lower classes. In this case, Mentavlos was 
reporting abuse by the sophomores in her unit. The court determined that:  
The Fourth-Class System established by the school has known risks of abuse as 
well as disincentives to reporting any abuse, these risks are inherent in the unique 
educational opportunity offered at The Citadel. To require that the risks be 
eliminated would be to eliminate the very system of education on which the 
school is based. This is not to say that the risks can be ignored. However, if the 
school makes genuine and reasonable efforts to minimize the risks, it cannot be 
said to endorse the abuses that might result. (Mentavlos v. Anderson, 2000, p. 
620) 
 
This discussion was used to identify that the alleged abuse of the sophomores, while 
offensive, did not subject the plaintiff to a claim against the state as the sophomores were 
not considered state actors acting on behalf of the institution, despite their higher rank, as 
the Citadel was not a recognized military institution (Mentavlos v. Anderson, 2000 & 
2001).  
Secondly, there was no evidence to support that the Citadel was indifferent to the 
behaviors utilized by the defendants in this action. The court pointed to the record that 
Anderson and Saleeby were both punished and addressed once the complaints were made 
known and the court found the response sufficient to the alleged abuses (Mentavlos v. 
Anderson, 2000 & 2001). Lastly on this point, there was no evidence provided that 
pointed to Mentavlos’s treatment and abuse by Anderson and Saleeby being related to her 
gender but was characteristic with other abuses that may have occurred during the 
defendants’ time at the Citadel. For these reasons, the summary judgment was affirmed 
related to Title IX gender discrimination claims. The next case, Roe v. Gustine Unified 
School District (2009), identifies a ‘test’ for institutional liability for sexual harassment in 
a hazing case. 
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Roe v. Gustine Unified School District (2009) 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008 (California) 
 Roe v. Gustine Unified School District (2009) was heard by the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of California on motion for summary judgment by 
the defendant school system and coaches in their individual capacity. Plaintiff Roe 
alleged that he was hazed during the high school football camp. Plaintiff alleged that 
upper-class members of the team violated his Title IX rights in a variety of ways, 
including (1) the exposure of genitals to the plaintiff and others on the team, (2) being 
verbally abused with terms like homo and fag, (3) being touched on his buttocks in the 
shower, and (4) being held down in the locker room and having the upperclassmen use an 
air pump to blow air in his rectum (Roe v. Gustine Unified School District, 2009). Upon 
learning of these incidents, the school administration punished the upper-class 
perpetrators.  
 The court granted defendants motion to dismiss Title IX violations in their 
individual capacities as Title IX does not apply to individual defendants (Roe v. Gustine 
Unified School District, 2009). “The Government’s enforcement power may only be 
exercised against the funding recipient, and we have not extended damages liability under 
Title IX to parties outside the scope of this power” (Soper v. Hoben, 1999, p. 854). Civil 
damages under Title IX as instituted by the Federal Government were only available 
from the educational institution that receives money from the federal government, not the 
individual actors who operated on behalf of the educational institution.  
 The court moved on to examine if the tests for school district liability of sexual 
harassment occurred, relying on the four principals created in Reese, 208 F.3d at 739: 
1. The school district must exercise substantial control over both the harassed 
and the context in which the known harassment occurs; 
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2. The plaintiff must suffer sexual harassment…that is so severe, pervasive and 
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school; 
3. The school district must have actual knowledge of the harassment; and 
4. The school district’s deliberate indifference subjects its students to 
harassment. (Roe v. Gustine Unified School District, 2009, p. 1025) 
 
Using these four characteristics to determine if there was substantial evidence to support 
the plaintiff’s claim, the court examined the facts of the case. First, the school district was 
in substantial control of the plaintiff and student defendants as the football camp 
happened on school grounds with oversight of school coaches and administrators. 
Second, the activities suffered by the plaintiff were deemed to be ‘severe, pervasive and 
offensive’ (Roe v. Gustine Unified School District, 2009). The plaintiff ultimately 
removed himself from the school following these incidents, creating a triable fact of 
deprivation of access to educational opportunities.  
Third, the plaintiff argued that the school district met the actual knowledge 
threshold by one of the coaches observing the group of upperclassmen using the air hose 
on a fellow student in a similar manner on day two of camp, and up to 15 students being 
assaulted in a similar manner (Roe v. Gustine Unified School District, 2009). The court 
determined again that enough evidence existed that the Coaches may have had 
knowledge of these incidents to allow the trial to go to court. Fourth, the deliberate 
indifference claim made by plaintiff related to the amount of time it took for the Coach to 
inform the Principal, discuss the incident with other coach witnesses, and inform the 
police. Based on these four requirements of school district liability for claims of Title IX 
violations having been met, the court denied defendant’s motion for summary judgement 
on the Title IX claims.  
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Conclusion of Title IX as Alleged in Cases of Hazing 
 The cases above present judicial opinions in four cases across three states where 
violations of Title IX are alleged in cases of hazing. The cases represent those cited most 
for future opinions on Title IX as alleged in a hazing incident. This section did not 
include previously discussed case, Seamons v. Snow (1996), which was discussed in 
previous sections of this chapter. The issues of state actor status, institutional liability, 
hostile environment, gender-based discrimination, and sexual harassment are important 
factors in considering how the courts may treat incidents of Title IX violations as alleged 
in hazing. 
Summary 
 The data presented in this chapter looked at all hazing cases that occurred 
between 1980-2013 with written judicial opinions. The data were presented across the 27 
categories of legal claims and allegations made in the cases and five major categories 
were identified: (1) tort liability and negligence, (2) violations of § 1983 of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, (3) cases where a violation of the statutory hazing law is claimed, (4) 
violations of assault and battery, and (5) violations of Title IX of the Educational 
Amendments of 1972.  
 Within each of these major categories, the precedent-setting cases were analyzed, 
and the prevailing court opinion was presented. This resulted in the presentation of 40 
court opinions identifying the unique perspectives of each individual case and the 
collective voice of the challenges facing the courts related to allegations of hazing. This 
data showed that hazing is rarely a singular issue presented before the court and there are 
many potential legal claims that surround an allegation of hazing. Chapter 5 will provide 
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the results of the data in this study, the primary conclusions that can be drawn and the 
answers to the research questions this study sought to address. 
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Chapter 5 
Results, Conclusions, Limitations and Recommendations 
This study sought to provide a thorough analyses of the total body of civil and 
criminal legal cases regarding hazing between the years of 1980-2013. Additionally, this 
case sought to expand upon the 2009 research conducted by Carroll, Connaughton, 
Spengler, and Zhang which used a content analysis methodology to look at anti-hazing 
case law as applied in cases where educational institutions were named as defendants, 
and the 2002 unpublished dissertation of Guynn which explored anti-hazing case law and 
its application in cases involving high school students. Specifically, this study sought to 
address these research questions:  
1. How many cases alleging hazing as a precipitating factor have been heard in 
Federal or State District Courts (or higher) since 1980? 
2. How have cases with allegations of hazing been treated by criminal and civil 
courts? 
3. What other legal issues have been brought before the court in cases alleging 
hazing as a precipitating factor? 
4. Is the creation of stricter anti-hazing laws an applicable response to incidents 
of hazing? 
5. In an incident of hazing, are other criminal acts more applicable than the anti-
hazing law itself? 
 
To answer these questions the study identified all criminal and civil cases where 
hazing or hazing like behaviors were alleged and tried in a court of law between 1980-
2013. LexisNexis was used as the main research database to collect the cases. The cases 
were read and examined individually for their relevance to this study and to the research 
questions. Issues of law were coded for each case that alleged hazing and as new legal 
theory was introduced, a new category for legal examination was added to the coding. 27 
categories of legal issues resulting from incidents of hazing were identified and the cases 
were sorted into those categories. Five major categories were identified and analyzed 
140 
 
further, (1) tort liability and negligence, (2) violations of § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, (3) cases where a violation of the statutory hazing law is claimed, (4) violations 
of assault and battery, and (5) violations of Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 
1972. Within these major categories, the precedent-setting cases were analyzed, and the 
prevailing court opinions were presented in Chapter 4. Based upon that data, conclusions 
and resulting recommendations are presented. 
Results 
 This section examines the outcomes of the case law data presented in Chapter 4 
and provides answers to the research questions guiding this study. Following the 
discussion of each prevailing issue resulting from an incident of hazing, a list of the key 
characteristics or key questions the courts have used to review the legal issue is provided. 
Cases Alleging Hazing 
 This study identified 167 cases that were heard by Federal or State District Court 
(or higher) between 1980-2013. Of these cases, 136 heard claims made in Civil Courts, 
22 were heard in Criminal Court, and the other nine (9) were cases of administrative, 
procedural, insurance law, or military law. 66 cases were heard in Federal courts, four (4) 
were heard in military court, and 97 of the cases were heard in state courts. Cases were 
heard in 37 states alleging violations of 27 different laws or legal standards. 
Hazing Cases in Criminal and Civil Courts 
 This study began with the belief that hazing would be tried as a criminal or civil 
violation in all legal cases where the factors of the case included an allegation of hazing. 
The research found that of the 167 cases with allegations of hazing as a precipitating 
factor to the case, only 35 of them were brought before the court arguing a violation of 
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the state hazing statute. The other 132 cases were brought to the court for decisions on 
other matters of state and federal law that occurred because of hazing.  
 In the 35 cases where hazing was alleged, or the hazing law was challenged, the 
court upheld the charges of hazing or the constitutionality of the hazing law 17 times. In 
Missouri v. Allen (1995), Illinois v. Anderson (1992), McKenzie v. Maryland (2000), 
Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha (1998), The Matter of Khalil H. (2010), Texas v. Boyd 
(2001), and Morton v. Florida (2008), the courts upheld most of the state statutes to 
challenges of overbreadth, vagueness, and equal protection. These decisions affirmed that 
state legislatures need not write laws that are so specific as to spell out every activity that 
may be constituted as hazing, but instead write legislation that can be “commonly 
understood by persons of ordinary intelligence” (Missouri v. Allen, 1996, p. 877).  
 Texas v. Boyd (2001) upheld the clause within the statute that if a person chooses 
to come forward and report hazing, that person can be held immune by the courts for 
their participation in the hazing. This decision may be important to inform future state 
legislators of an opportunity to increase reporting of hazing incidents by allowing victims 
(and perpetrators perhaps) with immunity from prosecution should they choose to come 
forward. 
 The state courts have differed on their interpretations of hazing law from a strict 
or loose adherence to the language contained within the statutes. Perkins v. 
Commonwealth (2001) walked back the decision of a lower court to apply hazing law to 
police academies noting that the statute only specifically stated student organizations as 
being applicable to the law; whereas, the State Court of New York In the Matter of Khalil 
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H. (2010) interpreted a gang with no official connection to an institution to be an 
organization and under jurisdiction of the hazing statute. 
Some challenges to the state hazing laws were upheld, however, in the cases of Ex 
Parte Barran (1998), Carpetta v. Pi Kappa Alpha (1998), and Texas v. Zascavage 
(2007). Ex Parte Barran identified that a member of an organization who enters an 
organization with knowledge that hazing may occur and chooses to subject himself to 
hazing in that organization does not reserve the right to later sue the organization for 
injury from the hazing. This ruling by the Supreme Court of Alabama increases the 
challenge of upholding the Alabama state hazing statute. The threshold for adjudicating 
hazing in Alabama has been raised beyond that of other states.  
In Carpetta (1998) and Texas v. Zascavage (2007) the void for vagueness 
exception was successfully argued. In Carpetta (1998) the term mental harm was found 
to be too vague to be applied in any setting and too imprecise to provide citizens of the 
State of Ohio with clear direction of how to avoid causing someone mental harm. 
Zascavage (2007) identified that a statute may not be written so broadly as to place a duty 
to prevent hazing on everyone in the universe, and state legislatures must remember to 
specify the persons or groups of people on whom a duty to prevent hazing has been 
placed. 
 Eighteen cases of alleged violations of hazing law were either dismissed from 
court, or the defendant in the case was granted summary judgment. In these cases, several 
issues resulted in the finding for the defendant. Duitch v. Canton County Schools (2004) 
and E.F. v. Oberlin City School District (2010) both brought challenges of hazing in a 
public city school and the courts identified that hazing cannot be considered when 
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participation in the group is not voluntary (i.e., being a member of the freshman class). 
This ruling applies to all students of public schools where traditions of hazing by the 
upperclassmen are still promulgated today. But this ruling brings to mind an important 
question of hazing as it relates to collegiate sports teams or programs of study where 
participation on the team may not be voluntary based on the offer and use of an academic 
scholarship to be on the team. This might be an important distinction for the courts to 
make in the future. 
In other cases, Texas v. Zascavage (2007) and Hilton v. Lincoln Way High School 
(1998), qualified or sovereign immunity was granted to school officials who knew or 
should have known that hazing was occurring and the duty to protect others from harm 
was not extended to the victim.  In two other cases, Yost v. Wabash College (2013) and 
Grenier v. Commissioner of Transportation (2012), the prior hazing actions of defendants 
were ruled to not have had effect on the resulting injury of the plaintiff and the courts 
ruled that the plaintiffs failed to state claims in the civil actions. 
 After reviewing the 35 cases where a violation of the state hazing law is alleged, 
the court is most likely to find in favor of the plaintiff if (1) there is a victim willing to 
come forward and make a report, (2) the victim is associated with an institution of higher 
education, (3) the victim is seeking membership in a voluntary organization (usually a 
fraternity), and (4) a physical injury has occurred. Outside of these parameters, there are 
few examples of the application of hazing law through judicial opinion.  
Other Legal Issues 
 In the 167 cases reviewed by this study, claims fell across 27 overall categories of 
law. Claims related to tort liability and negligence (i.e., negligence, duty, liability, 
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agency, premises liability, qualified immunity) were grouped together under one sub-
category and claims related to violations of 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
(First, Fourth, Fifth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendment violations) were grouped in a 
second sub-category. Additional categories of legal claims related to incidents of hazing 
were: (1) assault and battery, (2) Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972, (3) 
defamation, (4) laws related to the use of wiretaps as evidence, (5) challenges of due 
process in educational conduct hearings, (6) public records requests, (7) Workman’s 
Compensation law, (8) whistleblower laws, (9) intentional infliction of emotional 
distress, (10) wrongful death, (11) breach of contract, (12) discrimination, and (13) 
injunctive relief. Table 1 is reintroduced here to represent the wide range of legal issues 
and legal claims that may follow an incident of hazing. 
This study explored the five most commonly argued legal issues following an 
incident of hazing. Those issues are: (1) tort liability and negligence at 49.7% of the total 
claims, 2) civil claims related to 42 U.S.C. §1983 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act at 21.56%, 
3) hazing as its own legal issue was challenged in 20.95% of cases, 4) assault and battery 
was associated in 12.57% of cases, and 5) Title IX was challenged in 8.98% of cases. The 
next section will explore common issues in these four additional categories (of note, most 
42 U.S.C. §1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 claims overlap with issues of liability 
and negligence). 
Liability for alcohol consumption in a hazing incident. When considering the 
topic of liability for consumption of alcohol, court decisions were drawn from Ballou v. 
Sigma Nu (1986), Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter (1987), Haben v. Anderson (1992), Nisbet  
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Table 8. Legal Claims Following an Incident of Hazing          
Coded Variables   n   %          
Hazing Law   35   20.95  
Assault   21   12.57  
Constitutionality   8   4.79  
        
42 U.S.C. § 1983    36   21.56  
1st Amendment   5   2.99  
4th Amendment   10   5.99  
5th Amendment   2   1.19  
14th Amendment   15   8.98  
15th Amendment    1   0.59  
Freedom of Association   3   1.79  
Due Process   19   11.38  
        
Tort Liability & 
Negligence   83   49.7  
Liability   80   47.9  
Premises Liability   10   5.99  
Qualified Immunity   36   21.56  
Negligence   83   49.7  
Duty   65   38.92  
Agency   13   7.78  
        
Wrongful Death   8   4.79  
Breach of Contract   4   2.39  
Title IX   15   8.98  
Defamation   9   5.39  
Public Records   2   1.19  
Wiretap   1   0.59  
Intentional Infliction of 
Emotional Distress   8   4.79  
Discrimination   8   4.79  
Whistle Blower   1   0.59  
Injunctive Relief   1   0.59  
Worker's Compensation   3   1.79  
 
v. Bucher (1997), Oja v. Theta Chi Fraternity (1997), Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha 
(2000), and Prime v. Beta Gamma Chapter (2002). Each of these decisions relies upon 
the others in this category to interpret, analyze and adapt the law for the states involved. 
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In Ballou (1986) the court held that the jury could reasonably have found that the 
fraternity was the proximate cause of the decedent's death. “Based on evidence, it was 
reasonable to infer that the decedent would not have consumed a fatal amount of alcohol 
without the prompting of the active brothers" (Ballou v. Sigma Nu, 1986, p. 494). The 
court also ruled that the deceased may have understood that hazing would occur within 
the fraternity (based on previous knowledge of the organization) but assumed only the 
risks associated with verbal and physical abuse, not the risks associated with extreme 
intoxication. The resulting injury of the deceased plaintiff was ruled to have been related 
to the actions of the fraternity and not solely related to the consumption of alcohol.  
Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter (1987) used the decision in Ballou to re-interpret 
Illinois state law related to alcohol consumption and deaths related to fraternities, setting 
a new standard that allowed a social host to be considered negligent if (1) consumption of 
alcohol is coerced and (2) it is in relation to a hazing incident. The court wrote: 
The facts describe a fraternity function where plaintiff was required to drink to 
intoxication in order to become a member of the fraternity. We cannot close our 
eyes to the fact that the abuse illustrated in the present case could have resulted in 
the termination of life and the plaintiff was coerced into being his own 
executioner" (Quinn v. Sigma Rho Chapter, 1987, p. 1197) 
  
The court identified that there is importance in recognizing the action of consuming 
alcohol, the coercion of the surrounding members, and the value of ongoing membership 
in the organization when determining negligence in these cases. The fraternity in Quinn 
(1987) was deemed to have a duty not to harm the plaintiff during the new member 
process and the forced consumption of alcohol was a breach of that duty. 
Haben v. Anderson (1992) further supported the decision of the Quinn court in 
Illinois by relying on the precedent set in Quinn to hold an organization accountable for 
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their involvement in forcing a new member to consume alcohol as part of an initiation. 
The Haben court added an assumed duty of care when the older members of the team 
took Haben back to their dormitory room and allowed Haben to sleep on the team 
members’ floor but failed to check on him throughout the night (Haben v. Anderson, 
1992). Plaintiff Haben ultimately died because of asphyxiation due to alcohol 
consumption and the members of the team were found negligent in the forcing of Haben 
to drink and the failure to provide appropriate care. The Nisbet (1997) and Oja (1997) 
courts have similar outcomes based on similar sets of circumstances. 
Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha (2000) resulted in a different outcome based on 
the change in one single detail. In this case the Supreme Court of Iowa found that no duty 
existed because the member was not coerced or forced to consume alcohol, but instead 
was offered alcohol by the upper-class members of the organization. The decision was 
that Garafalo’s consumption of alcohol beyond the point of intoxication was the 
proximate cause of death and the fraternity members did not owe a duty to Garafalo to 
not allow him to continue consumption (Garafalo v. Lambda Chi Alpha, 2000). The 
Garafalo court made the distinction between the coerced and non-coerced behaviors of a 
new member in an organization and the choices an individual made to consume or not 
consume alcohol. The Prime (2002) court came to a similar decision in the state of 
Kansas. 
On the topic of liability for consumption of alcohol it is important to remember 
that each state is bound by different laws as set by the individual state legislature. The 
courts utilize analogical reasoning to apply the decision in similar cases in other states 
when there is no body of case law in their own state. The characteristics that apply in 
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liability for consumption of alcohol are: (1) did the organization (or individual) have a 
duty to the claimant to protect or not injure, (2) did the organization breach that duty 
(generally through coercive action or failure to provide care), (3) was there causation 
(i.e., did the claimant choose to consume alcohol on their own or did the organization 
coerce the individual to consume) and (4) was there damage (transport to the hospital, 
resulting brain damage or in extreme cases death). If these four characteristics are met, 
there is likely a cause of action in a tort liability and negligence claim for alcohol 
consumption related to hazing. 
Institutional liability. When considering the topic of institutional liability for 
hazing, decisions were drawn from Furek v. Delaware (1991), Alton v. Texas A&M 
(1998), Brueckner v. Norwich (1999), Knoll v. University of Nebraska (1999), and Martin 
v. North Metro Fire Dept. (2007). These decisions lay the foundation for court 
interpretation of institutional liability for hazing incidents. 
Furek v. Delaware (1991) was the first case in this period to examine university 
liability for hazing. In Furek, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the University 
maintained some liability in areas where it had previously attempted to control behavior.  
The evidence in this record strongly suggests that the University not only was 
knowledgeable of the dangers of hazing, but, in repeated communications to 
students in general and fraternities, emphasized the University policy of discipline 
for hazing infractions. The University policy against hazing …thus constituted an 
assumed duty which became 'an indispensable part of the bundle of services 
which colleges afford their students.’ (Furek v. Delaware, 1991, p. 520)  
 
Because the University had knowledge of previous hazing incidents on the campus and 
had instituted policies to address hazing on campus, the University created a duty of care 
and that duty was breached in the injury of plaintiff Furek. 
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Alton v. Texas A&M (1998) provided more detail for institutions and their 
response to reports of hazing. Alton involved the investigation of rumors of hazing at 
Texas A&M University and the ensuing investigation into those rumors by University 
officials. The court in this case found that the University was not responsible for the 
injury to Alton stating, “the court finds that reasonable officials in the shoes of the 
nonstudent defendants, could have concluded that their actions would prevent 
constitutional violations" (Alton v. Hopgood, 1998, p. 836). Based on the evidence 
provided, the defendants showed that they acted upon the initial rumor of hazing, were 
misled by plaintiff’s own statement, continued to investigate despite this information, and 
ultimately helped the plaintiff file his claims with the police. These actions proved that 
the defendants were in fact acting within the color of the law and on behalf of the 
plaintiff. In this case (as opposed to Furek) the University followed appropriate 
procedures to prevent further injury and were misled by the plaintiff’s original statements 
prior to his injury. The court ruled that in this case there was not a breach of duty to the 
plaintiff. 
Brueckner v. Norwich (1999) followed a similar fact pattern as Alton (1998) but 
with a different outcome based on small but important changes in the University 
response. Plaintiff Brueckner was a student at Norwich University, a military college in 
the state of Vermont. Brueckner attended Norwich for a total of sixteen days and was 
subjected to “a regular barrage of obscene, offensive, harassing language, interrogation at 
meals preventing him from eating” (Brueckner v. Norwich, 1999, p. 1089) and a series of 
assaults by the upper-class ‘cadre’ who were responsible for the transition and orientation 
of new students to Norwich. The court determined that the administration of Norwich 
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University was aware of hazing incidents of this kind in the past by previous cadre yet 
failed to address the behavior to prevent hazing from continuing and prevent new 
students at Norwich from facing injury. Due to this failure to address previous behaviors, 
the court ruled in favor of plaintiff Brueckner and allowed damages to be awarded. 
In Knoll (1999), the plaintiff was injured during a hazing incident following a 
similar pattern to other hazing incidents that occurred at The University of Nebraska in 
previous years. Because of this injury and the pattern of behavior it followed, the court 
ruled that Universities have a duty to provide reasonable care for their students in 
properties owned or overseen by the University, or in properties that have jurisdiction to 
the University Code of Student Conduct. By having knowledge of previous incidents of 
misbehavior within the FIJI organization, and knowledge of other fraternities conducting 
similar hazing incidents on campus, the Supreme Court of Nebraska ruled that a 
reasonable person could conclude that the injury of plaintiff Knoll was foreseeable and 
liability and negligence on behalf of the institution can be reasonably argued in a trial 
(Knoll v. Board of Regents, 1999). The important distinction in Knoll from Alton (1999) 
is that there was previous knowledge of like hazing incidents in other fraternities and 
there was previous bad behavior exhibited by the specific fraternity Knoll was injured by. 
This combination of circumstances allowed the court to determine that The University of 
Nebraska could have done more to protect Knoll from this foreseeable injury. 
Martin v. North Metro Fire (2007) is an example of a non-university entity being 
found liable for incidents of hazing within its organization. Plaintiff Martin was subjected 
to numerous incidents of beating and sexual harassment during his time as a probationary 
firefighter. Under this claim the plaintiff set forth evidence that probationary firefighters 
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were treated substantially different than non-probationary firefighters and there was 
significant history of the disparate treatment. For these reasons, the judge ruled the case 
could move forward and that individual firefighters and those who supervised but failed 
to respond to reports of hazing could be found responsible by a court of law (Martin v. 
North Metro Fire, 2007). 
 The characteristics that apply in institutional liability for hazing include: (1) did 
the institution have prior knowledge of incidents of hazing, 2) did the institution 
appropriately investigate these prior incidents, 3) was the injury to the plaintiff 
foreseeable and 4) did the institution work appropriately to prevent the foreseeable injury. 
In these cases, the responsibility is on the institution to appropriately investigate and 
provide discipline for all knowledge of alleged hazing within the institution. In cases 
where an institution has appropriately followed up, courts have generally ruled favorably, 
however in cases where institutions were shown to have ignored complaints of hazing or 
to have had knowledge of hazing but to not have addressed the behavior, the institution 
has been generally found to be negligent. 
 Consideration of qualified immunity. As a reminder, qualified immunity 
“protects officials from constitutional tort claims so long as ‘their conduct does not 
violate clearly established…constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would 
have known’” (Chen, 2006, p. 229). In the cases in this study, qualified immunity is used 
by various governmental entities and governmental employees as a defense against 
hazing activities that were either precipitated by the employee or plaintiff belief that the 
employee, school board, city government, etc. should have known that hazing was 
occurring prior to the incident. Qualified Immunity acts as a shield for governmental 
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employees against lawsuits where the employee was acting within the scope of their job 
(Bittner, 2016). The defense of qualified immunity extends to individuals and 
government organizations if the employee is acting within the scope of their government 
assigned duties. The compelling cases of qualified immunity related to hazing are, Bryant 
v. Rupp (1981), Rupp v. Bryant (1982), Reeves v. Besonen (1991), Meeker v. Edmundson 
(2005), and Pelham v. Board of Regents (2013).  
 The oldest case relating to qualified immunity and hazing is Bryant v. Rupp 
(1981) (and its corollary Rupp v. Bryant (1982)). In Bryant (1981) the court identified 
that Rupp and the principal of the high school were negligent in their failure to supervise 
the activities of an organization that was known to conduct activities against school board 
policy. The resulting injury to plaintiff Bryant, because of the hazing he endured by the 
club Rupp was assigned to supervise, resulted in the court’s decision to remove the 
sovereign immunity from these individual actors. 
 Rupp v. Bryant (1982) was heard by the Supreme Court of Florida on appeal of 
the lower court decision. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Court 
as it relates to the waiving of sovereign immunity. The Supreme Court agreed that Rupp 
and defendant Principal Stasco had a responsibility to supervise the activities of the 
Omega Club, and that these responsibilities were not discretionary and thus defendants 
do not enjoy official immunity (Rupp v. Bryant, 1982).  
Under the circumstances of this case, the specific duty to supervise the club was 
required by the school board’s own regulations, we have no difficulty in 
denominating such a duty as ministerial. Because the duty does not involve 
discretion in the policy-making sense, neither the principal nor the teacher may 
raise the shield of official immunity. (Rupp v. Bryant, 1982, p. 22)  
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The court went on to acknowledge that the school had assumed a duty to protect and 
supervise the activities of its students by requiring all student organizations to have an 
advisor assigned to them. Defendant Rupp’s inattention to the initiation planning meeting 
was determined to have some proximate cause in the injury to plaintiff. In this case, high 
school officials are held responsible for the failure to perform duties that resulted in the 
injury of a student. 
 Reeves v. Besonen (1991) reviews a similar fact pattern, but in this case, the 
football coach was present for the supervision of the team but did not have knowledge of 
the hazing that occurred. Based on this piece of evidence, the football coach defendant 
maintained his qualified immunity as the judge writes, "[the] Supreme Court has made 
very clear that substantive due process does not entitle every individual under the care of 
state authorities to protection from physical injuries" (Reeves v. Besonen, 1991, p. 1139). 
The participation in an activity hosted by the State or under guidance of a state official 
did not provide the participant protection from injury and/or equate to a violation of 
constitutional rights by suffering injury. The participant must acknowledge their own 
voluntary status in the participation in an activity, otherwise there would be no difference 
between state activities and constitutional protections. The court specified here that the 
coach of the team could not be held responsible for the actions of the student participants 
when he did not have knowledge of these actions. State actors are not mandated to protect 
individuals from injury just because the individuals are under their care. The resulting 
decision is that if a state actor performs their assigned duties, they maintain their status of 
qualified immunity even if the actions they are charged with supervising result in the 
injury of a student under their care. 
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 Meeker v. Edmundson (2005) highlights an incident of hazing where the coach of 
a high school wrestling team did not maintain qualified immunity. Edmundson utilized 
physical assaults carried out by older members of the wrestling team to haze the weaker 
members of the team. The court acknowledged that Edmundson’s actions of using 
physical violence to remove students from his wrestling team clearly violated those 
students’ constitutional rights to due process and right to a fair disciplinary proceeding 
(Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005). The defendant argued that he did not have a duty to 
protect Meeker from violence conducted by another person and claimed qualified 
immunity as a state actor. The court disagreed with his defense stating: 
The law is clearly established for qualified immunity purposes not only when ‘the 
very action in question has previously been held unlawful,’ but also when ‘pre-
existing law’ makes the ‘unlawfulness’ of the act apparent. The question is 
whether a reasonable educator could have believed that repeatedly instituting the 
unprovoked and painful beatings of one of his students was lawful, in light of 
clearly established law. (Meeker v. Edmundson, 2005, p. 323)  
 
The court found that these beatings were unlawful, and the law clearly provided guidance 
relevant to this ruling. Edmundson’s actions in ordering the beatings of his students 
vacated his qualified immunity status. For Edmundson, his actions in ordering the 
physical assaults led directly to the injury of the student in his care and his status as a 
state employee did not allow him to willfully conduct unlawful acts. 
 The decision in Pelham v. Board of Regents (2013) explored in further depth the 
issue of coaches using fighting as a means of hazing new members of the team. The facts 
state that Pelham was a member of the football team at Georgia Southern University and 
was injured at football practice when the “head coach ordered Pelham and other players 
to fight each other during practice” (Pelham v. Board of Regents, 2013, p. 791). The 
lower court dismissed the claims relying on Georgia Tort Claims Act, OGCA § 50-21-20 
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et seq. (GTCA). In the GTCA, there is an assault and battery exception and this exception 
“has been interpreted to mean that where a loss results from assault and battery, there is 
no waiver of sovereign immunity, even though a private individual or entity would be 
liable under like circumstances” (Pelham v. Board of Regents, 2013, p. 794). This 
exception barred plaintiff claims against the coach and against the Board of Regents as 
the facts allege an assault by a third party fellow student and not at the hands of the coach 
himself. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court and provided this 
important distinction in reviewing hazing cases that allege assault and battery. In the state 
of Georgia, there is an exception provided for assault carried out by a third party. This 
exception allows a state actor to maintain their qualified immunity in the case of an 
assault if the assault was carried out by a third party. 
 Qualified Immunity carries with it a difficult set of standards to apply across state 
lines. The courts must be aware of the individual state regulations for qualified immunity 
and the special exceptions provided within the state. The doctrine of qualified immunity 
provides a few characteristics to be aware of: (1) is the individual a state actor, (2) is the 
state actor performing the duties associated with the job for which they are employed, (3) 
is the action in question a clear violation of a law, and (4) are there special considerations 
within the state that provide further guidance for the action. The courts will use these 
guidelines to make decisions in cases claiming qualified immunity. 
 Assault and battery. The cases of, Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire (1980), 
Helton v. State of Indiana (1993), and Ex Parte Smith (2006) have provided guidance in 
claims of assault and battery following an incident of hazing. The major components of 
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these cases are 1) risk of injury versus result in injury, and 2) applicable state statute. The 
following is the progression of the cases. 
 Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire (1980) first explored the difference between 
intent to injure and an action resulting in injury following a hazing case in this era. The 
Court of Appeals of New York identified that defendants’ actions of wrapping Maines in 
a blanket, carrying him to a dumpster and throwing him inside the dumpster were 
intentionally taken upon plaintiff Maines despite his protestations. This represented a 
string of intentional actions that, while not intending to injure the plaintiff, were engaged 
in knowingly by the defendants and resulted in injury. 
The court takes up the idea of intent to injure versus intent to engage in an action 
that may cause injury, stating,  
The complaint could be interpreted as alleging that the individual defendants in 
throwing plaintiff into the dumpster committed an intentional assault upon him; 
moreover, plaintiff need not allege that defendants intended to bring about the 
harmful consequences that ensued, since the complaint in an action against a co-
employee for an assault committed outside the scope of the co-employee's 
employment need only allege deliberate intent or conscious choice to do the act 
which results in the injury. (Maines v. Cronomer Valley Fire, 1980, p. 538) 
 
The intentional act of restraining the plaintiff and throwing him in the dumpster resulted 
in the injury to the plaintiff. This original intent to engage in the activity constitutes a 
violation of the assault statute and highlights the important characteristic in considering 
assault charges after an incident of hazing. Helton v. State of Indiana (1993) further 
supports this position that the important characteristic when considering assault and 
battery in a case of hazing is the intent to engage in the activity, not the intent to injure. 
Rarely does one come across a hazing case where the alleged entered the activity with an 
intent to injure the victim, but these cases commonly show intent to engage in the hazing. 
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 Ex Parte Smith (2004) examined the application of aggravated assault as a charge 
following an incident of hazing in lieu of the charge of hazing. The Court of Appeals of 
Texas Fifth Circuit stated 
There is a valid statute under which the aggravated assault protection is being 
brought. Appellant does not raise a challenge that would render his prosecution 
void. He does not assert the aggravated assault statute is unconstitutional on its 
face or that the prosecution is barred by the statute of limitations. (Ex Parte Smith, 
2004, p. 172) 
  
The court opinion was that despite there being a statute for hazing which may also cover 
the offense in question, the prosecution has the right to choose which offense to charge 
the defendant with. The facts of the case alleged that the defendant violated the statute of 
aggravated assault as well as hazing, and aggravated assault carrying a stricter penalty 
was the charge brought to trial.  
 The decision of the prosecution to charge an alleged perpetrator with assault and 
battery, hazing, aggravated assault, kidnapping, criminal recklessness, or other applicable 
charge is not limited by the availability of a hazing statute in the state. The court supports 
the decision of the prosecution to bring forth charges based on the violations alleged, and 
the presence of a hazing statute does not limit the available charges of the prosecution.  
 Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972. Violations of Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments of 1972 following an incident of hazing have different fact 
patterns based on the specific allegation in the case. Most often, the hazing itself is not 
considered to be a violation of Title IX as seen in the case of Greenfield v. Michigan 
State University (1996). In Greenfield (1996) the court determined that while the 
activities engaged in were offensive and gross, to meet the criteria for a claim of sexual 
harassment the complaint must allege “conduct of the same nature as sexual advances or 
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sexual favors” (Greenfield v. Michigan State, 1996, p. 5). The use of sexual innuendo, 
offensive language, and exposure of genitalia in the hazing did not necessarily result in 
sexual harassment because the actions were not eliciting sexual advances. (This was also 
evidenced in Seamons v. Snow (1996)). 
In Mentavlos v. Anderson (2000), the court opinion to dismiss claims of Title IX 
violations was based on two main points: 1) the defendants in question are not state 
actors, and 2) there was no evidence to support gender-based harassment (Mentavlos v. 
Anderson, 2000 & 2001). Mentavlos (2000) showed that hazing is not a violation of Title 
IX unless it can be proven that the victim was hazed because of their status as a female 
(or male). Additionally, if the perpetrators in the hazing are not state actors or acting on 
behalf of the state, it cannot be shown that a hostile environment was created.  
Roe v. Gustine Unified School District (2009) was the only case to show a 
potential violation of Title IX by a school district, and the court used the tests for school 
district liability of sexual harassment from Reese, 208 F.3d at 739: 
1. The school district must exercise substantial control over both the harassed 
and the context in which the known harassment occurs, 
2. The plaintiff must suffer sexual harassment…that is so severe, pervasive and 
objectively offensive that it can be said to deprive the victim of access to the 
educational opportunities or benefits provided by the school, 
3. The school district must have actual knowledge of the harassment, and 
4. The school district’s deliberate indifference subjects its students to 
harassment. (Roe v. Gustine Unified School District, 2009, p. 1025) 
 
The presence of these factors in the Roe (2009) case successfully alleged a potential 
violation of Title IX by the school district but dismissed the case against the individual 
state actors, as individuals cannot be held accountable for creating hostile environments. 
However, this is not specific to hazing and is generally applicable to school districts for 
all allegations of harassment and Title IX violations. This body of law relevant to Title IX 
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is less likely to be applied by the courts following an incident of hazing, as claims in this 
area most often involve the use of sexual humor, exposure of genitalia, harassing 
comments of a sexual nature and other offensive contact as methods of hazing, but the 
episodic behavior does not meet the thresholds set by the courts for violations of Title IX. 
Legislation as a Response to Hazing Incidents 
 Based on the data provided by the review of these cases, there is no evidence to 
support the argument that the creation of stricter anti-hazing laws would result in the 
reduction of the number of hazing incidents that occur in the United States or beyond. 
The states of Florida and Texas have perhaps the most well-written, comprehensive, and 
strict hazing laws within the United States; however, the presence of stricter legislation 
has not resulted in more cases alleging hazing in those states or more convictions of 
hazing in those states. Across the body of 167 cases between 1980-2013, only 35 cases 
alleged violations of the state hazing statute. This low number of cases argued in courts 
versus the pronounced number of people who experience hazing each year (Allen & 
Madden, 2008, showed that over 50% of students involved in a student organization at 
the collegiate level experienced hazing) shows that hazing laws do not increase the 
number of hazing incidents reported, or the likelihood that a prosecutor would bring a 
charge of hazing following an incident of hazing. 
 Stricter anti-hazing legislation often follows a significant injury or death of a 
student at an institution of higher education and is written with the goal of criminalizing 
the behavior that leads to the injury or death. Florida’s legislation deemed the “Chad 
Meredith Act” added criminal felony charges as an option for prosecution if the result of 
an incident of hazing is the death of the victim (Fla. Stat. §§1006.63, 135). The addition 
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of felony charges certainly makes hazing a costlier act to engage in, but there is no 
evidence to support that criminalizing the behavior would alter the use of hazing in new 
member processes. A more likely reason states adopt stricter anti-hazing legislation 
following a hazing death is that passing a law gives the community a sense of “doing 
something” about the death of a student.  
 A more effective strategy for legislatures to consider could be to adopt more 
uniform definitions of hazing in their legislation and to broaden the applicability of the 
law to more organizations than just student groups and institutions of higher education. 
The goal of the legislation does not have to be the criminalization of the behavior, but 
more the protection of the citizenry that sees hazing appear more often today in middle 
and high schools than it did 10 years ago (Nuwer, 2013). Laws that in some states are 
only applicable to institutions of higher education have no ability to prevent hazing on 
sports teams and in student organizations at a middle school level. These incidents of 
hazing may be “minor” in comparison to the forced alcohol consumption and physical 
assault of incidents of hazing in college, but the learned behaviors are the same. Absent 
the guidance in the creation of appropriate methods of welcoming new members into an 
organization or onto a team, individuals may seek inappropriate methods of creating 
group norms (McCreary, 2012). It is more important that our legislatures direct guidance 
and resources to teachers, coaches, and advisors than it is to create a larger body of 
criminals in our penal system. Guidance can be provided through clearly written, uniform 
definitions of hazing and setting expectations of oversight and engagement of educators 
and coaches at all levels of youth interaction. 
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Application of Other Criminal Statutes 
 The research from this body of case law shows that other laws may be more 
applicable in the adjudication of hazing, but not necessarily criminal laws. The cases 
reviewed in this study only revealed 22 cases where criminal charges were brought to 
court following an incident of hazing. The logical answer to the question is that 
prosecutors should bring forward the most appropriate charges based on the evidence and 
facts of the cases as incidents of hazing may involve assault and battery, kidnapping, 
sexual assault, manslaughter, criminal recklessness, and other like crimes. The reality of 
this body of case law showed that civil charges are more often presented before the 
courts, and the issues of Tort Liability and Negligence cover more than half of all cases 
during this time. 
 The issue with the criminalization of hazing and the applicability of other criminal 
charges is proving the intent of the crime committed. As shown in the cases of assault 
and battery, the act of hazing is engaged in intentionally by the perpetrator, but the intent 
to injure is not often present. Further research on the background of each potentially 
applicable crime in a hazing incident should be done to determine the threshold at which 
the crime is committed before determining if those other available charges are more 
applicable. This study can inform prosecutors of criminal acts when hazing is alleged to 
evaluate other criminal acts for their applicability in each scenario.  
Limitations of Available Data 
 It is important to note that this study focuses solely on legal opinions of judges 
following incidents of hazing heard in a court of law. This data required that an allegation 
of hazing or injury following hazing be filed with a court, adjudicated in a trial court (or 
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civil court), and appealed to a District Court or higher for a judicial opinion to be 
rendered. This data is not inclusive of all cases filed in a court of law during this 
timeframe, as those cases that are settled by the defendant pre-trial (and generally sealed), 
or those cases where the defendant pled guilty are not (and could not) be included in this 
study. Therefore, it is likely that there are other cases in this timeframe that were heard in 
a trial court or were alleged in a court of law that could have been applicable that were 
not reviewed. The existence of these other cases could have different implications for the 
applicability of anti-hazing legislation within the courts. 
 Another limitation of this study is the use of keyword searches in Westlaw and 
LexisNexis databases as the keywords only reveal cases containing those specific 
charges. In this study the main keyword search included all variations of the word hazing 
(including haz!, haze, hazing, hazed) but did not expand to searches specifically focused 
on assault, battery, kidnapping, sexual assault, and others. There is a possibility that other 
incidents of hazing have been heard in a court of law where the word hazing was not used 
in the case log and would not have been found with the existing keyword search. 
Shepardizing and citating were used extensively to cut down on this possibility, but it still 
exists.  
Implications and Recent Developments 
 Since 2013 an additional 20 hazing related deaths have occurred in the United 
States and 19 of them were associated with a Greek letter organization (Nuwer, 2018). 
Many of these deaths are still being adjudicated in the court system at the time of this 
writing. The research of this study shows that the criminal application of anti-hazing law 
has not provided a large enough body of cases to prove its effectiveness. The number of 
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civil cases heard in the courts following an incident of hazing is more than double that of 
criminal cases, yet the number of successful civil cases across the 33 years of this study 
serves as only a fraction of a percent of the number of hazing incidents that occur each 
year (based on Allen & Madden’s 2008 report). 
The question remains then who is responsible for addressing hazing. This section 
will focus on recent developments associated with legislative responses to hazing and 
potential institutional responses to hazing (including new developments in the legal 
system). 
New Developments in Legislation 
 Three student deaths between 2014-2017 have resulted in new developments in 
legislation in three different state legislatures. South Carolina, Pennsylvania, and 
Louisiana state legislatures have each taken up discussion on new legislation following 
the deaths of Tucker Hipps at Clemson University (2014), Tim Piazza at Pennsylvania 
State University (2017), and Max Gruver at Louisiana State University (2017). The 
legislation in Pennsylvania and Louisiana looks to increase the penalties associated with 
existing anti-hazing law while legislation in South Carolina expands the transparency of 
transgressions against fraternities and sororities at institutions of higher education in 
South Carolina (Biemiller, 2018; SC statute 59-101-210, 2015). These three new pieces 
of legislation represent a continuation of the responsive thinking of state legislatures to 
hazing deaths within their states where the immediate course of action is to increase the 
penalty for committing an act of hazing in hopes that fear of punishment will alter 
behavior. A brief discussion of the history of each incident and the resulting legislation 
follows. 
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 Tucker Hipps Law. Tucker Hipps was a freshman at Clemson University in the 
Fall of 2014 when he mysteriously fell to his death from the “S.C. 93 bridge over the 
Seneca River at Lake Hartwell” (Monk & Cahill, 2015 online). The fall was allegedly the 
result of a confrontation between Tucker and one of the upperclassmen members of 
Sigma Phi Epsilon during a required early morning pledge run. The confrontation 
resulted because “Tucker had not gotten McDonalds’ breakfasts for 27 pledges that 
morning” (Monk & Cahill, 2015 online) and the upperclassman was angry with Tucker. 
After completing the run, the fraternity members waited several hours to report Tucker’s 
missing body to authorities and the months following the investigation revealed attempts 
by the fraternity to cover up the hazing and the activities that led to Tucker’s death on the 
morning in question. The Hipps family subsequently filed a “$50 million lawsuit against 
Clemson University, Sigma Phi Epsilon Fraternity and three fraternity brothers” (Monk 
& Cahill, 2015 online). The South Carolina state legislature subsequently took up new 
legislation in fall 2015 to address the transparency of fraternity and sorority 
transgressions. 
 In June 2016 the South Carolina state legislature passed the Tucker Hipps 
Transparency Act which took effect in the 2016-2017 academic year. The act stated: 
Public institutions of higher learning…shall maintain reports of actual findings of 
certain misconduct by members of fraternities and sororities formally associated 
with the institution, to specify information that must be included and must be 
excluded, to provide requirements for updating and preserving reports, to provide 
members of the public may seek redress for suspected violations under the 
freedom of information act. (SC stat. 59-101-210) 
 
Most important in this legislation is the requirement of institutions of higher education in 
the State of South Carolina to make public all information related to fraternity and 
sorority misconduct. The basis of this law is the belief that students and parents will 
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utilize the conduct reports produced by the universities relating to the past misconduct of 
the fraternities and sororities to make informed decisions about joining a specific 
organization. Additionally, there is belief that the law will keep fraternities and sororities 
from engaging in misbehavior for fear of that behavior being made public. While these 
are noble claims, there exists little evidence that the publication of these conduct reports 
has had any impact on the decision making of students and parents regarding the joining 
of certain organizations or on the behavior of fraternities and sororities. Also, of note is 
the exclusion of all other student organizations from the mandated reporting. This 
omission maintains a narrow view that hazing only occurs in fraternities and sororities on 
a college campus and ignores existing research that hazing occurs across all student 
organizations and athletic teams. (Allen & Madden, 2008).  
 Max Gruver Act. Max Gruver was a freshman at Louisiana State University in 
the Fall of 2017 when he died from asphyxiation following a night of forced alcohol 
consumption at the Phi Delta Theta fraternity house (Crisp, 2018). The fraternity 
conducted a ritual they titled Bible Study which required new members of the fraternity 
to consume 190-proof liquor while responding to questions about the fraternity’s history. 
Gruver died while sleeping on the fraternity sofa and toxicology reports later revealed 
that Gruver had a blood alcohol level of .495 (legal driving limit .08). The state 
legislature of Louisiana has since taken up multiple pieces of legislation to address 
hazing, including the Max Gruver Act (Louisiana House Bill No. 78, 2018) which was 
passed by a vote of 87-0 in the House of Representatives in March of 2018.  
 The Max Gruver Act increases the penalties for hazing in the State of Louisiana. 
In cases where hazing results in death, the possible penalties for an individual were 
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increased to fines up to $10,000 and/or up to five years in prison (Crisp, 2018). For 
organizations who contributed to the death of a student following an incident of hazing, 
penalties are also increased up to $10,000 in fines. The hope of the House of 
Representatives in Louisiana is that the increase in penalty for incidents of hazing will 
further deter organizations and citizens from participating in hazing activities.  
The Louisiana State Senate also heard recent legislation regarding hazing 
activities within the state including Senate Bill 91. This bill included penalties for 
“anyone found responsible for a hazing-related death could face additional civil penalties. 
That could include penalties for individual perpetrators, as well as universities and 
national chapters of organizations that don’t have clear anti-hazing policies” (Crisp, 2018 
online). This legislation could have additional impact for national fraternal organizations 
if their anti-hazing policies are deemed to be unclear; however, the bill does not outline 
what the threshold for clarity is. Regardless it is clear that the State of Louisiana will be 
passing additional legislation under the 2018 Spring General Session. Given the current 
provisions of the bills being heard and the research included in this study it would not 
appear that increasing penalty for hazing will have the intended impact of preventing 
hazing in the state. There are other pieces of anti-hazing legislation being considered in 
Louisiana that increase provisions for hazing education and prevention activities, but 
none have gained enough support to schedule a formal hearing (Crisp, 2018). 
Timothy Piazza Antihazing Law. Timothy Piazza was a 19-year-old sophomore 
at Pennsylvania State University in the Spring of 2017 when he died of “severe head and 
abdominal injuries after falling several times” (Scolforo, 2018) at the Beta Theta Pi 
fraternity house following the acceptance of his bid into the fraternity. The death of Tim 
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Piazza began a criminal investigation into the activities associated with the Beta Theta Pi 
fraternity that resulted in fraternity members charged with involuntary manslaughter, 
reckless endangerment and hazing. Many of these charges were initially dismissed from 
court in September 2017 preliminary hearings and again in March 2018 hearings 
following the discovery of new evidence. This court case has gained extensive news 
coverage and national attention since it began in 2017 (Biemiller, 2018). In March 2018 
the Judiciary Committee of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania took up the Timothy 
J. Piazza Antihazing Law for discussion (Penn. Stat. SB 1090 PN1583). 
The proposed Pennsylvania law combines some of the recent efforts of the State 
of South Carolina and the State of Louisiana by outlining mandated reports regarding 
incidents of hazing and increasing the penalties associated with serious bodily injury or 
death following incidents of hazing. This legislation creates a new category of criminal 
code for aggravated hazing which occurs when hazing results in serious bodily injury 
and has the penalty of being a felony in the State of Pennsylvania. Additionally, the new 
legislation outlines the definition of organizational hazing which too carries increased 
penalties. Among the penalties for organizational hazing is the potential forfeiture of 
assets (including property) that was used during the hazing (Penn. Stat. SB 1090 
PN1583).  
The inclusion of forfeiture of property is an interesting take on organizational 
penalties. If passed through the state legislature and upheld by the courts, the forfeiture of 
property could result in fraternities and sororities (or other organizations) losing houses 
and other properties that carry significant value following an incident of hazing. On 
paper, this appears to be a significant inclusion, but like the case of Kruger v. Phi Gamma 
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Delta (2001) and other fraternity hazing cases, finding a defendant for the case may 
prove difficult. In most instances after a significant injury or death resulting from hazing, 
the fraternal organization is suspended or disbanded as an unincorporated association 
within the state. Once the association dissolves, some states do not provide an available 
recourse to the injured party as no one is available to stand trial and represent the 
organization in court as the individual membership status has either been suspended or 
revoked. The national organization for the fraternity may stand trial, but the research of 
this study showed that courts have been reluctant to hold national fraternal organizations 
accountable for the day-to-day operations of the local fraternity chapter unless it can be 
proven that the national organization had prior knowledge that similar transgressions 
existed. It will be interesting to see how Pennsylvania courts respond to future incidents 
of hazing with the inclusion of forfeiture of property in the proposed Timothy J. Piazza 
Antihazing Law.  
Upon further review. One Pennsylvania state court took a different approach in 
the response to hazing in a January 2018 decision by state judge Margherita Patti-
Worthington. This judge issued a ruling to ban a fraternity from operating within the 
State of Pennsylvania for a period of ten years (Thomason, 2018). The decision came 
after the 2013 death of Chun Hsein Deng at Baruch College where five men were 
charged initially with third-degree murder. Four of the men charged pled guilty to 
voluntary manslaughter and had sentences reduced to two years in prison, while the 
fraternity was acquitted of the murder charges.  
This court ruling has quite possibly the greatest potential impact as a response to 
incidents of hazing in fraternities and sororities. Should the ten-year ban be upheld, this 
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could mean that other fraternal organizations (operating in Pennsylvania) could face 
similar penalties. Transferring this decision to the Timothy Piazza case, if another 
Pennsylvania court were to apply the outcome of the Deng case to the case against Beta 
Theta Pi, the national organization would face the potential of losing five additional 
chapters in the State of Pennsylvania and 283 total current undergraduate members 
(beta.org, 2018). The financial impact of those losses on a national fraternal organization 
would be significant. Additionally, the loss of those chapters could impact property 
ownership on each of those campuses, and future startup costs should Beta Theta Pi be 
allowed to reopen chapters after the ten-year ban was lifted. While having limited impact 
on the prevention of hazing, a penalty of this nature could cause a significant shift in the 
fraternity and sorority industry.  It is doubtful that this penalty would be upheld through 
the State Supreme Court (or US Supreme Court) as there would likely be First 
Amendment implications (freedom of association) but it will be interesting to follow. 
Legislators looking to make a difference on the issue of hazing would benefit 
from exploring the impact of the existence of a law on the decision making of those 
engaging in the illegal behavior. This study does not dive into that topic but does show 
that hazing law is not being regularly applied by the courts and that incidents of hazing 
continue to occur despite the existence of anti-hazing legislation. It is likely the 
population these laws are created to protect do not see the existence of law as being a 
deterrent from engaging in high risk behaviors. One need not look hard to find statistics 
on 16-24-year-old male and females engaging in illegal behavior such as underage 
drinking, contributing to the delinquency of a minor, use of marijuana or other narcotics, 
and hazing. Further criminalization of these behaviors may not be the most appropriate 
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response to increase the safety and security of this population. Legislatures may be better 
served to lean on existing research to inform practices for educators to engage in effective 
prevention techniques as outlined by Dr. Linda Langford in her 2008 paper A 
Comprehensive Approach to Hazing Prevention in Higher Education Settings where she 
outlines the need for colleges to utilize a public health approach (as successfully applied 
to alcohol prevention and violence prevention) to examine the culture of hazing and 
create solutions to prevent hazing from occurring in the first place. This does not exclude 
the need for a criminal or civil response to incidents of hazing that result in significant 
injury or loss, but those mechanisms are already in place. 
Institutional Responses to Hazing 
 Continuing this dialogue, this section will focus on implications and 
developments for institutional responses to hazing. Included here will be: (1) descriptions 
and recommendations for the use of the court tests for the application of Title IX law to 
incidents of hazing institutionally, (2) information regarding the recent California 
Supreme Court decision in Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court of 
Los Angeles (2018) and its implications for institutions of higher education, (3) a brief 
examination of the current climate of institutional responses to fraternity and sorority 
hazing incidents and (4) a brief expansion on the call for campuses to engage in hazing 
prevention work. 
 Application of Title IX tests for institutional response. On April 4, 2011 the 
Department of Education through the Office of Civil Rights sent communication to 
institutions of higher education providing guidance for the new application of Title IX 
regulations to institutions receiving federal funding (Larkin, 2016). The letter specifically 
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outlined that institutions of higher education would be required to take immediate action 
if the institution knew or should have known that student on student harassment and/or 
sexual violence was occurring (Ali, 2011). This letter enforced the expectation of the 
federal government that colleges and universities could not ignore gender-based 
harassment on their campuses and led to the creation of many new policies and protocols 
at individual institutions for response to Title IX issues (Larkin, 2016).  
 The Office of Civil Rights (OCR) and Department of Education reinforced this 
message by engaging in investigations of Title IX violations on college campuses across 
the country. Since the April 2011 letter was sent to colleges and universities, The 
Chronicle of Higher Education has tracked 458 OCR investigations into violations of 
Title IX and only 121 of those investigations have been resolved to date (Title IX, 2018). 
This increased attention on investigations has placed a significant emphasis on college 
and university handling of Title IX allegations and has improved the likelihood that a fair 
and balanced hearing for allegations of harassment and assault will occur on most college 
campuses. 
 This background is important to hazing as the application of Title IX tests to 
institutions of higher education are the same as those applied when institutions have been 
found liable by the courts for violations of hazing; namely, (1) did the institution have 
prior knowledge of incidents of hazing, (2) did the institution appropriately investigate 
these prior incidents, (3) was the injury to the plaintiff foreseeable and (4) did the 
institution work appropriately to prevent the foreseeable injury. The federal government’s 
pressure on institutions of higher education to apply the questions of prior knowledge, 
investigation, foreseeability, and prevention to Title IX and the historical application of 
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these same questions to institutions of higher education by the courts identifies an 
opportunity for colleges and universities to be held accountable for any existing non-
attention to incidents of hazing on their campus. This study should serve to inform 
institutions of higher education that appropriate attention should be paid to all reported 
incidents and suspected incidents of hazing on the college campus.  
The major difference today is that no federal agency is placing emphasis on 
hazing as a systemic issue across colleges and universities and no agency (other than the 
courts) is holding colleges and universities accountable for their non-attention to the issue 
of hazing. It is also clear that, at some institutions, attention will not be paid to the issue 
of hazing until an agency with the ability to threaten funding holds those institutions 
accountable for their non-action as is indicated by some colleges and universities 
retracting their Obama-era responses to Title IX because the new presidential 
administration has indicated that Title IX response is no longer a major focal area for the 
Office of Civil Rights (Larkin, 2016). Prior behavior suggests that without agency 
mandate and until a critical mass of college students are seriously injured or killed due to 
hazing, colleges and universities will not universally pay appropriate attention to the 
prevention of this issue.  
Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court of Los Angeles (2018). 
A recent decision by the Supreme Court of California could have significant impact on 
the relationship colleges and universities have with their students going forward. In this 
case, the California Supreme Court determined that a university “has a special 
relationship with their students and a duty to protect them from foreseeable violence 
during curricular activities” (Regents v. Superior Court, 2018 p. 2). The decision of the 
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court outlines specifically how the relationship between a student and the university 
meets the court definition of special by meeting the tests of (1) dependency, (2) control, 
(3) boundaries, and (4) benefit. The decision leaves open-ended the definition of 
curricular and activities closely related to the delivery of educational services and a 
concurring opinion is provided in the case outlining the problems with leaving these 
terms undefined. 
The case in question involves the attack of a student known to the university for 
having potential mental health concerns including auditory hallucinations and paranoid 
thoughts (Regents v. Superior Court, 2018). The student in question had shown behavior 
related to possible violence and had informed his teaching assistant that a specific student 
(Rosen, the future victim) in his chemistry lab was a potential harasser (though given the 
attacker’s mental health concerns, the harassment was likely a result of the hallucinations 
and paranoia). Within two days of reporting a specific person to the teaching assistant, 
the student attacked the victim while in chemistry class with a knife, stabbing the victim 
twice. The victim sued the university for negligence established by a special relationship 
and alleging that:  
UCLA had a special relationship with her as an enrolled student, which entailed a 
duty ‘to take reasonable protective measures to ensure her safety against violent 
attacks and otherwise protect her from reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct, to 
warn her as to such reasonable foreseeable criminal conduct on its campus and in 
its buildings, and/or to control the reasonably foreseeable wrongful acts of third 
parties/other students.’ (Regents v. Superior Court, 2018 p. 7) 
 
The Supreme Court of California agreed with the victim that the university was engaged 
in a special relationship with its students and that the relationship created the duty alleged 
by the victim. 
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 The California court’s decision relies on Furek v. Delaware (1991) as one of the 
cases that helps establish the special relationship between the college and the student 
highlighting that many aspects of student life are influenced by the university. This 
influence extends both inside and outside the classroom and because of the special 
relationship between the university and the student, the university has a duty to protect 
students against foreseeable harm and violence.  
 Despite this special relationship, the Supreme Court does acknowledge that there 
are many parts of a student’s life that the university has no control over. Those areas 
where the university lacks control set the boundaries for the relationship between the 
student and the university. “Colleges generally have little say in how students behave off 
campus, or in their social activities unrelated to school. It would be unrealistic for 
students to rely on their college for protection in these settings” (Regents v. Superior 
Court, 2018 p. 18). This statement by the court acknowledges that expecting a university 
to control student social behavior off campus is unrealistic but leaves open interpretation 
regarding how far a university’s control may extend. “Colleges are in a special 
relationship with their enrolled students only in the context of school-sponsored activities 
over which the college has some measure of control” (Regents v. Superior Court, 2018 p. 
18). 
 It is this last statement that raises significant questions for colleges and 
universities as it relates to institutional responses to hazing behavior. The California court 
waivers on defining exactly the boundary of institutional control over student behavior. 
In one sentence the court defines the relationship as it relates to “curricular activities” 
(Regents v. Superior Court, 2018 p. 2) and in another sentence defining the relationship 
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“in the context of school sponsored activities” (p. 18). If the relationship is confined to 
the boundary of the curriculum then universities would likely not be implicated in 
expanding the relationship to include control over the foreseeability of hazing; however, 
if the relationship is expanded to include school sponsored activities then the university 
may be compelled to take more action related to the foreseeability of hazing and the 
impact hazing can have on a student’s safety. 
 The decision in Regents v. Superior Court (2018) feels like an extension of 
previous court decisions in Furek (1991), Knoll (1999), and Brueckner (1999) where 
universities were determined to have liability for injuries related to hazing. Universities 
would be well suited to heed the advice of the court in Regents v. Superior Court (2018) 
and “take reasonable steps to protect students when it becomes aware of a foreseeable 
threat to their safety. The reasonableness of a school’s actions in response to a potential 
threat [will be] a question of breach” (p. 29). While hazing in specific organizations 
mostly remains a secret from colleges and universities, the likelihood of hazing occurring 
in organizations, clubs, and teams is not a secret. Data presented in this study showcases 
that hazing is an occurrence in many organizations (Allen & Madden, 2008). The threat 
of injury because of hazing is not as high, but it is foreseeable. The California Supreme 
Court decision in Regents should lead universities to engage more in the prevention and 
education of students around the topic of hazing. 
 Institutional responses to fraternity misbehavior. Hazing is not a fraternity 
issue alone; the research conducted by Allen and Madden (2008) showed that student 
athletes were just as likely to experience hazing as fraternity men, yet when a student is 
killed or injured by hazing, it is most likely to be a fraternity man that is the victim. The 
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fall of 2017 extended this likelihood as three university campuses faced tragedy 
following the hazing deaths of fraternity men (Biemiller, 2018). These incidents led to 
the temporary suspension of fraternity and sorority life at Florida State University, 
Louisiana State University and Texas State University. This does not encompass all 
suspensions of fraternity and sorority life within the past year as a quick internet search 
for fraternity community suspensions returned information about the University of 
Michigan, Ohio State University, the University of Kansas, and Indiana University. This 
modus operandi of universities identifies a significant behavioral issue amongst the 
national fraternity and sorority community. 
 Related to this study, colleges and universities should expect to be held more 
accountable for their control over the fraternity and sorority community. As incidents of 
hazing continue to result in the injury and death of college students, courts are likely to 
put more pressure upon colleges and universities to exert more control over the behavior 
of their students. This could lead to college and university presidents examining the value 
fraternities add to the college environment (provision of leadership, provision of student 
housing, alumni donations, et al.) and weighing that value against the cost of fraternity 
misbehavior (negative media presence, cost of staffing, use of university resources, cost 
of university response, et al.). The argument can be made that fraternities continued use 
of hazing as a means of bringing a new member into their organization will lead to 
universities refusing to recognize fraternities as legitimate associated student 
organizations (Biemiller, 2018). 
 Institutional engagement in hazing prevention work. Mentioned previously in 
this study is the work of Dr. Linda Langford as outlined in her 2008 paper A 
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Comprehensive Approach to Hazing Prevention in Higher Education Settings. Dr. 
Langford applies the framework of prevention as utilized in public health settings to the 
issue of hazing in colleges and universities. The paper argues that colleges and 
universities should be using the same tactics in the prevention of hazing as the tactics 
currently being utilized on college campuses in the prevention of sexual assault, alcohol 
abuse, and physical violence. These tactics include looking at hazing as both episodic but 
also as a product of the culture and environment of the institution. The traditional 
institutional response to hazing looks only at the incident. Dr. Langford’s model 
encourages the institution to look at all incidents of hazing within the institution to 
develop strategies and tactics to address the whole of the problem, not just one specific 
episodic issue. 
 Utilizing this approach to the prevention of hazing, colleges and universities can 
make changes to the overall institutional environment that can stop hazing before it 
occurs. This approach allows colleges and universities to increase the safety of their 
students involved in student organizations and allows the colleges and universities to 
engage the voices of their students, staff, and faculty to discover the factors that allow 
hazing to happen at their institutions. Based on the data of this study, a prevention 
approach is more likely to be successful in addressing hazing then relying on the law to 
be a deterrent to hazing.  
Conclusion 
 This study identified several issues to be considered by the courts following an 
incident of hazing. Many different permutations of case law can be involved including 
civil or criminal implications, violations of an individual’s civil rights, and the 
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protections provided by the United States Constitution, organizational and institutional 
implications for liability and negligence, and legislative implications for the 
constitutionality of the law are all potentially present in a hazing incident. The lack of a 
uniform legal standard for hazing across all states has forced the courts to utilize 
analogical reasoning to examine issues of hazing across state lines, but also across state 
definitions of the act of hazing. This has resulted in different interpretations of hazing in 
different states and fails to provide guidance to organizations and individuals for the 
potential outcomes of a hazing incident. The victims of hazing are left in this scenario 
without clear guidance by case law toward the appropriate process to seek justice for the 
injury(s) they suffered.  
 Despite these challenges, in most instances judges are appalled by the behavior 
presented before them in incidents of hazing and are willing to utilize the law to the 
extent they can to provide justice for the victims of hazing. It is also clear that the youth 
and young adults of the United States will continue to allow themselves to be subjected to 
incidents of hazing for the promise of social status or the acceptance an organization can 
provide to them and the threat of injury or subjection to several types of degradation and 
humiliation are not a deterrent from their willingness to engage in these behaviors. It is 
up to our legislatures, teachers, coaches, advisors, mentors, parents, and other adult 
figures in this country to work diligently to protect this population of youth and young 
adults from welcoming the potential harms of hazing into their lives. We all must 
continue to guide our youth in the appropriate rites of passage into organizations and onto 
teams, so they may avoid the dangers that accompany hazing in their organizations. 
 
Copyright © Christopher Keith Ellis 2018 
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